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PREFACE
The period analyzed in this dissertation was of
crucial importance in the history of Argentina. In the
postwar years, her long commercial and financial
connection with Britain came to an end. Relationships
with the United States became increasingly important for
Argentina, as the Southern country grew more and more
dependent on U.S. capital goods, technology and financial
capital for the implementation of her development
programs. Because of the competitive nature of the
economies of the two countries, it would not be easy for
Argentina to adjust to this new situation.
The relationships between the United States and Latin
America have been the subject of several recent studies,
including those made by Stephen Rabe in his book
Eisenhower and Latin America , and by Thomas Zoumaras in
his doctoral thesis "The Path to Pan Americanism:
Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy Toward Latin
America". These studies have traced the Eisenhower's
Administration transition from a policy based almost
exclusively on the promotion of trade liberalization and
foreign investment as the best solution to the economic
problems that afflicted Latin America to a policy of
increased aid through loans. But no in depth study of the
relationships between the United States and Argentina
during this period has yet been made. This dissertation
will thus be the first systematic study of this subject
based on extensive archival research of recently opened
documents. Such a study will help us understand the
process by which the above mentioned transition in
Eisenhower's economic policy to Latin America took place,
as well as the effect that this transition had for
countries like Argentina.
The three different regimes that controlled Argentina
during this period attempted, through different economic
programs, to effect the country's transition from a
predominantly agricultural export oriented economy into a
more autonomous and diversified industrial one. These
three governments also tried, through different strategies
and with varying degrees of success, to enlist the
collaboration of U.S. public and private capital for
Argentina's economic development. This dissertation will
test the hypothesis that changes in the nature of the
Argentine regimes from the authoritarian rule of Peron to
the military government of Aramburu or to the
democratically elected Frondizi administration had
relatively little effect on U.S. policies toward that
country. This dissertation will also examine the
combination of domestic and external factors that shaped
the process of Argentina's industrialization during this
period and the ways in which these factors helped promote
or inhibit economic change.
This study is based largely upon sources from the
U.S. National Archives at Washington, D.C.; the Dwight D.
vi
Eisenhower Presidential Library; the John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library and the John Foster Dulles Papers in
the Princeton University Library.
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ABSTRACT
U.S-ARGENTINE RELATIONS IN THE 1950s
FEBRUARY 1992
NORMA D. GONZALEZ, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF RIO CUARTO
M.A.
, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Stephen E. Pelz
The relationships between the United States and
Argentina, traditionally complicated by diplomatic rivalry
in the sphere of inter-American relations and by
commercial difficulties derived from the non-complementary
and often competitive nature of their economies, had
reached their lowest level during World War II. However,
in the aftermath of the war, a combination of
international and domestic developments would lead
Argentina to seek a rapprochement with the United States.
The breakdown of Argentina's long commercial and financial
relationship with Britain combined with its growing
dependence on the United States as a source of capital
goods, technology and financial capital, provided a
powerful incentive for the Southern country to seek an
alliance with Washington. On the other hand, the
opportunity to exert a closer influence on the policies
adopted by Argentina was welcomed by Washington since,
although Argentina was a country of only peripheral
strategic and economic importance for the United States,
the course it followed acguired larger significance for
viii
Washington in the context of its impact on the development
of inter-American relationships. However, although the
circumstances seemed to be favorable for an improved
relationship, the path toward rapprochement would be slow,
difficult and uneven, as a combination of cultural
misunderstandings, persisting stereotypes and structural
economic constraints complicated the efforts made by both
sides to find satisfactory solutions to the problems that
stood between them.
This dissertation is the first systematic study of
the relationships between Argentina and the United States
in the 1950s based on extensive archival research of
recently opened documents. It focuses on the strategies
adopted by three different Administrations led
respectively by Juan D. Peron, the military and Arturo
Frondizi to lead Argentina through the transition to a
more autonomous and diversified industrial economy and on
their efforts to enlist the collaboration of U.S. private
and public capital in this process. It analyzes the ways
in which the Eisenhower Administration responded to the
new opportunities and challenges offered by these
developments in Argentina within the context of inter-
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AN INTRODUCTION TO ARGENTINE HISTORY AND
U.S. -LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS
Between 1860 and 1914, Argentina experienced rapid
and sustained growth, based on a combination of foreign
trade, foreign investment and immigration. Free-trade
liberalism dominated economic thought and Argentine
politics were controlled by a powerful landowning elite.
The country's economy was centered around one basic
activity: the production of huge quantities of
agricultural and cattle products. Argentina's rich
farmlands produced not only the meat and cereals required
for domestic consumption but also huge surpluses for
export abroad. By the early 1900s, Argentina had become
the world's leading exporter of chilled beef, linseed,
corn and oats and the third largest exporter of wheat.
Her agricultural exports were second only to those of the
United States, and they accounted for at least ninety
percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. 1
Great Britain was Argentina's main trading partner.
Britain bought around 4 0 percent of Argentina's exports,
with chilled beef accounting for the largest share, and it
provided 35 percent of Argentina's imports, dominated by
coal and finished metal and textile goods. There was also
a thriving trade with France, Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Italy, which took approximately 50 percent
2of Argentina's total exports, primarily grains, vegetable
oils, quebracho extract, leather. These countries also
supplied around 50 percent of Argentine imports. The
remaining 15 percent came from the United States. 2
Foreign capital played a prominent part in the
development of Argentina. In 1914, foreign investment,
both public and private, represented about half of
Argentina's total capital stocks. Over 60 percent of all
foreign investment in Argentina was British, and it was
concentrated mostly in railroads, meat-packing, public
utilities and government loans. By 1913, British
investment in Argentina was valued at $1,551 million,
followed by investments of $771 million from France, $298
million from Germany, $180 million from Belgium, $80




The strong commitment of Argentina's governing elite
to free-trade liberalism was accompanied by a marked
reluctance to support any efforts to industrialize and the
domestic market was supplied mostly by imported goods.
However, a substantial portion of consumption goods were
produced domestically, particularly in the food
processing, clothing and leather products sectors.
Tariff protection was provided only for a few industries
such as sugar, flour and wine. The remaining industries,
such as the meat-packing plants, were mostly connected
3with processing of rural products for exports and
predominantly owned by foreign firms. 5
By 1914, Argentina was rapidly emerging as a modern
developed nation and contemporary observers predicted a
future of greatness for the Southern country. Per capita
income was higher than in Spain, Italy, Sweden and
Switzerland and large sectors of the population enjoyed a
relatively high standard of living. 6 But Argentina's
prosperity was built on tenuous foundations and the
structural weaknesses in its economy would become
increasingly evident in the changing political and
economic international environment of the postwar . Before
World War I, Argentina imported 60 percent of the
industrial products used in the country and it financed
these imports with its export earnings. This situation
made the Argentine economy particularly vulnerable to
changes in the international environment, since any
decline in the demand for its exports would immediately
reduce the country's capacity to import. Even the
expansion of agricultural output was dependent on imported
agricultural machinery, given the fact that the best land
was already in production. Prospects for an expansion of
the manufacturing sector seemed limited because Argentina
had no heavy or capital goods industry and the country was
almost completely dependent on imported coal. Small
domestic markets limited the possibilities for advanced
technology and economies of scale and access to larger
4foreign markets was difficult, since they were already
dominated by the industrial giants. 7
World War I exposed the structural deficiencies in
Argentina's growth model and created public awareness of
the dangerous effects of the country's excessive
dependence on external markets. Exports and imports fell
drastically and prices of imported goods rose, provoking
inflation and shortages of basic consumption items. A
severe depression followed and unemployment skyrocketed.
Gradually, exports began to recover stimulated by European
war demands, but imports continued to be scarce.
Argentina suffered from severe shortages of metal
products, railway eguipment, machinery and fuel. As a
result of the scarcity of fuel, many factories had to
close down, electric power plants had to reduce output,
and railways had to cut back their operations. Argentina
had to resort to burning large amounts of corn as a
o
substitute for coal.
By 1913, petroleum provided less than 5 percent of
Argentina's energy. The first Argentine oil well had been
discovered by accident in 1907, and a government bureau
had been established to develop the country's oil
resources. But, until 1913, there had been little
progress in domestic oil production and most petroleum
products were provided by a few foreign-owned companies
led by Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso) and Royal Dutch
Shell. These companies also had concessions for
exploration and exploitation of oil, but their production
was insignificant and they obtained their supplies mostly




The growing awareness of the serious consequences of
excessive dependence on foreign energy resources brought
about by the experiences of World War I would lead, in the
1920's, to a decided government effort to expand domestic
production. In 1922, the Radical Party government
reorganized the state oil company Yacimientos Petrol iferos
Fiscales (YPF) and launched an ambitious plan to break the
foreign companies ' monopoly of refining and distribution
through the building of a refinery and the creation of a
distribution and sales network for YPF's products. By the
late 1920' s YPF had become the very symbol of national
economic independence and it attracted powerful political
support
.
World War I also signaled changes in the
international economic system. Britain's position in
world trade and finance began to decline, and the United
States gradually started to take over. As hegemony of the
world economy passed from Britain to the United States,
the export-led model of growth on which Argentina's
prosperity had been based began to lose its dynamism. The
United States' economy was more self-sufficient than that
of Great Britain and, consequently, its import
requirements were lower. This situation would prove
6particularly problematic in the case of Argentina, since
most of her exports were competitive with those of the
United States, and it would be very difficult for her to
open up in
.
i i k ( • t : ; in tin- Noi t ticrn n. it ion. 11
The postwar period also brought about changes in the
composition and direction of investment. British
investment in Argentina came to a halt during the war and
the early postwar period, recovering only slightly in the
late 1920's. The United States became the major source of
postwar foreign i nvest nient . By 1930, U.S. investment in
Argentina had risen to almost one-third of the British
total, having increased from $39 million in 1 9 1 3 to $654
million in 19)1. U.S. investment, previously concentrated
almost entirely in the meatpacking and oil industries, now
went predominantly to utilities and manufacturing of
consumer goods such as automobiles, plastics, tobacco,
radios, household and office equipment • Twenty two
subsidiaries of U.S. manufacturing corporations were
established in Argentina between 1924 and 1933. The First
National Bank of Boston and the First National City Bank
of New York opened their first Latin American branches in
Buenos Aires during this period. Although overall
foreign investment before the war had represented 40
percent of total investment in Argentina, after 1914 its
contribution to capital formation (tee lined to 15 percent
between L920 and L924 and to 10 percent between 1935 and
1939, with domestic capital filling in the d i f f e rence
.
1 2
7Domestic manufacturing began to expand more rapidly
after the war, reaching an annual rate of 2.1 percent.
The Index of industrial prodution rose from 20.3 percent
(Index base, 1950=100) in 1914 to 45.6 in L920. The
1920 's also brought about increased diversification in the
manufacturing of consumer durables, chemicals, electricity
and, particularly, metals. Hut most of the growth in
manufacturing war. in light and traditional industries,
thus continuing the pre-war pattern. In addition, the
expansion ol manufacturing created a new dependence on
imports, since most of the machinery and raw materials
used by industry came from abroad. A growing share of
these imports came from the United States which had begun
to displace Britain as Argentina's main supplier of
automobiles and capital goods for agriculture and
industry. By 1929 imports from the United States, valued
at 4 5 million gold pesos in 19 14, had risen to !>1(>
million. The British share of the Argentine market fell
from 30 percent in L911-1913 to only L9 percent by 1929-
1930, while the United States share increased from 15 to
24 percent. During the same period, imports from
continental Europe fell from 50 to 30 percent. 14
Changes in Argentina's import trade were not
accompanied by a similar reorientation in exports. In the
1920 's, the Argentine government implemented an active
campaign to expand the country's exports to the United
States. This campaign, led by the Argentine Ambassador
8Honorio Pueyrredon with the strong support of Argentine
exporters' associations, was unsuccessful. In the 1920's,
United States farmers, represented by the powerful Farm
Block in the U.S. Senate, succeeded in protecting their
markets through the high tariffs imposed by the Fordney-
McCumber Act. For example, during this period, the U.S.
tariff on combing wool, an important Argentine export, was
60.8 percent; on carpet wool 2 4.2 percent and on linseed,
26.8 percent.
Argentines had expected to increase beef exports to
the United States. In 1924, a San Francisco firm had
bought 200,000 pounds of Argentine beef and had been able
to sell it, after paying customs duties, transport costs
and all other expenses, for ten to fourteen cents a pound
less than meat imported from other countries. Sales of
this volume had raised hopes among Argentine cattlemen
that they could gain access to U.S. markets. These hopes,
however, would be dampened in 1927 when the U.S.
Department of Agriculture prohibited imports of fresh or
refrigerated meats from Argentina on the grounds of hoof-
and-mouth disease (Bureau of Animal Industry, Order 298)
.
As a result of this order, U.S beef imports from Argentina
fell from 1.5 million pounds in 1926 to nothing in 1927.
The U.S. sanitary embargo aroused a good deal of criticism
in Argentina where it was viewed as unfair protectionism
for the benefit of the U.S. cattle industry. The
Argentine press strongly condemned U.S. trade policy and
urged the government to cut down imports from the United
States. 16
By the late 1920 / s, Argentina sold only 9.4 percent
of its products in the United States, and it remained
heavily dependent on its exports to Western Europe,
especially to Britain. After the war, the proportion of
exports that was sent to Britain had risen from 26.1
percent in 1991-1913 to 32.5 percent in 1928-1930. The
trade surplus with Britain served to balance Argentina's
deficit with the United States. However, as imports from
Britain had fallen from 31.0 to 19.8 percent, Argentina
feared that Britain might eventually respond with
discriminatory action, cutting its purchases from
Argentina to relieve its trade deficit. Such fears were
supported by the campaign in progress for Imperial
Preference, the success of which would have given
Argentina's share in the British market to British
Dominion producers such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and South Africa.
Despite these worrisome trends, the Argentine economy
recovered quickly after the war. Per capita income in
Argentina remained higher than in most of Western Europe
and the standard of living rose while illiteracy fell. By
1929, there were more motor vehicles per head of
population in Argentina than in any European country.
However, expansion was less rapid than before the war.
The rate of growth during the years 1899 to 1913 had been
10
almost double that from 1913 to 1929. Export volumes rose
by more than 5 percent a year before 1914 but by only 3.9
percent subsequently, and the annual increase in the
percentage of land under cultivation declined from 8.3
percent to 1.3 percent. Agricultural expansion became
progressively dependent on mechanization. Farming
activities had pretty much fulfilled and exhausted their
role as the leading sector of growth, and the progressive
appearance of structural unemployment was evidence of a
change in comparative advantage. Future growth would
require a shift from land use to more capital-based
activities, such as intensive agriculture and industry.
However, Argentine policy makers, strongly influenced by
laissez-faire, free-trade economic ideology, remained
unwilling to launch an effort to industrialize. °
The crisis of the 1930 's put an end to the era of
prosperity. The period of flexible, open international
trading in which Argentina had prospered was coming to an
end as the great trading nations increasingly began to
move toward policies of economic autarchy and bilateral
trading. Between 1929 and 1933, total world trade
19
declined from 68,598 million gold dollars to 24,173.
The Depression had a strong impact on Argentina, and it
forced the ruling class to reconsider its economic policy.
In 1930, Argentina's export earnings fell by 34 percent as
against the previous year. In 1933, world cereal prices
dropped to their lowest point in forty years. The decline
in the value of Argentina's exports had a drastic effect
on the country's capacity to import. The volume of
imports fell from 13 million tons in 1929 to 6,9 million
tons in 1933. In an effort to deal with the balance of
payments deficit, the Argentine government introduced a
system of exchange controls, import permits and improved
tariff protection for industries considered essential to
domestic consumption. It also established a system of
price supports for rural producers, administered by
regulatory boards which financed production and purchased
surpluses to promote price stability.
The adoption of protectionist measures by the main
trading countries seemed to rule out the possibility of a
return to the level of exports of the 1920 's. In 1933,
Britain adopted Imperial Preference, a system by which it
granted preferential access to products from its dominions
in return for the same concession for its own products.
During the negotiations on Imperial preference, Britain
agreed to proposals from Australia and South Africa to cut
back imports of Argentine beef. The Argentine government,
in a desperate effort to preserve the historic connection
with Britain, sent a team of negotiators to London and a
bilateral trade agreement known as the Roca-Runciman
treaty was concluded by which Britain agreed to continue
admitting the same quantity of Argentine beef as in 1932
in return for Argentina's commitment to reduce tariffs on
almost 350 British products to the rates of 1930 and to
give special treatment to British companies. 2
1
In spite of this temporary solution, the Argentine
government, fearing that the demise of the long connection
with Britain was imminent, made renewed and unsuccessful
efforts to gain access to U.S. markets. In 1930, the
Hawley-Smoot Act had strengthened the barriers to imports
from Argentina by raising tariffs on linseed, corn, wool
and hides and specifically prohibiting imports of meat
from countries infected with foot-and-mouth disease. The
U.S. tariff on combed wool went up to 150 percent and the
tariff on linseed to 74.9 percent. The Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 raised prices of U.S. farm goods
above international levels and, soon after, a ban was
imposed on all foreign farm goods that undersold
domestic.
Argentine government officials made repeated efforts
to negotiate an agreement that would permit U.S. imports
of meat from disease-free areas in Argentina, such as
Tierra del Fuego, under the zone principle which had been
established in the 1928 Sanitary Convention with Mexico.
This solution was endorsed by both President Roosevelt and
the State Department and, in May 1935, U.S. Secretary of
State Cordell Hull submitted to the Senate the draft of a
Sanitary Convention which would have authorized imports of
meat from disease-free zones. U.S. exporters and
manufacturers, led by the National Foreign Trade Council
and the U. S . -Argentine Chamber of Commerce, publicly
endorsed ratification of the Convention, since they
expected that an improved commercial atmosphere between
the two countries would enable them to regain the ground
they had been losing in Argentina as a result of the Roca-
Runciman Treaty and other measures taken by the Argentine
government to alleviate the country's balance of trade
position. Whereas in 1929, the U.S. had supplied 27
percent of Argentina's total imports, Britain 17 percent
and continental Europe 27 percent, by 1935 these
proportions had changed to 25 percent for Britain, 25
percent for continental Europe and 13 percent for the
United States. 23
But the convention met strong opposition from U.S.
cattle raisers and Congressmen from beef-producing states,
who inundated the State Department with letters of
complaint. The State Department's efforts to reduce
opposition to the treaty failed and, at the end of 1936,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull told Argentine negotiators
that, although exclusion of Argentine beef was "an
absurdity", he feared that "certain interests might secure
legislation in Congress defeating our purpose". The
controversial Sanitary Convention never even received
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
and in 1948, at President Truman's reguest, a Senate
resolution was passed formally withdrawing the convention
2 4from consideration.
In spite of Argentina's commercial difficulties, the
economy had started to recover again by 1934. Argentine
grain exports rose again, reaching a record volume in
1936-1937. By the time World War II started, Argentina
supplied approximately 70 percent of the linseed, 20
percent of the wheat, 4 0 percent of the chilled and frozen
meat and 12 percent of the wool in the international
markets for these commodities. 25 Furthermore, after a
period of stagnation caused by the Depression,
manufacturing had also resumed rapid growth. Argentine
manufacturers, stimulated by the demands of Argentine
consumers and a reduced supply of imports, engaged in a
fast process of import substitution and expanded their
production by 54 percent between 1935 and 1945. From 1930
to 1941-1943, manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 3.4
percent, as against only 1.8 percent growth in the rural
sector and, in 1943, the value of industrial production
surpassed that of agriculture for the first time. Between
1935 and 1946, industrial establishments grew from 40,000
to 86,000. However, virtually none of this expansion
involved heavy industry, though it did include machinery,
chemicals and fuels as well as the traditionally dominant
food and textile industries. Moreover, during this
period, industrial establishments remained predominantly
o a.
small in scale.
The growth of manufacturing brought about major
social change, characterized by the appearance of new
15
social sectors formed by the rising industrial and
commercial bourgeoisie engaged in import substitution and
a rapidly expanding industrial proletariat. These new
groups had little voice or influence in the political
sphere, still dominated by the agro-export ing sectors.
Before 1943, the Argentine governing elites were still
reluctant to offer any deliberate support for
industrialization and they continued to emphasize the
constraints posed by the small native reserves of coal and
iron ore, the absence of adeguate power and transportation
facilities, limited supplies of capital and the small size
of the domestic market. Although they perceived the value
of industrial growth as a way of strengthening the balance
of payments, providing employment and, conseguently
,
deferring political unrest, they believed that economic
progress lay not in industrialization but in a return to
the agricultural-export model that had been the basis of
2 7Argentina's prosperity in the past.
However, by the mid-1930's, nationalism had begun to
emerge as a strong force in Argentina, particularly among
certain intellectual and military groups. Concerned with
what they viewed as Argentina's excessive dependence on
foreign capital, markets and imports, these groups
advocated a coordinated effort to promote
industrialization and national economic self-sufficiency.
They criticized the Roca-Runciman treaty as a humiliating
betrayal of national interests for the purpose of
protecting the profits of the landowning governing elite.
Such attacks were increasingly followed by a bitter
propaganda campaign against British firms accused of
illegal monopolistic practices and bribery of government
officials over the securing of concessions. 28
Nationalist sentiments were also a powerful force in
the field of petroleum policy. In 1935, the Argentine
Congress passed a law restricting all private petroleum
concessions to their existing areas and establishing
government ownership of petroleum reserves in all national
territories. The foreign oil companies tried to drive YPF
out of business by flooding the country with cheap
imported petroleum. The government responded by capping
petroleum imports and by assigning shares of both the
import trade and the petroleum-product market among YPF,
Esso, Shell and the smaller private companies. YPF
expanded rapidly, tripling its output and increasing its
share of the market.
Throughout the war, Argentine exports of meat to
Britain remained high but exports of grain to continental
Europe plummeted. Moreover, supplies from Western Europe
were almost completely cut off and imports from Britain
fell sharply as resources there were shifted to war
production. 30 These developments helped overcome any
doubts that Argentina's leaders might have had concerning
the need to develop industry and industrialization became
a high-priority national goal. However, to develop
manufacturing, Argentina needed imports of capital goods
and certain raw materials and the United States was the
only country that could provide them. The Argentine
government renewed efforts to negotiate a trade agreement
with the United States. After a number of failed
attempts, a Trade Agreement was signed in mid-1941, the
first one since 1853. However, each side made only token
concessions. Argentina renounced bilateralism and
exchange controls, both non-existant issues now that the
United States had become almost the sole supplier of
manufactured goods. The United States lowered tariffs on
goods that they already imported from Argentina, such as
linseed and hides and on other items such as tungsten,
beryllium, some dairy products and wine. Argentina,
however, failed to obtain concessions for its main
products, its meats and cereals. x
Disagreements between the United States and Argentina
over trade issues had often extended into spheres of
diplomacy and inter-American relations. In the course of
the twentieth century, U.S. efforts to develop a Pan-
American organization under her own leadership had often
conflicted with Argentina's determination to preserve her
independence of action and with her own ambition to assume
the role of spokesman for the rest of the nations of South
America. This basic tension in the relationship between
the two nations reached its peak during World War II. As
long as the United States remained neutral, the relations
between the two countries were harmonious but, after Pearl
Harbor, Argentina's decision to maintain her neutrality
was viewed by Washington as an annoying obstacle in its
efforts to build a solid anti-Axis hemispheric front under
U.S. leadership. 32
The neutralist policy of the Conservative Party
government in Argentina was supported by the majority of
public opinion since it conformed with the country's
tradition of noninvolvement . At the same time, this
policy facilitated the continuation of Argentina's
profitable trade with Britain since it diminished the
possibilities of German attacks on Argentine ships. U.S.
attempts to coerce Argentina out of her neutral course
through diplomatic and economic pressure progressively
helped strengthen the more nationalist elements in the
government. The tensions created by this pressure,
however, eventually contributed to the overthrow of the
Castillo government by a coalition of army officers in
June 1943. Assuming that the cause of the revolt was a
desire to change the policy of neutrality, the United
3 3States promptly recognized the new government.
The 1943 revolution, however, was not primarily
motivated by disagreements on Argentina's foreign policy.
It grew rather out of a deep domestic struggle for power
between the old Conservative party leadership, whose
influence rested upon the power of the old landowning
oligarchy, and a variety of challenging groups including
industrialists, workers and their respective military
allies. The 194 3 revolution would eventually become a far
reaching and complex movement which would have permanent
and profound effects on the political and economic course
of the country.
As far as foreign policy was concerned, it soon
became evident that the new government, under the
leadership of General Pedro Ramirez, intended to continue
with the policy of neutrality. By the end of 1943, U.S.
Secretary of State Hull had become convinced that the
Argentine government was dominated by Fascists and, for
all practical purposes, controlled by Axis forces.
Washington then decided to step up its pressure and use
every method short of armed intervention to force
Argentina to change her course: denial of military
assistance to Argentina while, at the same time, building
up Brazil; denial of access to vital supplies through a
commercial embargo; diplomatic intervention to isolate
Argentina by arguing that it had become a foothold for
Axis propaganda and espionage and freezing of her gold
reserves in the United States. 34
Ramirez eventually capitulated and, in January 1944,
he broke diplomatic relationships with the Axis powers.
Shortly after that, however, he was ousted by another
group of military officers led by General Edelmiro
Farrell. Washington refused to recognize the new
government and the relationships between the two
20
governments continued to deteriorate. Juan Domingo Peron,
a colonel who began his political career while serving as
labor secretary of the Ramirez government, would soon
become one of the leading figures in the new Argentine
regime. From his position as Secretary of Labor, Peron
had begun to build a mass worker movement by using state
authority to create new unions and to provide benefits
previously denied to workers, such as government tribunals
to arbitrate labor disputes, obligatory paid vacations and
guaranteed social security benefits for union members.
Through these and other measures, Peron soon managed to
transform the Argentine labor movement into a loyal
instrument of his rule and he thus became the architect of
a new and powerful coalition of military and working class
35groups . ^
By the end of 1944, some important groups and persons
in the United States and most of the Latin American
Republics had begun to criticize Hull's policy as both
self-defeating and, ultimately, as dangerous to
hemispheric unity as Argentina's own behavior, and to
press for a change. After Hull's resignation in November
1945, the new Secretary Stettinius and his Assistant
Secretary for Latin American affairs, Nelson Rockefeller,
initiated a new policy of rapprochement with Argentina.
Rockefeller believed that Peron himself was not in fact
representative of the most nationalistic elements in the
Argentine military, and he was convinced that it would be
possible to achieve a better U. S . -Argentine relationship
by working through Peron rather than against him. Two
powerful groups in the United States supported
Rockefeller's position: the U.S. military, who were
concerned about building a solid hemispheric collective
security system, and an important part of U.S. investors
and traders, attracted by Argentina's commercial
possibilities. 36
The Chapultepec Conference marked the beginning of
the rapprochement. Argentina endorsed the final Act of
the Conference, which pledged the American nations to
cooperation on mutual defense and trade and, on March 27,
1945, the Argentine government declared war on Germany and
Japan. The United States recognized the Farrell
government and diplomatic relations were restored. A U.S.
mission headed by the chief of the American Republics
Division of the State Department Avra Warren visited
Argentina to discuss not only improvement of diplomatic,
economic and cultural relations but also the possibility
of U.S military aid. At the San Francisco Conference,
the United States supported Argentina's admission as a
full member, in spite of strong opposition by the Soviet
Union. U.S. sponsorship of Argentina's admission to the
San Francisco Conference was so unpopular with large
sectors of U.S. public opinion, particularly labor groups
and the liberal press led by the New York Times , that it
3 7
eventually cost Rockefeller his job.
The rapprochement with Argentina was short-lived and
the new U.S. Ambassador to the Southern nation, Spruille
Braden, launched a vigorous campaign against Peron and
what he considered to be a Fascist regime. In August
1945, Byrnes, who had succeeded Stettinius as Secretary of
State, recalled Braden to Washington to take Rockefeller's
post and from there, he continued his efforts to undermine
the Argentine government. In October, Farrell announced
presidential elections for February 1946, and Peron
presented his candidacy with the support of a newly
created Labor Party. Less than two weeks before the
elections, the State Department released a so-called "Blue
Book on Argentina", documenting collaboration between the
Farrell-Peron government and the Nazis. Such an obvious
attempt to influence the outcome of the election had quite
the opposite effect and considerably strengthened Peron 7 s
position.
Meanwhile, the Argentine military government had
initiated several measures aimed at encouraging the
country's industrialization. In April 1944, it had
established an Industrial Credit bank to promote
manufacturing. In June, tariffs were substantially
increased and quotas were imposed on imports competing
with domestic goods. The government also made efforts to
expand trade with neighboring countries and signed
commercial treaties with Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia.
Between 1941 and 1945, Argentine exports of manufactured
goods to Latin America, rose considerably. Led by
textiles and shoes, they came to represent 13.6 percent of
Argentina's exports. In 1946, the military government
nationalized the Central Bank. Shortly after that, it
created a state trading organization, Instituto Argentino
para la Promocion del Intercambio (IAPI) , to regulate
trade in agricultural products and imports of essential
goods. IAPI would purchase commodities at official prices
and sell them at higher prices in the world market,
keeping most of the profits for allocation by the national
government. 39
By 194 6, Argentina had abandoned its former export-
led strategy based on constant additions to agricultural
sectors in favor of an inward-looking strategy of
industrialization, propelled by an actively
interventionist state supported by a new coalition formed
by the military, a sector of the national bourgeoisie and
the industrial working classes. In the postwar years,
Argentine policy makers would have to learn how to cope
with the novel problems and opportunities created by the
re-orientation of the nation's economy and the decisions
they made would have a permanent impact on the future
course of the Southern nation. Moreover, the breakdown of
the long connection with Britain, which had been at the
base of Argentina's prosperity, would confront the nation
with the problem of building new alliances. Relationships
with the United States would assume increasing importance
24
for Argentina as it looked for a way of economic and
political insertion in the postwar international order.
The United States had emerged from the war as the
world's dominant power, with global ambitions and
responsibilities. Determined to prevent a recurrence of
the economic and political collapse which had followed
World War I, U.S. leaders decided to use their nation's
substantial economic, military and political leverage to
foster the creation of a global system of limited
management by international organizations that would
guarantee peace, stability and high international economic




The most urgent tasks facing the Allies were the
reconstruction of the world's monetary and trading
systems, which had been devastated by the war and the
rehabilitation of Western Europe, which was viewed as a
necessary prereguisite to the fulfillment of the former
aim. Under U.S. leadership, the Allied nations had met at
Bretton Woods in 1944 to lay out the basis of a new
international monetary order, the main pillars of which
would be an International Monetary Fund (IMF) , created to
stabilize world currencies and to provide credit to
countries with temporary balance of payments difficulties,
and an International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) , designed to assist in the
reconstruction of war-torn areas and to provide
development loans . 4 1
Subsequently, the United States had called for an
international conference to implement a convention which
would regulate and reduce restrictions on international
trade. The convention offered rules for all aspects of
international trade, including tariffs, preferences,
quantitative restrictions, subsidies, state trading and
international commodity agreements, and it provided for an
International Trade Organization (ITO) to oversee the
system. After long and complicated negotiations among the
participating nations, a compromise was reached and the
Havana Charter was drafted. This document, however, was
never adopted because of the U.S. Congress' refusal to
ratify it. Consequently the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) , a much more limited and less
comprehensive treaty which had been drawn up in 1947 as a
temporary measure to provide guidelines on tariff
negotiations, became the established framework for future
trade negotiations. 42
All contracting parties agreed to adhere to the
nondiscrimination and the most favored nation principles.
Tariff reductions based on reciprocity would be negotiated
bilaterally between principal suppliers and then broadened
under the most favored nation principle. Quantitative and
other non-tariff restrictions were prohibited, except
temporarily in the case of balance of payment
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difficulties. However, the most favored nation principle
included exceptions in favor of preferential systems in
force in 1947. Another exception was made to the rule
against use of quantitative restrictions to permit the
United States to continue to support domestic agricultural
prices. The GATT incorporated practically none of the
few provisions of the Havana Charter (such as those on
international commodity agreements) which took account of
the special situation and problems of the less developed
countries.
As the new international and trade systems were
becoming institutionalized, developing countries expressed
their strong concern at the absence of any specific
provisions to address their particular development
problems. The planners of the new order considered such
special provisions unnecessary since they believed that
the liberalization of trade, supplemented by the renewed
flow of private investment, would be sufficient to provide
the necessary stimulus for the economic growth of all
43nations
Latin America in particular had hoped for broader
U.S. economic assistance in the postwar era. The
Roosevelt Administration had repeatedly promised Latin
American leaders that the United States would cooperate
with their development plans once the enemy was
defeated. 44 The Latin American countries had made an
important contribution to the war effort by supplying raw
materials to the Allies at set prices and by accepting
limited access to machinery and other goods. As the war
drew to a close, Latin America looked forward to the
continuation of close economic ties and hoped for direct
economic assistance from the United States as a reward for
wartime cooperation. 45
Many Latin American leaders had become convinced
that, as long as their countries continued to be mainly
dependent upon foreign demand for their commodities and
upon foreign sources of supply for their manufactures,
their economies would remain precarious and the success of
their programs for economic and social welfare would be
jeopardized. They were determined to make a resolute
effort to diversify their economies and industrialize.
They saw industrialization as the chief means not only to
lessen the region's vulnerability to world trade cycles,
but also to raise income levels, expand domestic markets
and achieve better use of their resources, increased
productivity, and political and economic stability.
They believed that, in order to move faster and more
directly toward these goals, the state would have to play
an expanded role, coordinating economic development
projects and tempering the impact of market forces through
protective tariffs, exchange restrictions, import controls
and sponsorship of industrialization programs. The state
would also be responsible for financing those long-term
development programs, such as the building of
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infrastructure, that private capital was reluctant to
undertake. Development plans would also require
coordinated action at hemispheric level. Consequently, as
soon as the war was over, Latin American leaders beqan to
press for an inter-American economic conference to discuss
the special problems and needs of the region. Washington,
concerned with what it viewed as higher global priorities,
showed little enthusiasm for such a conference and, as
long as Braden remained in charge of inter-American
affairs in the State Department, the conflict with
Argentina provided a good excuse to postpone any
hemispheric meetings.
^
As the difficult transition from war to peacetime
conditions proceeded, the problems of the Latin American
nations became more pressing. With the abrupt lifting of
wartime price controls in the United States, the prices of
industrial goods rose rapidly and the purchasing power of
the foreign exchange accumulated during the war was
considerably diminished. As the Latin Americans sought to
relieve their wartime shortages and satisfy accumulated
demand, their savings evaporated quickly. Their economies
were further affected by the abrupt termination of war
purchases. U.S imports declined and, as pre-war markets
had not yet recovered from the devastation brought about
by the war, Latin American exports diminished and balance
of trade problems became more acute. Moreover, the
capital and intermediate goods that the Latin American
nations needed to carry out their industrialization
projects were still difficult to obtain since the United
States was practically the only country that could provide
them and most of the available equipment was being
channelled to Europe. 47
Demands for an inter-American economic conference
intensified. Arguing that the wide fluctuations in
commodity prices, and thus in export earnings, hindered
investment and disrupted development planning, Latin
American leaders called for international commodity
agreements to stabilize prices. They also hoped that the
United States would provide expanded markets for their
products through the removal of tariff and other trade
barriers and would give their countries financial
assistance comparable to the amounts it had provided
4 ftWestern Europe.
But their hopes for a concerted hemispheric effort at
economic development would soon be dampened. U.S. policy
makers were convinced that the most effective path to
economic development in Latin America lay in the promotion
of free enterprise via private foreign investment and
trade liberalization. In their view, the promotion of
heavy industry at the expense of agriculture, the
maintainance of high-cost industries through trade
restrictions and the emphasis on state-owned enterprises
and trading corporations were, not only inefficient, but
also unnecessarily costly. Administration officials
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repeatedly told Latin American leaders that economic
growth in the region should be achieved principally
through domestic efforts. Such domestic efforts would be
enhanced by the progressive removal of international
barriers to trade, which would in turn enable developing
countries to increase their national income and to earn
the foreign exchange needed to pay for their imports. In
those cases where additional capital was needed, private
investment could supplement export earnings and, if this
was not enough, additional capital assistance could be
obtained through the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the
IBRD. Developing countries could contribute to stimulate
the flow of such private capital through the creation of a
"suitable climate" for foreign investment. 49
U.S officials untiringly advised Latin Americans that
a favorable investment climate could be achieved by
rejecting expropriation, following acceptable monetary and
fiscal policies, promoting equitable legislation and
minimizing governmental competition with private business.
But such advice was not always welcomed by the Latin
American governments since it basically meant that private
investors themselves would determine what a favorable
climate was. In practice, creating a favorable climate
often required the abandonment of government policies that
were considered desirable for the achievement of economic
growth. Moreover, the Latin American governments
naturally resented foreign investors telling them what
31
constituted sound policy and equitable legislation.
Although, in general, they were not opposed to foreign
investment participation, they insisted on exercising
control over the scope and form of such investment so as
to make sure that it would actually contribute to the
economic growth of their countries. 50
Secretary of State George Marshall laid out the U.S.
position in his inaugural address to the Ninth Inter-
American Conference gathered at Bogota in March 1948 to
draft the charter of the Organization of American States.
After reviewing the history of the development of the
United States, Marshall restated Washington's view that
economic development was primarily the province of private
capital. He told the delegates that, although the United
States was willing to help, it simply could not
simultaneously undertake the economic reconstruction of
Europe and provide massive assistance to the
underdeveloped world. European rehabilitation would
contribute to the progress of Latin America by restoring
markets for agricultural and raw materials and providing
another source of supply for capital goods. In the
meantime, any external financing would have to come
through the contribution of private capital or, where
private capital was unavailable, through IBRD or EXIM-Bank
loans. Marshall then promised that an economic conference
would be held in the future, and he announced the
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increasement of the Exim-Bank's lending authority by $500
• 1 1 • 51million. JX
The Latin Americans were thoroughly disappointed.
Throughout the rest of the Truman Administration, they
would continue to denounce what they considered
Washington's neglect of Latin America and indifference to
their problems. They were particularly disturbed by
Washington's refusal to listen to their proposals while it
was pouring massive amounts of aid on more distant regions
in Europe and Asia. Between 1945 and 1950, European
countries received over $28 billion in U.S. aid, mostly as
grants, while Latin America obtained only $500 million and
that predominantly in the form of loans to be repaid in
dollars. 52 The Latin American countries' concern with
economic development was underlined by their decision to
press for the establishment of a United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA)
,
analogous to those
already set up for Europe and Asia. Washington strongly
opposed the creation of ECLA on the grounds that it would
overlap with the Inter-American Economic and Social
Council which had been created in 1945 to coordinate all
official inter-American social and economic activities.
In spite of U.S. opposition, ECLA was officially
established in February 1948 and, under the leadership of
the Argentine economist Raul Prebisch, it soon became an
important source of statistical information on Latin
America as well as of economic and social development
programs. Meanwhile, as Latin Americans continued to
press for economic assistance and for a concerted
hemispheric development effort, Washington invariably
responded with the same kind of advice, telling them that
they could have all the capital they needed by putting
their financial houses in order and removing barriers to
the free flow of trade and foreign investment. The
conflict between these two different points of view would
thus remain as an important obstacle in the way of
improved relations in the postwar years.
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CHAPTER 2
PERON AND THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
Argentina, favored by large wartime gold and foreign
exchange reserves and a high demand for its agricultural
products, managed at first to escape the deleterious
consequences of postwar economic dislocations endured by
other Latin American republics. In February 1946, Peron
was elected president with 52,4 percent of the vote and a
substantial majority in both Chambers of Congress and
provincial governorships. The new administration intended
to accelerate the process of transformation of Argentina
into a modern, self-sufficient, developed economy through
a state-sponsored, inward-directed development strategy
based on import-substituting industrialization and mass
consumption. 1
Peron and his advisers believed that there would be a
repetition of the pattern that had followed World War I: a
short-lived trade boom followed by a Depression and then a
new World War. Acting on this premise, they decided that
Argentina would have to stockpile imports of machinery and
raw materials and accelerate the process of
industrialization at any cost so as to be prepared for the
time when export earnings declined and replacement capital
2goods and raw materials became scarce.
Shortly after his inauguration, Peron launched an
ambitious Five-Year Plan outlining the course his
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government intended to follow. The administration planned
to stimulate industrial growth through subsidized credit,
tariff protection, and an overvalued exchange rate that
would facilitate the importation of raw materials,
intermediate and capital goods. To sustain the process of
industrial development, they intended to promote the
expansion of internal consumption through income
redistribution and social welfare. Agricultural exports
and the substantial reserves accumulated during the war
were expected to finance this program. Peron planned to
redistribute income from rural producers to urban
consumers and national industrialists through tax, price,
wage and credit controls. To achieve this aim, the
government had to establish control over the country's
financial and trading systems. 3
Shortly before Peron 's inauguration, the military
government had nationalized the Central Bank and created a
state trading organization, the Instituto Argentino de
Promocion del Intercambio (IAPI) to regulate
commercialization of agricultural products and imports of
essential goods. IAPI would purchase commodities at
official prices and sell them at higher prices in the
world market and the profits would be allocated by the
national government. Peron planned to use the Industrial
Bank, created in 1944, to channel credit into areas
favored by the government. He also intended to increase
state control over transportation and public utilities. 4
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The success of the Five-Year Plan depended on four
assumptions: first, that Argentina would be able to
maintain a continued high level of agricultural exports to
secure the foreign exchange necessary for the imports
required by industrialization; second, that favorable
international prices for Argentine products would continue
for a sustained period; third, that import substitution
would reduce the economy's dependence on the exchange
earnings from agricultural exports, either by saving
enough foreign exchange to pay for its new import
requirements or by creating new exports; and fourth, that
industrial investors would respond energetically to the
new tariff and credit incentives. 5
Peron 's industrialization program was supported by
labor groups, the military and some sectors of the
industrial bourgeoisie. However, many industrialists were
not totally at ease with Peron, and they were especially
concerned by his labor reforms and the increasing
militancy of the working-class. Moreover, his program met
substantial and continued opposition from the powerful
economic elite of cattlemen and farmers who had
traditionally dominated the government. These groups
strongly resented the government's policy of forcefully
diverting profits from agriculture to industry, precisely
at the time when they were being excluded from the
decision-making process. Opposition to Peron was
aggravated by the President's inflammatory populist
48
rhetoric and his personalistic rule. Peron's rhetoric,
however, was mostly aimed at holding popular support, but
his policies were hardly radical. Peron never attempted
to implement land reform or to nationalize the meat-
packing industry in spite of considerable public pressure
to do so. 6
In the field of foreign relations Peron, aware of the
risks involved in isolation, intended to restore Argentina
to an active role in international organizations and to
improve the country's relations with the United States.
Peron had at least two good reasons for a rapprochement
with Washington. For one thing, most of the capital goods
and technology that Argentina needed to speed up its
industrialization effort would have to be imported from
the United States. In addition, the Argentine military
were determined to re-eguip and modernize their forces to
recover the ground lost during the war as a conseguence of
Argentina's lack of access to military supplies. However,
the U.S. embargo on arm sales to Argentina imposed during
the war and retained subseguently posed an obstacle to
their plans, particularly since it was extended to Britain
and Canada through a Gentleman's agreement with the United
States. The Argentine military hoped that the
normalization of relations with Washington would make it
possible for them to participate in the program of
standardization of armaments, training and organization
promoted by the U.S. military. Shortly after his
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inauguration, Peron publicly announced that in any future
war Argentina would fight on the side of the United States
and the other Latin American nations. in September 1946,
the Argentine Congress ratified the Act of Chapultepec and
the United Nations Charter. 7
Meanwhile, some important groups in the U.S. Congress
and Defense Department had become convinced that it would
be more profitable to work with and through Peron than
against him and favored a more conciliatory approach.
George Messersmith, the new U.S. Ambassador to Argentina,
reflected this new attitude. During his tenure in Buenos
Aires, he developed a close relationship with Peron and he
became convinced of the sincerity of the President's anti-
communism and of his desire to work out mutually
satisfactory agreements for the participation of U.S.
firms in Argentina's economic development. However, as
long as Spruille Braden remained in charge of Latin
American affairs at the State Department, any
rapprochement with Peron would be very unlikely. Braden
even went so far as to delay the conclusion of the
regional security pact provided for by the Chapultepec Act
for over a year in order to keep Argentina isolated.
As the conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union deepened, powerful elements in Congress, the
Pentagon and the State Department became increasingly
impatient with Braden 's position and pressed for the
solution of the conflict with Argentina as a prelude to
the consolidation of a hemispheric defense system. In
June 1947, Secretary of State Marshall put an end to the
dispute between Messersmith and Braden by removing both
from office. Subsequently, the Treaty of Inter-American
Reciprocal Assistance was signed at the Rio Conference in
August, 1947 and the Organization of the American States
Charter was drafted at the Bogota Conference in March,
1948. Argentina signed both, but the Rio Pact was not
ratified by the Argentine Congress until 1950. The U.S
arms embargo on Argentina was lifted and bilateral
negotiations were started for the purchase of military
equipment in the United States. 8
Peron, as a military man, was concerned with
Communist infiltration in Latin America. But, as an
observer of recent history, he believed that widespread
poverty and illiteracy provided a fertile ground for the
spread of Communist propaganda. He argued that the best
way to combat Communism effectively was through adequate
economic and social programs which would improve the
living conditions of the Latin American masses.^ Peron
favored coordinated hemispheric action to deal with the
problem of communist infiltration, and he raised this
subject with U.S. officials on several occasions. At the
outset of the Rio Conference in August 1947, the Argentine
Foreign Minister Juan Bramuglia discussed the problem of
Communism with Secretary of State Marshall and proposed an
inter-American pact for a joint effort to combat
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Communism. Bramuglia was given a "polite brush-off" with
the explanation that the United States was not interested
in a multilateral anti-communist agreement and that
measures against communism should be left to individual
countries. 10 Before the Bogota Conference, Argentine
officials once again raised the topic of a hemispheric
anti-communist pact, but the United States rejected this
proposal favoring instead a more general anti-communist
resolution. On several occasions, Peron and other members
of his government gave U.S. officials assurances that, in
the case of a war between the United States and the Soviet
Union, Argentina would immediately throw its support on
the side of the United States. 11
On the domestic front, however, Peron often resorted
to a highly nationalistic, anti-imperialist rhetoric. In
the course of his government, Peron developed a body of
doctrine called Justicialismo which became the
philosophical basis of the Peronist movement. Its stated
objectives were social justice, economic independence and
complete national sovereignty. In economic matters,
Justicialismo was defined as an intermediate position
between uncontrolled capitalism and communist
totalitarianism that was intended to avoid the excesses of
both. In international affairs, Peron favored a position
of equidistance between the two rival world power blocs
which would enable Argentina to retain its freedom of
action in its dealings with both groups. In pursuing this
policy, Peron adapted traditional Argentine isolationism
to his own purposes. Nationalist-populist rhetoric had a
strong appeal among Peron 's followers and it was an
important element in holding his heterogeneous supporters
together. 12
But Peron 's Third Position would become an obstacle
in the way of closer relations with the United States.
While Peron might privately assure U.S. diplomats of his
anti-communism and his determination to align Argentina
with the United States in the event of a war, his anti-
imperialist discourse, highly publicized by the foreign
press, reinforced the hostility of the U.S. public to the
Argentine president that dated from World War II. Peron's
Third Position came at an unfortunate time, when the world
was progressively being divided into "the capitalists and
the communists" and neutrality was increasingly viewed as
immoral. Moreover, Peron's economic doctrine, which
proclaimed the existence of a middle way between
capitalism and communism conflicted with the U.S aim of
promoting free enterprise against statism. For this
reason, Argentina was regarded by many in Washington as a
dangerous example to the rest of Latin America and a
potential threat to U.S. influence in the area. Thus, in
spite of the significant gap between Peron's rhetoric and
the policies he followed, the rhetoric was often believed
to be a true reflection of principles and policies, both
1 3
at home and abroad.
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Peron's Five-Year Plan gave immediate results.
Between 1945 and 1948, Argentina's GNP grew by 29 percent
and the manufacturing share of the economy rose from
27.5 percent in 1940-1944 to an average of more than 30
percent between 1946-1955, led by textiles, food-
processing and some chemicals, metals and electrical
equipment. Between 1946 and 1953, 75.000 new
manufacturing firms were established. But most of the
progress was in the field of light industry while
investment in heavy, state-owned industry declined. The
government also built hydroelectrical facilities, created
a national airline and a merchant shipping company and
expanded the exploitation of the country's coal and
petroleum reserves. 14
As a result of the growth of manufacturing, the
composition of imports changed. Imports of finished
consumer goods which had represented approximately 40
percent of total imports in 1930 fell to less than 10
percent in the early 1950's. But between 1935 and 1945-
1949 annual average imports of raw materials increased by
38 percent, fuels by 27 percent and capital goods by 49
percent. Part of this increase was the result of pent up
demand accumulated during the war. Between 1945 and 1948,
total imports quadrupled, creating a strong pressure on
the balance of payments. More than half of these imports
came from the United States. From a total value of 159
million pesos in 1945, imports from the United States rose
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to 665 million in 1946, 2,431 million in 1947 and 2,287
million in 1948. 15
Argentina could theoretically pay for these imports
with the reserves accumulated during the war plus new
earnings from exports. But most of these reserves were
either in the form of credits that Europe could not repay
or in inconvertible currencies. in 194 6, about three-
quarters of Argentine foreign reserves were held in
inconvertible western European or Latin American
currencies. That same year, Argentina added some $425
million to its foreign reserves, but two-thirds of these
funds were inconvertible. In addition, in the immediate
postwar years Argentina had to grant substantial credits
to her most important trading partners such as Britain,
France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands to
be able to sell her products. On the other hand, Europe
had little to sell, especially of the kinds of goods
Argentina needed. Thus, as Argentina continued importing
from the United States, it faced an increasingly
unfavorable balance-of-trade position in the dollar area.
By the end of 1947, Argentina's dollar reserves, which
amounted to $569 in early 1946 had almost been
1 ft
exhausted.
The problem of inconvertibility was particularly
serious in the case of trade with Britain since, before
the war, Argentina had used the surplus generated by sales
to Britain to finance her imports from the United States.
In September 1946, Argentina and Britain signed the Eady-
Miranda Treaty by which Argentina granted Britain a four-
year contract for meat imports at favorable prices and
advantageous conditions for the British-owned railroads in
Argentina. In return, Britain pledged that Argentina's
future sterling earnings would be freely convertible.
This agreement still left the wartime 150 million sterling
balance blocked, but it offered Argentina the possibility
of a return to the pre-war pattern of triangular trade.
However, in August 1947, Britain unilaterally decided to
suspend convertibility again. This decision was a hard
blow to Argentina which had counted on the sterling
surplus to finance her growing dollar deficit.
Convertibility would not be restored until 1957 and, by
then, Argentina's trade with Britain had declined
substantially. 17
Meanwhile, Peron had moved forward in his plans to
nationalize certain public services. In 1946, he bought a
small group of French-owned railroads and a telephone
company owned by the International Telephone and Telegraph
Company. In February 1947, he bought the British-owned
railroads for 150 million sterling. Peron's opponents
have strongly criticized the wisdom of this decision. In
their view, the purchase was an unnecessary waste of
national reserves which could have been used more
profitably to strengthen other areas of the economy, such
as oil and steel. Moreover, they argue that it was a bad
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business deal since the railroads were obsolete and
required extensive new investment (of the 4 000 engines,
3000 were over 20 years old and 1500 over 45 years old)
.
Peron's defenders support the purchase of the railroads
arguing that the President had a very limited area for
maneuver and that there was little else that could be done
with the blocked sterling in any case. They also
underline the fact that, at the time the deal was made,
Britain had promised to authorize the convertibility of
future Argentine sterling earnings. However, as things
turned out, Peron's nationalizations contributed to reduce
the country's reserves which, by 1948, had fallen from
4,099 million pesos in 1945 to only 433.9 million. 18
In the meantime, Argentina imports from the United
States kept growing. The announcement of the Marshall
Plan had led the Argentine government to hope that it
would be able to solve the country's dollar shortage
problem through increased sales to Europe paid in Marshall
Plan dollars. These hopes would soon be dashed by the
refusal of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)
to authorize the purchase of Argentine products with
Marshall Plan dollars. Instead, ECA planned to supply
Europe from U.S., Canadian and other British Commonwealth
sources. This decision had serious consequences for
Argentina since, without a substantial injection of
dollars (or their equivalent in convertible currencies)
,
it would be impossible for the country to maintain the
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level of U.S. imports required by industrialization and
most of the projects of the Five-Year Plan would have to
be suspended. Peron made desperate attempts to persuade
Washington to reverse this decision. In conversations
with James Bruce, who had replaced Messersmith as U.S.
Ambassador, Peron explained that his anti-U.S. remarks
were merely domestic rhetoric, "a bit of political
demagoguery for home consumption" to be used in peacetime
and which "has no application and would not even exist in
the event of war between the United States and Russia." 19
He sent top-level government officials to Washington to
discuss the possibility of Marshall purchases in Argentina
as well as plans to increase Argentine exports to the
United States. But ECA's policy remained the same.
Although ECA Administrator Howard Bruce in a conversation
with Argentine Foreign Minister Bramuglia had anticipated
ECA purchases in Argentina for about $300 million,
Argentine sales to Europe under the Marshall Plan totaled
a mere $21 million. 20
U.S. Embassy officials were concerned about the
effects that the acute economic crisis provoked by the
dollar shortage might have on U. S-Argentine relations.
They warned that "if Peron should reach the conclusion
that there is no hope of increasing exports to the United
States or of obtaining ECA dollars, his position would
become more desperate, he would be filled with resentments
against the United States and his course of action would
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become more and more totalitarian." 21 Under pressure from
Ambassador Bruce, the State Department ordered an
investigation of ECA activities that revealed at least 33
instances of discrimination against Argentine products. 22
Bruce believed that Argentina's precarious financial and
economic situation provided a strategic moment for the
United States to write "its own ticket" for a settlement
with the Peronist regime and an opportunity to strengthen
the hand of the "pro-US, pro-free enterprise elements in
the Argentine government." He advocated authorization of
dollar purchases in Argentina in return for certain
concessions such as restrictions on IAPI activities and
favorable conditions for U.S. firms. ECA, however,
remained firm in its position. 23
During this period there were two other developments
which indirectly affected U . S-Argentine relations. One
was the reform of the Argentine Constitution, approved in
March 1949 . The new Constitution included an article
which declared public services and mineral resources the
inalienable property of the nation. This article was
added over Peron ' s ob j ect ion , and it created concern among
foreign investors , who viewed it as a threat of
expropriation. State Department officials protested
vigorously against this provision of the Constitution, and
Peron repeatedly assured them that it would never be
2 4invoked while he was in power.
The second issue was the signing of a five-year trade
agreement between Britain and Argentina in June 1949. in
essence, this agreement provided for the exchange of
Argentine meat for sterling area petroleum. The
conversations preceding the agreement were long and
complicated and Britain benefited from Argentina's weak
negotiating position to drive a hard bargain. In return
for a market for its meat products, Argentina had to
commit itself to take a considerable volume of British
manufactured goods, such as luxury goods, automobiles,
agricultural, industrial and transportation machinery.
For technological reasons, Argentina usually preferred to
buy most of these goods in the United States, but since it
could only sell its meat to the British for inconvertible
sterling and she did not have access to Marshall Plan
dollars, she had no other way out. 25
The United States viewed this "renewed resort to
bilateral barter" as "a revival of unacceptable
practices." The U.S Commerce and State Departments
protested vigorously against the agreement which they
regarded as "the most serious blow to American interests
in Argentina since the negotiation of the Roca-Runciman
Agreement in 1933.
"
26 Bruce defended the position of
Argentina. In a letter to the Secretary of State he
argued strongly that "the Anglo-Argentine agreement [had
been] engineered by junior staff ECA who used US
taxpayer's dollars in [an] attempt to force down Argentine
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prices [of] meat and engineered pork purchases from the US
at a much higher price than Argentine pork, with [the]
idea of forcing Argentina to sign [the] agreement." The
Embassy "had long foreseen and lamented [the] consequences
[of a] barter deal between Great Britain and Argentina but
in view [of the] dollar shortage and ECA opposition [it]




By the end of 1949, Argentina's situation had become
desperate. After two years of substantial trade deficits
her foreign reserves had fallen by two thirds. Most of
the remaining reserves were inconvertible and Argentina
owed the United States approximately $200 million.
Britain's suspension of convertibility and ECA's exclusion
of Argentina from Marshall Plan purchases had dealt major
blows to Peron's plans, forcing him to abandon most of the
projects of the Five-Year Plan because of lack of dollars
to pay for the needed machinery. The economic crisis
afflicting Argentina, however, had more profound causes
that would become evident in the next few years. In the
1950s, Argentina's problems would be compounded by a
2 8
crisis in agriculture and in the capacity to export.
The agricultural crisis was partly the result of
recurrent and severe droughts, and partly the result of
Peron's policies, which had exacerbated the declining
trend in agriculture. IAPI's pricing practices and the
forced diversion of funds to manufacturing had discouraged
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farmers, while import and credit restrictions had
intensified the chronic shortage of tractors, fertilizers
and agricultural machinery. In 1949, grain production
declined by 8 percent against the previous year and, in
1950 by 6.7 percent. 29
The redistribution of income toward the urban sectors
had increased domestic consumption of farm products,
leaving fewer goods for export. In the period from the
late 1930's to the early 1950's, total output of farm
goods, both grain and meat, did not expand much, but
domestic consumption of farm products rose by
approximately one-third and export volumes declined by
two-thirds. The proportion of grain production exported
decreased from 47 percent in 1935-1939 to 23 percent in
1945-1949 and 22 percent in 1950-1954. Between 1946 and
1950, there was a continuous rise in domestic meat
consumption, and the percentage left for exports fell
accordingly. Thus, in 1938, 60 percent of the meat
produced was consumed at home and 4 0 percent was exported;
in 1949, the corresponding percentages were 77 and 23
percent; in 1950, 79 and 21 percent and in 1951, 86 and 14
i opercent.
In 1949, Argentina was unable to meet the quotas
specified in the Trade Agreement with Britain. Before the
war, Argentina had supplied more than 40 percent of
Britain's meat imports but in 1950, she accounted for only
28 percent. 31 In 1952, Argentina had to import wheat from
Canada for the first time in its history. To make matters
worse, the decline in agricultural production was
compounded by tightening world market conditions. As
competition for markets with growing Australian and
Canadian production and, above all, with heavily
subsidized U.S. farm products increased, the
international prices of agricultural goods declined, and
the terms of trade began to move against Argentina.
Between 1948 and 1950, for each unit of imports Argentina
had to increase exports by more than 30 percent. 32
The decline in agricultural exports exacerbated
Argentina's balance of trade crisis and brought the
industrialization effort practically to a halt. By 1950,
most of the import-substitution that could be expected
from the traditional branches of industry such as
foodstuffs, textiles, tobacco and clothing, had been
exhausted and future industrial growth would have to come
either from the expansion of manufactured exports or from
further development of more complex import-substituting
activities, such as metals, vehicles, machinery,
electrical equipment and heavy industry. Exports of
manufactures, which had expanded rapidly during the war,
had declined drastically when the industrialized countries
returned to normal trade. Argentine industries, highly
protected and mostly inefficient, could not compete with
the larger corporations in international markets. The
transition to the next stage of import-substitution was
more complex since it required a higher rate of capital
investment and access to more sophisticated technology.
Moreover, this transition presupposed, at least in the
initial stage, the capacity to import the necessary
intermediate and capital goods. But, by 1950, the foreign
exchange bottleneck had forced the Argentine government to
curtail imports drastically. The economy stagnated,
prices rose, and wages fell. GDP grew by 13.8 percent in
1947, by only 1.2 percent in 1948 and declined by 4 .
6
percent in 1949. Inflation compounded the crisis. In
1947, the cost of living rose by 12.2 percent, in 1948 by
13.0 percent and in 1949 by 32.7 percent. Simultaneously,
the increased demand prompted by industrialization
triggered a serious fuel and energy crisis. Between the
late 1930 's and early 1950 7 s, Argentina's dependence on
imported oil grew from around a third to a half of total
consumption. By 1950, imported petroleum products
constituted 2 3 percent of Argentina's total imports. Coal
and oil shortages slowed down the growth of electricity
supply and, between 1945 and 1955, capacity increased at
3 3
an annual rate of only 2 percent.
By the end of 1949, the main problem facing Argentina
was how to improve its export situation so as to be able
to finance imports. To solve this, she had to revitalize
agriculture and increase productivity. Since she could no
longer resort to the traditional method of incorporating
new lands, increased production would depend on
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technological progress, mechanization and use of
fertilizers. But Argentina was caught in a vicious circle
because, to obtain these things, she needed foreign
exchange, and she had already used up her reserves and
exhausted her credit with the United States.
This situation prompted Peron to make new efforts
toward an agreement with the United States. The moment
seemed propitious because the Chinese revolution and the
explosion of the first atomic bomb had helped intensify
Washington's Cold War concerns and had increased the
Truman Administration's interest in building an inter-
American alliance on which it could rely while confronting
the Soviet threat. On 19 May 1950, NSC 56/2 was
approved, authorizing military aid to Latin America: the
Inter-American Defense Board would design a General
Military Plan for the Defense of the Continent and the
United States would subsequently negotiate bilateral
military grant assistance programs with specific Latin
American nations to help them prepare for their designed
missions in the defense of the hemisphere. Approval of
the general defense plan was a prerequisite to receipt of
military grant aid. In October 1951, the U.S Congress
appropriated $38,150,000 for direct military assistance to
Latin America. The hemispheric defense plan was completed
in November 1951 and submitted to the member nations for
approval. Subsequently, Washington began to negotiate




The opportunity to improve relations with Argentina
was thus welcomed by Washington. Argentina's need for
dollars put Washington in a favorable position to demand
the Southern country's clear and uneguivocal alignment on
the side of the West as the price for its assistance.
Washington was becoming impatient with Peron's Third
Position and his anti-imperialist rhetoric, which often
sounded very similar to that of the Soviets. The United
States wanted Argentina to ratify the Rio Pact which had
been blocked in the Argentine Chamber of Representatives
since 1948. 35
Several groups of U.S. businessmen supported a
rapprochement with Argentina because they expected that an
improved atmosphere might contribute to the solution of
their specific problems. Since Argentina's dollar
shortage had led the government to curtail imports
drastically and to try to supply basic needs from non-
dollar sources, U.S. exporters feared that they would
eventually be driven out of the Argentine market
altogether. Businessmen with investments in Argentina
also faced problems derived both from Argentina's balance
of trade crisis and from Peron's policies. Outstanding
among these problems were the suspension of profit
remittances enacted by the government in 1948 and the
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complications created by price and exchange restrictions,
import licences, wage and labor regulations. 36
In response to an Argentine initiative, a Joint U.S-
Argentine Committee was set up in Washington to discuss
the many financial and trade problems between the two
countries and to explore ways of expanding Argentine
exports to the United States. After months of talks and
negotiations, the Committee concluded its studies with a
report which offered general guidelines and declarations
of goodwill but very little in the way of specific
solutions. Argentina then began to consider the
possibility of obtaining an EXIM-Bank export credit to
finance imports of farm equipment. 37
As negotiations between the two countries continued,
Assistant Secretary of State Edward Miller visited
Argentina to discuss U . S . -Argentine relations. He urged
Peron to have the Rio Treaty ratified and discussed with
him the specific problems of U.S. firms operating in
Argentina, such as the oil and utility companies, meat-
packers, airlines, news agencies and the motion picture
industry. Miller's visit was very successful. Peron
promised to ratify the Rio Treaty during the 1950
congressional session, and he began to take steps to
improve the position of U.S. firms. 38 The Argentine
government authorized the transfer of blocked funds of
U.S. airlines, signed a five-year contract with the motion
picture companies permitting unlimited entry of U.S. films
and annual remittances for $1.1 million, worked out more
satisfactory operating arrangements for U.S. oil and
meat-packing companies and authorized Swift to transfer
its holding company from Buenos Aires to the United
States. 39
In May 1950, an agreement was reached for a $125
million EXIM-Bank loan at 3 . 5 percent annual interest to
be repaid in 20 semiannual installments. The totality of
this credit, granted to a consortium of Argentine banks,
had to be used to pay for past due dollar obligations to
U.S. exporters. The State Department was disappointed
with both the size and the purpose of the credit. During
the negotiations with the EXIM-Bank, the State Department
had repeatedly pressed upon Bank officials the political
importance of making some provisions for future sales of
agricultural equipment to Argentina in view of the many
specific actions the Argentine government had taken to
solve the problems of U.S. companies. 40 Peron was also
disappointed since he had expected a much larger amount
that would enable Argentina to resume imports to aid
agriculture and manufacturing. The credit was strongly
criticized by all the members of Peron 7 s Cabinet. 41 EXIM-
Bank officials argued that, by re-establishing credit,
Argentina would be able to negotiate further loans from
private banks. Argentine officials explored this
possibility but the private banks demanded a gold deposit
as guarantee, a condition the Argentine government felt
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it could not accept. 42 In the United States, the loan was
highly criticized. Labor organizations condemned it as "a
compromise with democratic principles and appeasement of
dictatorships." Investors were also unhappy because,
although the credit had solved the problems of backlogs to
U.S. exporters, it had not dealt with past arrears of
profit remittances. 43
U.S. hopes of a permanent change in Argentine policy
seemed justified at the time of the Korean War. Three
days after the opening of hostilities, the Argentine
Congress ratified the Rio Treaty, and Argentina supported
the United Nations' intervention in Korea. Peron publicly
endorsed the sending of U.S. troops to Korea, and he
considered the possibility of contributing Argentine
forces. However, as rumors spread, there was a severe
popular reaction in Argentina against Argentine
involvement, especially against any contribution of
troops. Peron toned down statements of support and
gradually returned to his Third Position rhetoric to calm
public opinion.
The Korean War became more serious when Chinese
troops intervened in November 1950. Once more, Washington
turned its attention to Latin America and reguested an
urgent consultation of OAS Foreign Ministers. Washington
wanted Latin America's military and political cooperation
in the struggle and increased production of strategic and
raw materials. 45 The Truman Administration gave special
importance to the position taken by Argentina and, in
January 1951, ex-Ambassador Messersmith was sent on an
unofficial mission to try to persuade Peron of the
necessity of aligning Argentina publicly and uneguivocally
with the Western powers once and for all. In his
conversations with Peron, Messersmith emphasized the very
negative effect that Peron's references to the Third
Position had on U.S. public opinion, entreating the
President to make public his constant private assurances
of support to the U.S. and to prepare the Argentine people
for a more positive and decisive course of action. Peron
was in a difficult political situation, however, because,
although he personally understood the U.S. position and
favored active Argentine participation in the conflict,
he faced strong resistance not only from public opinion in
general and from opposition parties, but also from within
his own party. This resistance was based on Argentina's
deeply-rooted tradition of neutrality and isolationism,
and Peron was not ready to take the political risk of
going openly against it. 46
Assistant Secretary of State Edward Miller was sent
on a tour of Latin America to build up support for the
U.S. position before the OAS meeting. Washington's main
concern was to secure Latin American contribution of
ground forces to the battle field, a commitment which was
viewed by the Truman Administration as a component of the
Rio Treaty. Most Latin American rulers, however, faced
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serious political and legal problems in this respect since
there was a generalized resistance in most countries to
any commitment of national forces outside the hemisphere.
Moreover, there was widespread disappointment in Latin
America with U.S. policy on economic aid; Latin American
leaders in general were more concerned with solving the
economic problems of their countries than with winning the
Cold War. 47
Miller visited Argentina where he was cordially
received but, in contrast to his previous visit, he could
never see Peron alone. Miller received repeated
reassurances of Argentina's support for the U.S. position
but no concrete commitments were made. 48 During the OAS
meeting in Washington, Argentine representatives kept a
low profile. Argentina contributed to the war effort with
14,000 cases of canned meat but no troops were sent. In
fact, most of the Latin American countries reacted coldly
to the U.S. requests, offering mostly rhetorical support




As the economic crisis in Argentina deepened, social
and political tensions intensified. With growing pressure
on wages from inflation, workers' unrest mounted. In
1950, the number of strikes increased, culminating with a
railroad strike in January 1951. Peron ended the strike
by mobilizing the railroad workers. Meanwhile, attacks
against Peron from middle and upper class opposition
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groups had become increasingly bitter. The opposition
campaign charged the Peron regime with corruption and
accused Peron of having abandoned his previous
nationalistic stand by ratifying the Rio Pact and
accepting the EXIM-Bank loan. Unable to restrain such
attacks, the government resorted to increasing repression,
authoritarianism and overt demagoguery. Opposition
leaders were persecuted and new restrictions were imposed
on the press.
^
Among the most outspoken critics of Peron was the
newspaper La Prensa owned by Alberto Gainza Paz, a member
of one of Argentina's most traditional and conservative
families. La Prensa
. founded in the 1870's, had
traditionally been the mouthpiece of Argentina's
landowning oligarchy. On January 26, 1951, the newspaper
was forced to cease publication because of a boycott by
the newsvendors' union and in March a special session of
Congress voted the seizure of the paper. This action
provoked an outcry against Peron in the United States
press, led by the U.S. news agency United Press which had
highly profitable business connections with the Buenos
Aires daily. On March 12, Assistant Secretary of State
Miller criticized the Argentine government's attitude
5
1
toward La Prensa during a press conference.
The U.S. press campaign against Peron's violations of
civil liberties and freedom of the press reached its peak
as the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers was being held in
Washington. Criticism of the Argentine government was
"constant, daily and widespread." On April 6, the
National Press Club of Washington called for a day of
national mourning to commemorate the passing of La
Prensa. 52 On April 13, the Argentine government
expropriated the newspaper and six months later, handed it
to the General Confederation of Labor. Although it was
strictly an internal Argentine problem, the expropriation
of La Prensa had a highly detrimental effect on U.S-
Argentine relations. The situation of La Prensa would
remain as a constant source of hostility to the Peron
regime from the U.S. press, liberal intellectual sectors
and labor groups until the overthrow of Peron.
For the remainder of the Truman Administration, U.S.
relations with Argentina would be distant. Strongly
disappointed in Peron, Washington would follow a policy of
"strict correctness" designed "to demonstrate that
Argentina has greater need of the US than the US has of
Argentina." 53 U.S. Embassy officials in Buenos Aires
resisted this change in direction, fearing that it would
lead to a return of the Braden policy which had had such
damaging effects on U . S . -Argentine relations. Instead,
they supported further attempts to reach an understanding
with Peron, pointing at the favorable results that such a
policy had produced in a short period of time; they
stressed the positive steps taken by Peron to solve the
problems of U.S. firms, Argentina's "active and
constructive" role in international organizations on
matters of interest to the United States, and the
ratification of the Rio Treaty. Arguing that Peron's
actions were more important than his words, Embassy
officials pointed out the real difficulties that Peron
faced because of nationalistic feelings and widespread
support of neutralism among the Argentine population and
strong resistance to the idea of sending Argentine troops
outside the hemisphere. In the Embassy's view, Peron had
taken a bold step when he ratified the Rio Pact since
"this action represented a radical departure from
traditional Argentine policy and its accomplishment
required the Peron government to proceed against strong
opposition both within and outside the Peronist Party."
As Embassy officials reflected, "the amazing thing is that
Peron has gone as far as he has" since, "when there was
talk of sending troops to Korea, he went too far for his
own good." Feeling that Peron was the best available
alternative at the moment, the Embassy counseled patience
"as long as we get results."
Washington, however, decided to go ahead with its
policy of cold "correctness", granting no special favors
to Argentina. The State Department refused to authorize
Argentina's request to apply the unused portion of the
EXIM-Bank loan to purchases of agricultural machinery. It
was hoped that the continuing need for U.S economic
assistance would eventually bring Peron to terms with U.S.
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objectives. 55 in 1952, Washington signed bilateral
defense treaties with several Latin American nations, but
Argentina was not offered one. The State Department
expected that concern in Argentine army circles over the
possibility of being surpassed militarily by Brazil would
constitute another source of pressure on Peron. 56
The worsening economic crisis exacerbated social and
economic conflicts in Argentina. 1952 was a disastrous
year. Agricultural output plunged once more, to 14.9
percent less than in 1951. GDP declined by 5.9 percent
and manufacturing fell by 2.6 percent. Inflation
compounded the crisis. Between 1945 and 1955, the money
supply increased 23.4 percent per year and the GDP 3
percent per year. To provide jobs for displaced workers,
Peron overburdened the public sector, thus increasing its
deficit. As economic deterioration intensified and
Peron gave up hope of obtaining economic aid from the
United States, his rhetoric became more aggressively
nationalistic. His administration became increasingly
critical of U.S. policies in Korea and anti-U.S.
propaganda was spread in other Latin American countries
through Argentine information media and labor attaches.
Peron's anti-imperialist propaganda, aimed mostly at
diverting domestic attention from economic problems,
alienated U.S. public opinion even further. 58
In November 1951, Peron was re-elected for a second
six-year term with 63 percent of the vote. Once more,
75
Peronists carried both Chambers of Congress and most of
the provinces. Shortly after the election, the government
issued a second Five-year Plan which marked a significant
reversal of Peron's earlier policies. The new plan was
aimed at increasing Argentina's capacity to export by
stimulating agricultural activities. It gave high
priority to imports of agricultural machinery and
fertilizers and contemplated the construction of new silos
and grain elevators. The government also planned to cut
down domestic consumption through a two-year wage-freeze
and periodic bans on domestic retail sales of meat. To
promote industrial recovery, the new plan emphasized wage
and price controls, increased productivity and development
of heavy industry. The government intended to accelerate
the development of the Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina
(SOMISA) , an army-sponsored mixed steel company, and to
tackle the energy crisis through projects aimed at
increasing the output of oil, coal and electricity. Since
petroleum and steel products constituted the two largest
items on Argentina's list of basic imports, development in
these two areas would enable the country to save foreign
59
exchange needed for other projects.
Peron had also decided to seek the contribution of
foreign capital for development in areas of particular
interest to the government, such as petroleum, steel,
electricity and automobile and agricultural machinery
manufacturing. Peron himself had never been hostile to
76
foreign capital participation in economic development and,
as early as 1946, he had tried to negotiate agreements
with foreign oil companies. Foreign investment had played
a major part in capital formation in Argentina,
representing 4 0 percent of total investment before World
War I but, after 1914, its participation had declined to
15 percent between 1920-1924, 10 percent between 1935-1939
and 3 percent in 1950. In fact, during World War II and
in the postwar years, any new additions to foreign
investment had come from the re-investment of unremitted
profits. The decline in foreign investment had been
partly the result of a worldwide tendency beginning with
the Depression and partly the response to policies adopted
by the Argentine governments after 1943. Peron now
intended to reverse this trend in the hope that foreign
investment would help solve the problem of
decapitalization and access to new technology, thus making
the process of capital accumulation required by
6 0industrialization less painful for the Argentine people.
Peron' s decision to seek foreign capital for the
development of basic industries led to a renewed effort by
his administration to improve relations with the United
States, the country which was in the best position to
provide the capital goods, technology and investment
capital needed for the projects of the new Five-year Plan.
The advent of a Republican Administration under Dwight
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CHAPTER 3
EISENHOWER AND LATIN AMERICA: THE ROAD TO CARACAS
Latin America's unenthusiastic response to the U.S.
request for help during the Korean war had provided clear
evidence of the depth of the region's disillusionment with
U.S. policy as well as of the degree of deterioration in
U.S. -Latin American relations. During the presidential
campaign, Eisenhower had criticized Truman's "neglect" of
Latin America, and he had promised to rectify this
situation. John Foster Dulles had reiterated those
denunciations in the hearings on his nomination as
Secretary of State as well as in his first major speech in
that office. These indications that Washington was
reconsidering its policies had helped raise hopes among
Latin American leaders that the United States was finally
going to listen to their economic concerns and endorse
their requests for a program of hemispheric economic aid
similar to the Marshall Plan. 1
The Eisenhower Administration regarded stable,
satisfactory relationships with the Latin American nations
as important to its broader international economic and
security policies. The United States had extensive
economic interests in the region. By 1953, total annual
trade between the United States and Latin America averaged
$7 billion, or over 25 percent of all U.S. international
trade, and direct U.S. investment in the area amounted to
89
$6 billion, representing over 30 percent of all U.S.
private investment overseas. Moreover, the Latin American
nations had materials with strategic military value such
as petroleum, copper, antimony, bauxite, quartz crystals,
tungsten, iron ore, tin, zinc and others whose
availability to the United States or to its enemies might
have a direct impact on the outcome of a war. 2
Washington considered hemispheric solidarity an
important component in the struggle against communism.
U.S. policy makers had gradually begun to view the Cold
War as a struggle between two ways of life, characterized
by increasing competition for economic and political
ascendancy over the Third World, rather than simply a
direct military confrontation. This view was reinforced
by changes in Soviet foreign economic policy after the
death of Stalin and more frequent Soviet offers of
economic, commercial and technical assistance to the Third
World. Against this background, the Eisenhower
Administration became increasingly concerned with the
spread of nationalism and rising popular demands in the
less developed countries. The Administration feared that
nationalism might provide a fertile ground for the advance
of communism, and this fear led to intensified efforts to
keep the Latin American countries unequivocally aligned
with the Western powers. Hemispheric solidarity and
eradication of communism became prominent objectives of
90
Eisenhower's Latin American policy as enunciated in NSC
144/1. 3
While most Latin American statesmen shared the
interest of the United States in preventing Soviet
penetration, they disagreed with Washington concerning the
means to achieve this aim. Most Latin American leaders
were convinced that the region's main problem was
underdevelopment, not communist subversion, and they
argued that, as long as this problem remained unsolved,
their countries would be subject to constant social unrest
and instability. Washington did not deny the importance
of economic development and modernization of Latin
America. In fact, disagreements over this issue were
mostly a matter of emphasis, method and degree of urgency.
Latin Americans tended to envision rapid economic growth
as possible only under comprehensive government planning
aimed at economic diversification and financed by both
public and private foreign and domestic capital. 4
The position of Latin America was supported by the
work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) which, from the time of its creation, had
become an important source of comprehensive studies on
economic development and of technical advice for the
governments in the region. Raul Prebisch had assembled an
outstanding group of intellectuals from various Latin
American countries who had set out to analyze the social
and economic problems of the area on the basis of the
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historical experiences of their countries. ECLA officials
had begun to challenge the conventional economic theory of
international trade, which argued that regional economic
specialization worked to the benefit of all by enabling
each country to exploit its comparative advantages and
maximize the use of its resources. According to ECLA,
specialization in raw materials limited a country's growth
prospects because of a secular tendency of the prices of
primary products to deteriorate relative to the prices of
manufactured goods. This meant that raw material
producers had to export an increasing quantity of their
products in order to continue importing the same amount of
industrial commodities. The resulting disparity between
the rate of growth of exports and imports led to an
increasingly severe foreign exchange constraint which
limited a country's growth prospects. ECLA was not
arguing against international trade. But it suggested
that the negative effect of terms of trade decline could
be ameliorated through the diversification of exports,
international commodity agreements to stabilize prices,
expanded markets for Latin American products through the
removal of tariff and other trade barriers in the
industrialized countries and long-term, low-interest loans
for development and economic diversification programs. 5
At the domestic level, ECLA favored an "inward-
oriented" development model based on import substitution
industrialization which would help reduce the expenditure
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of limited foreign exchange for imports while
simultaneously providing jobs and facilitating a more
rational use of national resources. The Commission's plan
called for the state to be actively involved in
development through a variety of devices such as
comprehensive planning, easy credit, infrastructural
support, favorable foreign exchange rates and
protectionist tariffs. ECLA did not oppose private
enterprise but it argued that the private sector would
respond better to the economic and social needs of the
country if the latter were clearly laid out within the
context of a development plan. Foreign capital
contribution was also recognized as vital for economic
growth because of the limited amount of domestic capital
available and the undesirabil ity of increasing national
investment by forced savings through altering current
levels and patterns of consumption.
ECLA's theories and philosophy were unacceptable to
most members of the Eisenhower Administration. The
Commission represented everything that the Administration
opposed. Primarily, Washington objected to ECLA's
advocacy of statist policies. In the context of the Cold
War, governmental planning was regarded by Washington as
symptomatic of socialistic, centrally-controlled economic
systems opposed to the American way of life. Washington
thus continued to emphasize orthodox economic policy for
development, pointing to the fact that it was a free
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economy that had led to the success of the United States.
The basic conflict between these two opposite economic
theories would continue to plague U.S.
-Latin American
relations throughout Eisenhower's first term in office.
Shortly after his inauguration, President Eisenhower
sent his brother Milton Eisenhower on a good-will, fact-
finding mission to South America. Latin American leaders
welcomed the gesture because they expected that it would
lead to changes in U.S. policy. The trip was highly
successful. 6 Eisenhower's report to the President,
published in November 1953, followed Washington's
traditional line, arguing that Latin American progress
could come only through "self-help" and recommending the
Latin American governments to adopt "sound" budgetary,
fiscal and credit policies, to promote political and
economic stability and to remove barriers to private
investment and trade.
But the report also suggested certain changes in U.S.
policies. Concerned with what he viewed as seriously
deteriorating conditions in Latin America, Eisenhower
singled out "economic cooperation" as "the key to better
relations between the United States and the nations to the
South". He viewed stable trade relations and expanded
markets for Latin American products as crucial to
hemispheric prosperity and harmony. He therefore
recommended that the United States "pursue stable trade
policies with Latin America, with a minimum of mechanisms
94
permitting the imposition of increased tariffs or quotas",
and that it expand its stockpiling program to help support
the prices of Latin America's raw materials. He also
strongly endorsed authorization of EXIM development loans
for infrastructure and development projects as well as
expansion of IBRD loans. 7 Despite its moderate tone, the
report triggered a heated Cabinet-level debate within the
Administration and, by the end of Eisenhower's first term,
most of its recommendations had not yet been implemented.
In fact, in spite of some new suggestions, the Eisenhower
Administration followed basically the same line that
Truman had adopted, postponing the summoning of an
economic conference for as long as possible and untiringly
telling Latin American leaders that the path to prosperity
lay in expanding foreign trade and attracting foreign
investment. 8
President Eisenhower strongly believed that the
expansion of trade and private investment were central to
world peace and prosperity. In his Inaugural Address, he
had emphasized the need to reduce foreign aid and
substitute instead an enlarged program of trade
liberalization and encouragement of private investment
abroad as the best way to domestic and international
economic growth. The concept of "trade not aid" became
the basis of his world economic program. However, in the
course of his Administration, Eisenhower would discover
that there were strong domestic obstacles to trade
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liberalization, and he would be forced to make major
concessions to protectionist forces. 9
In Eisenhower's view, the United States had to
continue along the path of trade expansion which had been
inaugurated with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934. This Act had empowered the President over a three-
year period to reduce American tariffs by as much as 50
percent through reciprocal trade agreements with foreign
countries. Between 1937 and 1948, the Trade Act had been
periodically extended by Congress without significant
amendments. 1948, however, had signalled the beginning of
an increasingly protectionist trend in Congress. The Act
had been extended for only one year and a "peril point"
amendment had been added, requiring the Tariff Commission
to survey all commodities on which the President proposed
to negotiate agreements and to specify rates of duty below
which tariffs could not be lowered without injuring
American industry. In addition, Congress had opposed U.S
membership to ITO and the Havana Charter had never been
ratified. The Executive branch, however, had continued to
press for lowering of trade barriers and, in 1949,
Congress had renewed the Trade Agreements Act for two
1
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years and dropped the peril-point clause.
In 1951, protectionist forces had resumed their
attempts to limit the President's authority to negotiate
trade barrier reductions. The Trade Act had been extended
for two more years, but Congress had restored the peril-
point amendment and added an escape clause which required
the President to withdraw concessions granted under trade
agreements in cases where, "as a result of unforeseen
developments and of the concession granted", a product was
being imported in such quantities as to cause or threaten
injury to domestic producers of the same product. Under
escape clause legislation, the Tariff Commission was
required to undertake the investigation of cases in which
domestic producers had been or could be injured by
increased imports and to submit a report of its findings
together with recommendations for action to the president,
who was in turn to decide on the course to follow. 11
In both his Inagural Address and State of the Union
message, Eisenhower had urged Congress to extend the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act for another three years
and to authorize him to make additional tariff cuts.
However, aware of strong opposition to further trade
liberalization among protectionist business and
conservative legislators, Eisenhower had eventually
decided to ask Congress for only a one-year extension and
to appoint a commission, headed by Inland Steel director
Clarence Randall, to undertake a comprehensive study of
12the nation's entire foreign economic policy. In
January, 1954, the Randall Commission presented its
report, recommending a three-year renewal of the Trade
Agreements Act, authorization for an additional 15 percent
reduction in tariff rates and retention of the peril point
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and escape clause provisions. Despite the moderate tone
of the Commission's recommendations, Eisenhower failed to
get Congress to implement them and he obtained only a
further one-year extension of the Trade Act. By 1954, the
prospects for a forceful program of trade liberalization
did not look very good.-*-^
This trend worried Eisenhower. In his personal
diary, he expressed anger at the "short-sightedness
bordering upon tragic stupidity of many who fancy
themselves to be the greatest believers in and supporters
of capitalism (or a free competitive economy) but who
blindly support measures and conditions that cannot fail
in the long run to destroy any free economic system."
This inability of his countrymen "to make the immediate
sacrifice in favor of a long term investment" would
eventually play into the hands of the Communists.
Eisenhower believed that in a world "where men and women
and their children suffer the pains of hunger and
exposure", it was the responsibility of the "free world"
to "espouse and sustain, under the leadership of America,
a system of world trade that will allow backward people to
make a decent living, even if a minimum one measured by
American standards" or else "in the long run we must fall
prey to the communist attack." "The United States", he
wrote "cannot continue to live in a world where it must,
for the disposal of its products, export vast portions of
its industrial and agricultural products unless it also
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imports a sufficiently great amount of foreign products to
allow countries to pay for the surpluses they receive from
us." Moreover, given the "American complete dependence
upon other areas for certain types of materials such as
tin, cobalt, uranium, magnesium, natural rubber and,
increasingly, crude oil" it is imperative that "the areas
in which these materials are found are under the control
of people who are friendly to us and who want to trade
with us" or else "we are bound in the long run to suffer
the most disastrous and doleful consequences." 14
One of the main obstacles in the way to expanded
trade liberalization was the U.S. domestic agricultural
problem. When Eisenhower became president, the U.S.
government was already committed to a program of
agricultural price supports through parity payments
coupled with purchases and storage of agricultural goods,
administered by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
under the authority of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933 (AAA) . To make high price supports effective, the
AAA provided authority under Section 22 to impose import
quotas and subsidies, following a Tariff Commission
investigation, on imports that might interfere with any of
its programs. U.S. agriculture was also protected by the
escape clause provision of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act. Furthermore, section 32 of the AAA authorized the
government to use 3 0 percent of the annual customs
revenues to subsidize agricultural exports. In 1944, the
CCC had been authorized to sell commodities for export
below the parity or market price in order to meet
competitive world prices. 15 These protectionist policies
were in direct contradiction with U.S. aims of
liberalizing world trade and were naturally resented by
other countries.
The inconsistencies in the U.S. trade program became
increasingly evident during the Eisenhower Administration
as agricultural exports, which had increased greatly
during the war and immediate postwar, began to decline
when European agricultural production recovered. Between
1951 and 1952, the dollar value of agricultural exports
dropped by nearly 30 percent. Surpluses started
accumulating as the CCC acquired large holdings of wheat,
cotton, tobacco, corn, vegetable oils and dairy products.
CCC stocks increased 70 percent in 1952 and 100 percent in
1953. These developments triggered a series of
restrictive actions under Section 22 and import quotas and
fees were applied to several trade agreement products
during and after 1953. 16
In April 1953, following a Tariff Commission
investigation, Eisenhower proclaimed Section 22 quotas or
fees on butter, dried milk products, cheese, peanuts,
peanut oil, flaxseed and linseed oil. A few days later,
he announced a quota on filberts. In October 1953,
following a Commission recommendation for an import quota
on oats, the United States negotiated an arrangement with
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Canada under which Canada agreed to restrict its exports
of oats to the United States instead of facing a Section
22 quota. In March 1954, Section 22 quotas were applied
to rye and its products. in November 1954, following a
Tariff Commission recommendation for import quotas on tung
oil and tung nuts, the United States negotiated agreements
with Argentina and Paraguay under which these countries
agreed to limit exports of tung oil and tung nuts to the
United States instead of facing Section 22 quotas. In
October 1954, Section 22 quotas were proclaimed for barley
and its products. During 1953, both the Tariff Commission
and the Department of Agriculture recommended fees on
wool, but Eisenhower turned down the idea because of the
disruptive effect it would have had on U.S. trade-
agreement commitments with the British Commonwealth. A
system of direct price support payments to wool growers
was implemented instead. 17
By the end of 1955, import quotas or fees had been
established for a large number of agricultural commodities
subject to price support. These measures had very
damaging effects on U.S. -Latin American relations and gave
rise to widespread criticism, particularly from those
countries that were adversely affected by them. U.S.
protectionist and interventionist measures also brought
vigorous complaints from GATT members who felt that the
United States was not carrying out its GATT commitments in
good faith. During the general revision of the GATT
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provisions in 1955, U.S. officials pressed for and
obtained a waiver from the GATT rules for any Section 22
actions that it had taken in the past or might have to
take in the future. Even though other countries, hard
pressed by Washington, eventually yielded to the U.S.
position, this exception set up a very bad precedent for
the future of trade liberalization, and it did not solve
the inconsistency that existed in the Eisenhower trade
program. 18
Given the strength of the farm bloc in Congress and
the popularity of the commodity price-support program with
farmers throughout the nation, the option of reforming the
whole domestic agricultural program or adjusting price-
support schemes to more reasonable levels was fraught with
political dangers and, therefore, not very attractive for
the Administration. During the 1952 presidential campaign
and again in the first State of the Union message,
Eisenhower had promised to continue supports on farm
commodities until 1954. 19 Throughout 1953, the
Administration reviewed the farm program and explored
different proposals but, in his agricultural message of
January 1954, the President counseled policies that
differed from current programs only in degree; he
recommended flexible price supports, restricted use of
acreage allotments and a modernized parity formula. The
Agricultural Act of 1954 only lowered price supports to 75
to 90 percent of parity. 20 Meanwhile, as CCC inventories
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amounting to $5.5 billion piled up, daily storage charges
reached an average of $852,000 for 1954 and it was
estimated that they would rise to $1,207,000 in 1955. 21
As agricultural surpluses continued to grow and the
possibilities for adjustments on the home front looked
dimmer and dimmer, producers and legislators began to look
to foreign markets as the place to unload them. In the
spring of 1953, Section 550 was added to the Mutual
Security Act, directing the Executive branch to use $250
million of the funds allocated for Mutual Security to
purchase surplus agricultural commodities. These
commodities could then be sold for local currencies to
other nations and the funds derived from such sales could
be used for mutual security purposes. The new program was
continued in 1954, through Section 402 of the Mutual
Security Act which replaced Section 550, and
appropriations were increased to $350 million. 22 In the
summer of 1954, Congress passed the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480)
,
authorizing the use of $700 million to promote sales of
surplus agricultural commodities for local currencies
(Title I) and of $300 million for donations of food for
famine and other "urgent" relief programs (Title II) .
Title III authorized food donations for emergencies within
the United States and allowed the government to exchange
surplus agricultural commodities for strategic and other
scarce materials on a barter base. Moreover, subsidies
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derived from Section 32 funds and CCC sales at or below
market prices continued to be used as ways to dispose of
U.S surpluses abroad. In 1955, P.L. 480 appropriations
were increased to 1.5 billion and in 1956 to 3 billion.
In the mid-fifties, P.L. 480 sales accounted for over one-
third of all U.S. agricultural exports. 23
Although humanitarian and altruistic motivations
undoubtedly played a part in the implementation of P.L.
480, this program was primarily a means by which the U.S.
government sought to relieve itself of onerous surpluses.
The decision taken by the Eisenhower Administration to
solve the domestic problem of agricultural overproduction
by exporting the surplus provided only a temporary remedy
and simply postponed the moment when more rational (though
politically less attractive) farm policies would have to
be adopted. At the same time, it created friction with
other agricultural exporting countries who feared that
P.L. 480 sales, combined with CCC sales at below market
prices, might have market-depressing effects and reduce
their own commercial export opportunities despite the fact
that the recipient nations were required to pledge that
the surplus commodities received would be in addition to
the amounts that they normally purchased. 24
Trade liberalization was only one aspect of the
Administration's foreign economic program. Almost as
important, in its view, was the need to encourage the flow
of U.S. private investment abroad, particularly to the
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less developed countries. In his first State of the Union
message, Eisenhower had committed his administration to
"doing whatever our Government can properly do to
encourage the flow of private American investment abroad"
including, "as a serious and explicit purpose of our
foreign policy, the encouragement of a hospitable climate
for such investment in foreign nations." 25
Eisenhower was concerned that foreign private
investment was not going to Latin America in sufficient
amounts to stimulate the region's economic growth. Since
the end of World War II, U.S. investment in Latin America
had been declining and, between 1950 and 1953, the net new
dollar flow had averaged only $15 million, with most of
the investment concentrated in a few selected countries
and fields. In the postwar period, the largest share of
U.S. investment in Latin America had gone to the petroleum
industry, attracted by its high rate of return which rose
from 20.4 percent in 1945 to 28.4 percent in 1948 and to
31.1 percent between 1948 and 1951. 26 In addition, a
large percentage of the total increase in postwar U.S.
investment in Latin America had resulted from the
reinvestment of back earnings rather than from new capital
contributions. Reinvested earnings had made up 3 8 percent
of total investment between 1946 and 1951 and 55 percent
in 1951. In 1954, reinvested profits had increased from a
total of $152 million in 1953 to $193 million while direct
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private investment had dropped from $93 million to $82
million. 27
U.S. policymakers believed that it was primarily the
responsibility of Latin America to attract private
investment by creating an appropriate climate for it.
They attributed the economic problems of the region to
misguided policies such as state intervention,
maintainance of high cost industries through subsidies,
inflation, hostility toward free enterprise, expropriation
threats and trade restrictions. Secretary of the Treasury
George Humphrey repeatedly stated his belief that, if the
Latin American countries "behaved properly", they would be
able to obtain adeguate amounts of capital from private
sources for their development. U.S. government officials
rarely missed an opportunity to give foreign governments
advice on the advantages of relying on private enterprise
to promote economic development and on ways to create a
"favorable climate" to attract foreign investors.
However, the Administration also believed that it was
its responsibility to stimulate the flow of private
capital abroad through tax and other business incentives.
Thus, Washington resumed efforts began under Truman to
negotiate bilateral Investment Treaties which would ensure
non-discriminatory treatment for U.S. investors, prompt
and adequate compensation in the case of expropriation and
guarantees for the conversion and withdrawal of profits
and capital. Most Latin American governments, however,
were reluctant to accept such treaties as proposed by
Washington because they felt that they did not give
sufficient recognition to the principle that foreign
companies must be subject to the laws and courts of the
country in which they are operating. Thus, by 1955,
Washington had managed to sign only one investment treaty,
with the government of Haiti. Eisenhower also continued
the Investment Guarantee Program begun by the U.S.
government in 1951 to insure U.S. overseas investors
against risks of expropriation and inconvertibility. In
addition, the Administration encouraged tax reductions on
business income from foreign subsidiaries to 14 percent
below the rate on domestic corporate income and deferral
of taxes on income from foreign branches until repatriated
in the United States. However, in spite of these
incentives, private capital continued to move very slowly,
particularly into less developed countries. 29
Eisenhower was convinced that trade and foreign
investment could and should lead development abroad. The
President was a fiscal conservative, and he feared that
foreign aid was putting an excessive burden on the
nation's budget. In his view, trade liberalization and
the free flow of private capital should reduce the need
for external financing by making it possible for the
developing countries to earn the income necessary for
needed imports and development projects. In the
meantime, the most pressing needs for external financing
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could be met primarily by the IBRD and the EXIM-Bank. The
IBRD, however, had a very poor record in making loans to
Latin America since, from the moment of its creation, it
had been almost exclusively concerned with the
reconstruction of Europe. Furthermore, IBRD loans had to
be repaid in hard currency at market rates, and they
applied only to projects for which private capital was not
available on "reasonable terms." Since the Bank itself
determined what these "reasonable terms" were, Latin
American governments were usually reluctant to resort to
this Bank for credit, as this meant that they would have
to accept a number of conditions (such as implementation
of an economic plan devised by the Bank, monetary and
fiscal controls, avoidance of policies favoring state
intervention in the economy or government ownership of
business, etc) which they often did not want to or could
not politically afford to accept. 31
The EXIM-Bank thus became, in practice, the only
source of development loans for Latin America. But, in
the postwar period, EXIM-Bank loans had been going
predominantly to Europe and the Bank's operations in Latin
America had been substantially reduced. 32 To make things
worst, the Eisenhower Administration had decided to
curtail EXIM-Bank activities even further. The EXIM-Bank
obtained its funds from the U.S. Treasury and Secretary of
the Treasury George Humphrey, determined to reduce fiscal
claims and to balance the budget, had convinced Eisenhower
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to restrict EXIM-Bank lending operations to short-term
export credits. Humphrey believed that long-term
development lending should be the exclusive responsibility
of the IBRD, and he sustained this position throughout his
tenure in the Eisenhower Administration. EXIM development
loans dropped from $257 million in 1952 to $40 million in
1953 and the percentage going to Latin America fell from
$147 million in 1952 to $7.6 million in 1953. 33
Eisenhower's decision to reduce EXIM lending
authority was resisted by some Administration officials,
particularly those members of the State Department who
were responsible for U.S. -Latin American relations. Led
by Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs John
Moors Cabot and supported by Milton Eisenhower and by the
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Harold
Stassen, they fought to reverse Eisenhower's decision.
These officials argued that private capital was not going
to Latin America fast enough and that, even if it were, it
would not be able to fulfill all the capital needs of the
region. In their view, public financing at reasonable
interest rates should be made available for
infrastructural development projects which, in turn, would
contribute to make the region more attractive for foreign
investors. EXIM authority to make long-term loans should
be restored and extended to cover development loans.
Other groups were also concerned about the
consequences of Humphrey's EXIM-Bank policy.
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International traders felt that the lack of adequate
financing required for sales of costly capital equipment
would put them in an unfavorable position with respect to
European and Japanese competitors, who were subsidized by
their governments. Their concerns found a responsive
chord in the Senate Banking and Currency Committee on
which the EXIM-Bank depended for legislative support.
Senator Homer Capehart, chairman of the Committee, decided
to undertake a thorough study of the operations of both
the EXIM-Bank and the IBRD and he organized a 131-member
Citizens Advisory Committee, with representatives from
industry, agriculture, labor, commerce and finance for
this purpose. 60 percent of the Committee members
represented major corporations, banks and business
35associations
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Capehart also organized a seven-week trip to fourteen
Latin American countries. During this trip the Senator,
accompanied by a staff of experts, held meetings with
Latin American and U.S. businessmen, bankers, government
officials and other groups to discuss obstacles to the
expansion of trade, problems facing foreign investors and
the need for financial assistance. In every country he
visited, he found that there was strong interest in
imports from the United States but that the lack of
adequate financing prevented more purchases. Capehart
returned to his country convinced that the lack of
adequate channels for long-term financing of sales of
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equipment necessary to implement economic development
projects would only lead to more state intervention and
government ownership in the private sector. He was now
determined to use all his influence and that of the
Citizens Advisory Committee to press the case on behalf of
expanded EXIM and IBRD short- and long-term lending in
Latin America. 3
The Banking and Currency Committee held two hearings
in January and June of 1954 to explore all the above
mentioned problems. The reports supplied by all the
different groups that participated in the Hearings and in
the previous studies favored substantially increased
lending authority for both the EXIM-Bank and the IBRD. In
June 1954, Capehart introduced Senate Bill 3589 proposing
the expansion of EXIM lending practices and a $500 million
increase of its lending authority. However, in spite of
the combined pressure from U.S. exporters, members of
Congress and administration officials responsible for
U.S. -Latin American relations, Humphrey managed to retain
Eisenhower's support for his position through 1953 and
most of 1954. 37
In 1954, developments in Guatemala prompted the
Administration to review its Latin American policy.
Eisenhower and Dulles feared that the Guatemalan
government, headed by Jacobo Arbenz, had been infiltrated
by communists and had thus become a threat to U.S.
strategic and commercial interests in the area. In 1952,
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Arbenz had begun a program of land reform which involved
the expropriation of 255,000 acres of uncultivated lands
belonging to the U.S. United Fruit Company. Washington
had immediately made strong diplomatic representations on
behalf of the company and had begun to apply economic and
political pressures against the Arbenz government. 38
As the situation in Guatemala continued to
deteriorate, Washington denounced the presence of
communists among Arbenz 7 advisers and began to seek Latin
American support for collective action against his
regime. Dulles hoped to get the Latin American nations to
condemn Guatemala at the Tenth Inter-American Conference
to be held at Caracas in March 1954 and to endorse an
anti-communist resolution that would provide a basis for
collective action against the Arbenz government. Knowing
that it would have to offer some economic concessions to
secure hemispheric support for its position, the
Administration set about to review its Latin American
policies. On January 11, Milton Eisenhower submitted to
the President a confidential supplement to his 1953
report, with recommendations on actions that could be
taken to solve certain specific problems in individual
countries. On reading the report, President Eisenhower
commented that he was "struck by the fact that a very
small loan investment or grant on our part might reap very
definite and extensive advantages to us." But no further
3 9
action was taken on his brother's recommendations.
1Meanwhile, discussions proceeded among other
government officials and different options including trade
concessions, commodity price stabilization agreements,
higher stockpile ceilings, bilateral economic assistance
and expanded EXIM and IBRD lending were evaluated and
rejected. With the Conference less than a month ahead,
U.S. officials in charge of Latin American affairs
increasingly began to express their frustration at the
Administration's failure to reach a minimum consensus on
economic policy proposals to bring to Caracas. Both the
U.S representative to the OAS, John Dreier and the
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs John Moors
Cabot, made pessimistic forecasts regarding the outcome of
the Conference and stepped up pressure for some
definitions. 40 Cabot, knowing that it would be difficult
to reach a compromise concerning trade issues, decided to
press instead for resumption of long-term EXIM loans and
approval of an "assistance package" based on some of
Milton Eisenhower's recommendations for cultural and
technical assistance programs and involving appropriations
of about $80 million. Cabot also urged Dulles to appeal
to President Eisenhower and suggest that he send a special
message on Latin America to Congress recommending support
for the assistance package. 41 Dulles responded that he
"did not have enough time to get into these matters" on
the eve of his departure to Berlin and Cabot's proposal
was dropped. 42
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Shortly after that, the Undersecretary of State
Walter Bedell Smith sent a circular telegram to U.S.
diplomats in Latin America instructing them to "prevent
the development in Latin American thinking of the idea
that their approving a strong resolution against communism
would constitute a concession to the U.S. which could only
be justified by concessions on our part in the economic
field." For Smith, "the political-security phase of the
OAS relationship can and must stand on its own feet." In
his view, "the issue of communism in the hemisphere"
provided a test for the United States to find out "whether
that relationship is a useful and effective one." 43
By the time the Caracas Conference opened the U.S.
delegation did not yet have any new economic proposal to
offer to the Latin American delegates. The negotiations
at Caracas were long and complicated. One after the
other, Latin American delegates pressed U.S. officials to
commit their government to consider proposals aimed at
stabilizing prices of raw materials, reducing competition
for markets from agricultural surplus disposal programs,
providing expanded access for Latin American products
through removal of tariff and other trade restrictions and
supplying increased financial assistance for economic
development. They presented "lengthy and well-prepared
documents" which, in the State Department's view, "had





Dulles' main concern was to secure the passage of the
anti-communist resolution. But most of the Latin American
delegates, fearful of a return to interventionist policies
in the hemisphere, showed little enthusiasm for a
declaration specifically condemning Guatemala. As the
debate continued, the U.S. Cabinet met and hastily
approved Cabot's earlier proposal, authorizing Dulles to
announce the Administration's intention to expand the
lending authority of the EXIM-Bank and to allow the Bank
to "consider on their merits applications for the
financing of development projects which are not being made
by the International Bank and which are in our common
interest, are economically sound, are within the capacity
of the prospective borrower to repay and within the
prudent loaning capacity of the Bank." Dulles also agreed
to continue the discussion of hemispheric issues at an
inter-American economic conference to be held in Rio de
Janeiro before the end of the year.
These announcements were not enough to palliate the
discontent and fears of the Latin American delegates and,
after two weeks of intensive debate, the Conference passed
a weakened version of Dulles' resolution, recommending the
calling "of a Meeting of Consultation to consider the
adoption of appropriate action" in the case of any threat
of "domination or control of the political institutions of
any American state by the international communist
movement." Argentina and Mexico abstained and Guatemala
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voted against it. Dulles left the Conference immediately
after the resolution had been approved, delegating the
discussion of economic and social questions which were the
primary concern of the Latin American representatives to
his assistants. 46
Reviewing the results of Caracas at a National
Security Council meeting, the Secretary admitted that "it
had not been easy to secure general acceptance of the
anti-communist resolution" since "there was much in the
climate of opinion which militated against quick success."
He commented that he had "encountered much unhappiness and
anxiety with respect to the commercial and financial
policies which the Administration was following in Latin
America" and that "it had required two weeks of very
intensive work and almost daily meetings with the other
Foreign Ministers to change this atmosphere and to secure
general agreement to the resolution." 47 However, the
Administration was pleased with the results obtained and,
as Caracas passed, U.S. officials began to prepare for the
next meeting at Rio. In the meantime, EXIM-Bank policy
remained unchanged and, between the time of the Caracas
Conference and the end of the year, only $25.2 million
were loaned to Latin America, $15 million of which went to
4 8
Brazil to finance the purchase of U.S wheat.
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CHAPTER 4
PERON AND THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION I
In 1953, Peron had moved forward in his effort to
improve Argentina's relationships with the United States.
Soon after Eisenhower took office, Peron called in the
United States Ambassador, Albert Nufer and, blaming all
past tensions on the Truman Administration, suggested that
the time had come for a rapprochement between the two
countries. He followed this action by ordering his press
organs to limit anti-US attacks and by lifting official
restrictions on the operations of U.S. news agencies. In
subsequent meetings with Nufer, Peron informed him of his
desire to cooperate with the Embassy in trying to solve
the outstanding problems between the two countries,
including those affecting U.S. business firms already in
or seeking to enter Argentina. He suggested that he would
welcome the entrance of "responsible" private investment
capital, particularly in fields of special interest to the
government such as power, steel production and petroleum
development.
*
Several important groups in the United States
welcomed this chance to improve relations with Argentina
and pressed the administration to give a favorable
response to Peron 's friendly gestures. Outstanding among
such groups were businessmen with investments in Argentina
who expected that an improved atmosphere would facilitate
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the settlement of certain specific problems afflicting
their companies. Other groups interested in promoting
better relationships included prospective investors
attracted by Argentina's commercial possibilities; the
military, concerned with strengthening the hemispheric
front against communism; and State Department officials
and Congressmen who shared one or both of the above-
mentioned concerns.^
In July 1953, President Eisenhower decided to send
his brother Milton on a fact-finding tour of Latin
America. At first Eisenhower was reluctant to include
Argentina on the itinerary, primarily because of his great
concern over the strong U.S. public hostility to Peron.
Dulles, however, eventually managed to persuade Eisenhower
that a visit to Argentina would be in the interest of the
United States since it might afford an opportunity to
capitalize on Peron' s friendly overtures and to clear up




A week before the visit, Peron submitted to Congress
the draft of a new investment law intended to establish a
favorable climate for foreign investment. The law
guaranteed that foreign investors who brought new capital
into the country under its provisions would be allowed to
take out profits up to a maximum of eight percent annually
and, after ten years of operations, to withdraw their
investment in a series of quotas. The law gave the
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Executive broad discretionary authority in reaching
agreements with potential investors. This provision
triggered a heated debate in the Argentine Chamber of
Deputies since opposition parties feared that it would
open the way for government concessions to foreign oil
companies. In spite of this opposition, the law was
enacted by the Argentine Congress in August, 1953. 4 State
Department officials were disappointed because the law did
not solve the problem of accumulated backlogs of profit
remittances for firms already operating in Argentina. The
oil companies were also disappointed because the
percentage of profit remittances authorized was too small.
In spite of these shortcomings, the law was welcomed as
evidence of a substantially improved attitude toward
foreign investment. 5
The Eisenhower mission was received with great
cordiality by the Argentine government, and it was highly
successful. Besides the top-level conversations between
Peron and Milton Eisenhower, economic experts of the two
nations discussed trade, finance and the implications of
the new legislation on private investment. Through his
conversations with Peron, Dr. Eisenhower became convinced
of the President's anti-communism and of his sincere
commitment to join the United States in the defense of the
hemisphere in the event of Communist aggression. As a
military man, Peron had a high personal regard for General
Eisenhower which he expressed on several occasions. In
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the course of a conversation with Nufer, Peron asked the
Ambassador to tell Eisenhower that "he is the Senior
General and I will carry out his orders." 7 Shortly after
Milton Eisenhower's visit, Peron reiterated his support
for hemispheric solidarity in the course of a press
conference in Paraguay, praising Eisenhower as one of the
most powerful leaders in the Western World and adding that
"fortunately, we have an Eisenhower in the United States"
in the face of the present danger. 8
Peron was convinced that a Third World War was
inevitable, and he wanted to prepare Argentina to play an
important role in the defense of the southern part of
South America, On several occasions, he told U.S.
officials that Argentina would immediately and strongly
ally herself with the United States in the event of such a
war. 9 Peron 7 s stance on this issue was of particular
importance to the Eisenhower Administration, which had
made anti-communism one of the central features of its
Latin American policy. Washington was convinced that any
appreciable improvement in U . S . -Argentine relations would
contribute to hemispheric solidarity and strengthen the
defense of the free world against communist aggression.
Dulles believed that it was "of the greatest importance to
develop a sound basis of solidarity with the Argentine
government to prevent its becoming a possible communist
1
0
threat to inter-American solidarity."
However, not everybody in the United States shared
the Administration's interest in a rapprochement with
Argentina. The Eisenhower mission was strongly criticized
by liberal and labor groups who accused the government of
trying to bribe Peron through promises of large loans.
The members of the Eisenhower mission strongly denied such
charges and publicly acclaimed the "constructive 11 attitude
of President Peron and the coincidence of interests
between Argentina and the United States. 11
In fact, Peron's efforts to seek a rapprochement with
the United States were not aimed at obtaining direct U.S.
loans or aid but rather at encouraging U.S. private
business to liberalize credit terms and to invest in
Argentina in fields that would facilitate the fulfillment
of the development projects included in the new Five-Year
Plan. Representatives of several U.S. companies such as
Standard Railway Equipment
,
Westinghouse , John Deere,
Caterpillar, International Harvester, Kaiser, A. G . McKee
,
Merck & Co., Monsanto Chemical visited Argentina,
attracted by the provisions of the new investment law.
They found strong interest among Argentine businessmen and
government officials in possible agreements with U.S.
firms concerning new investments and purchases of U.S.
products. Consequently, several companies approached the
EXIM-Bank with proposals to finance projects in Argentina.
Bank officials told them that they could only consider
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relatively small loan applications due to the Bank's
limited lending capacity. 12
In September 1953, Ambassador Nufer visited the EXIM-
Bank to discuss Argentina's position and the concerns of
U.S. businessmen with top-level bank officials. After
outlining the political and economic situation in
Argentina and the marked improvement in U . S . -Argentine
relations which had followed Milton Eisenhower's visit,
Nufer recommended a change in EXIM-bank policy. He told
Bank officials that "if the Export-Import Bank or some
other institution did not assist American exporters in
holding their own in the Argentine market the Germans and
other Europeans would increasingly crowd the Americans out
of the picture." EXIM officials reiterated their policy
of financing only small projects, adding that this
limitation would probably make it impossible for the bank
to finance any large projects in Argentina. However, in
view of the increased number of applications which were
coming in on Argentine projects, the Bank was conducting
an over-all study of the Argentine economic and financial
picture. 13 On several other occasions, Nufer insisted on
the need to help U.S. exporters finance sales of costly
capital equipment in Argentina. Given Argentina's
excellent record in paying off her debts, the Embassy was
not "unduly concerned over the possibility of any
Argentine default", but was "more concerned over the
probability that our position and influence in this market
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will deteriorate seriously unless U.S. manufacturers




The concerns of U.S. exporters also found a
sympathetic audience in the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee. During his tour of Latin America, Senator
Homer Capehart spent four days in Argentina. After
numerous meetings with Peron, government officials, U.S.
and Argentine businessmen, industrialists and bankers,
Capehart left the country convinced that there were many
opportunities for business investment and sales of
eguipment in Argentina, especially in the steel and oil
industries. Capehart was also convinced that failure to
find a reasonable way to finance sound projects would only
• • • 1 ^lead to more state intervention in the economy.
Peron's new Five-Year Plan emphasized three areas of
development of particular interest to the government:
electricity, steel and oil. Argentina was facing a
serious energy crisis. Its rapidly industrializing
economy demanded larger and larger amounts of electricity
and existing capacity had failed to keep pace with the
rising demand. Between 1945 and 1950, capacity had
increased from 1.29 million to 1.35 million kilowatts, an
annual rate of only 2 percent. The problem of power
shortage was particularly critical in the Gran Buenos
Aires where most of the industries were concentrated. The
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government planned to increase capacity in the area from
600,000 to 11,000,000 kilowatts. 16
The electric power industry had traditionally been
dominated by foreign companies. The Compania Argentina de
Electricidad (CADE) owned by Belgian interests, provided
most of the power for the city and province of Buenos
Aires with an installed capacity of 500,000 kilowatts.
Other smaller firms supplied electricity in most of the
provinces. The only U.S. company with investments in
electric utilities in Argentina was American and Foreign
Power (AMFORP) , a subsidiary of Electric Bond & Share,
with relatively small holdings distributed in different
Argentine provinces. Since the late 1930 7 s, the guestion
of foreign-owned electric utilities had become a sensitive
political issue in Argentina and foreign companies had
acquired a bad reputation because of charges of illegal
monopolistic practices and bribery over the securing of
their concessions. Moreover, as a result of inflation, it
had become increasingly difficult to keep the rates high
enough and the services provided by the companies had
deteriorated
.
Since the 1940 's, AMFORP had been experiencing
problems with provincial governments that had either
intervened or expropriated subsidiaries amounting to forty
percent of AMFORP ' s total investment in Argentina. The
provincial governments had made nominal payments
representing approximately eighteen percent of the book
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value of the expropriated properties, which AMFORP valued
at $50 million. In 1949, after the approval of the
reformed Argentine constitution which declared public
services to be the inalienable property of the state,
AMFORP had offered to sell all its Argentine subsidiaries
to the central government. Such plans, however, had to be
abandoned in 1952 because of the difficult foreign
exchange situation that made it impossible for the
Argentine government to accept any settlement involving a
substantial dollar outlay at that moment. 18
In October 1953, Mr. W.E. Knox of Westinghouse
visited Argentina and obtained a contract from the
Argentine government for his company to supply all the
equipment needed to build a new power plant in Buenos
Aires. After preparing a detailed study of materials and
prices, Westinghouse applied to the EXIM-Bank for an
exporter's credit of $19.4 million to finance the project.
Subsequently, Peron reached an agreement with CADE for the
company to undertake the installation and operation of the
19
new generating units to be provided by Westinghouse.
AMFORP vigorously opposed any EXIM-Bank loan for new
power facilities in Argentina until its own claims had
been settled. The company wanted to sell all its
properties to the government and pull out of Argentina
completely. Though its holdings in Argentina were
relatively small, AMFORP had a strong leverage through its
connections with the EXIM-Bank and the U.S. Commerce
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Department. The company was one of the largest U.S.
investors in Latin America and, between 194 5 and 1960, it
was the biggest EXIM borrower among all U.S. corporations.
EXIM-Bank officials repeatedly assured AMFORP that they
would keep the company's problems in mind in any
consideration of power loans to Argentina. 20
Peron' s efforts to improve relations with the United
States had given AMFORP new hopes of achieving a
satisfactory solution to its problems in Argentina, and it
was determined to use all its influence to make this issue
a precondition to the granting of any loans to the Peron
government. On several occasions, Ambassador Nufer
brought up the AMFORP issue in his conversations with
Peron, emphasizing that a favorable solution of this
problem would contribute to create an atmosphere of
confidence among prospective U.S. investors. Although
Peron showed a favorable disposition to mediate in the
conflict between the provincial governments and the
company, there were certain legal issues involving
provincial jurisdiction which could not be sidestepped
that slowed down the pace of negotiations. Moreover, the
existence of considerable public sentiment for the
nationalization of the electric power industry as a whole
limited Peron's freedom of action to bargain on this
point. 21
Another field of special interest to the Argentine
government was steel production. Peron had decided to
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speed up the development of the Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia
Argentina (SOMISA) through the construction of a modern,
integrated steel mill. Westinghouse offered to sell
Argentina the necessary equipment for the steel mill, and
the company applied to the EXIM-Bank for a loan to finance
the sale. * Once more, AMFORP would prove to be a strong
obstacle in the way of negotiations leading to any EXIM
loan to the Peron government.
In November 1953, the Argentine government signed an
agreement with the Czechoslovakian government to purchase
a steel-plate finishing mill that had been built in the
United States for a Czechoslovakian firm but which had
been placed under embargo when Czechoslovakia joined the
communist bloc. The U.S. Treasury Department disapproved
the agreement between Argentina and Czechoslovakia and
refused to release the blocking order, announcing that the
mill would be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder. Argentina bought the mill on May 10, 1954 for $9
million, and the component parts were shipped to Buenos
Aires. The sale of the mill was strongly criticized by
those sectors in the United States that opposed any
further strengthening of relations with the Peron regime.
The purchase of the mill, however, did not solve all of
SOMISA' s problems since the most expensive component
required to make the mill operative, the blast furnace for
producing cast iron, still had to be acquired. In March,
1954, SOMISA signed a contract with a U.S. firm, A.G.
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McKee for the purchase of the blast furnace, and McKee
applied to the EXIM for a loan to finance the operation. 23
As several months passed without any EXIM response to
the various applications presented by different companies
requesting financing for the Argentine power and steel
projects, Argentina began to explore the possibilities of
acquiring the needed equipment in Europe. Gomez Morales
visited Great Britain and Germany and received very
favorable offers for the sale of British electrical and
German steel mill equipment on acceptable extended terms.
Westinghouse, facing the possibility of losing profitable
business to European competitors, renewed its attempts to
expedite the resolution of the proposals pending at the
EXIM-Bank. In the course of conversations with Henry
Holland, who had replaced Cabot as Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, and with other State
Department officers, representatives of Westinghouse and
CADE, repeatedly pointed out the irrationality of losing a
business opportunity that would provide work not only to
Westinghouse but to approximately "a hundred of suppliers
of electrical equipment in twenty nine different states."
They stressed the disadvantageous position of U.S.
manufacturers vis-a-vis their European competitors, who
could count on the assistance of their governments in
financing their sales abroad. CADE officers preferred
U.S. equipment for technical reasons but, unless U.S.
firms could offer terms of payment comparable to those
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given by the Europeans, they would have to consider the
proposals of the British companies or else stay out of the
project and let the Argentine government build the new
plant itself. SOMISA officers had also repeatedly told
Westinghouse representatives that they preferred U.S.
(eguipment which was best suited to their needs, but if
they could not buy it they would have to do with German
J
equipment rather than abandon the whole project. 24
jWestinghouse and CADE officers argued that an EXIM-
j
Bank loan would not be adverse to AMFORP interests since
'
the company would also benefit from the better relations i!
engendered by such a loan. On the contrary, AMFORP ' s
!
continuing opposition would only make its position in
Argentina more difficult. U.S. Embassy and State
Department officers shared this belief. Though
acknowledging the validity of AMFORP' s claims, they were
beginning to grow impatient with the company's "dog-in-the
manger" attitude. They believed that the time had come
,
for the U.S. government to give some positive response to
Argentina's friendly gestures and they favored approval of
the McKee blast furnace application still pending at the
EXIM-Bank. 25 9'^i^ 1 ccs U tftfcl.tlM
Important political considerations gave added urgency
to the State Department's need to make some concession to
the Peron government. As the Guatemalan crisis
intensified, Washington was trying to build up hemispheric
consensus for an OAS meeting to consider the problem of
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international communist activities in Guatemala and of
clandestine delivery of arms from the Soviet orbit to the
Central American nation. The United States wanted the OAS
to condemn Guatemala and authorize the detention and
inspection of all ships bound for that nation. However,
before calling the meeting, the United States wanted to
make sure that it could count on the two-thirds majority
necessary for collective action under the Rio Treaty. 26
In the first week of June, Nufer conferred with Peron
to sound out the president's views on a meeting of
consultation on Guatemala. Peron supported the meeting
and Argentina's participation in it, but he suggested that
it would be better to convene the meeting for a more
general purpose, such as studying means of hemispheric
collaboration to confront the problem of communism in the
continent rather than for the specific case of Guatemala.
He feared that the Latin Americans 7 traditional allegiance
to the non-intervention principle would become an obstacle
to the passing of a resolution specifically condemning
Guatemala and authorizing either unilateral or collective
intervention in its internal affairs. Other Latin
American countries had similar concerns and consultations
2 7
continued over the wording of the proposed resolution.
On June 18, Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan army
officer in exile, started the invasion of Guatemala from
Honduras with the support of the C.I. A. The Guatemalan
government denounced the invasion before the United
Nations Security Council and requested U.N. action to
stop the aggression against its territory. The United
States immediately introduced a resolution to remove the
case from the United Nations and bring it before the
Inter-American Peace Committee of the OAS. The Soviet
Union vetoed the resolution and, with the support of
France and Britain, proposed to send peace observers to
Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala. On June 23, the United
States prepared a plan whereby Nicaragua would ask the
Inter-American Peace Committee, formed by Argentina,
Mexico, Brazil, Cuba and the United States, to send its
own observers to the three nations involved in the
conflict instead of the U.N. mission. U.S. officials then
talked to the representatives of the Committee member
nations to persuade them to respond favorably to the
request of Nicaragua. This was a delicate matter since,
as soon as the invasion of Guatemala started, there were
demonstrations throughout Latin America supporting the
Guatemalan government and denouncing the U.S. covert
support of the operation. Washington particularly
anticipated problems in obtaining approval for the mission
from Mexico and Argentina. However, after a day of
frantic negotiations, the Committee authorized the
mission.
Meanwhile, AMFORP had stepped up pressure to make the
settlement of its problems a prerequisite to any EXIM loan
to Argentina. W.S. Robertson, director of AMFORP, had
sent a twenty-page memorandum to Hawthorne Arey, Assistant
Director of the EXIM-Bank, reviewing the company's
problems in Argentina and highlighting the company's
concern with "this example of injustice to some 60,000
security holders in the United States." He also called
Rollin Atwood, Director of the Office of South American
Affairs in the State Department, to state his company's
opposition to the approval of the McKee blast furnace
credit. Atwood responded that, although the State
Department sympathized with AMFORP's problems, it was
their firm belief that it would not serve the interests of
AMFORP for the U.S. government to tie future EXIM-Bank
loans to the settlement by Argentina of the company's
problems
.
On June 23, AMFORP held a meeting of stockholders in
the course of which the company's situation in Argentina
was discussed. On the following day, Hylander and
Ginsberg of AMFORP called on Atwood to discuss the
company's position. They mentioned the news reports on
the AMFORP stockholders' meeting, as evidence of the
concern with which the Argentine situation was regarded.
They also told Atwood that, on hearing about the
Department's views as given to Mr. Robertson by Mr.
Atwood, the Board had been "shocked and dismayed". Atwood
reiterated the Department's position. He described the
marked improvement in the relations between the United
States and Argentina, a development which could be
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expected to benefit American business generally. He then
explained that the United States had taken a number of
economic steps, particularly as related to trade
restrictions and disposal of agricultural surpluses, which
had adversely affected the Argentine economy, adding that
unless there were some simultaneous steps of assistance to
Argentina, the rapprochement between the two countries
might not last. For this reason, the Department believed
that it was necessary to approve the blast furnace
application without strings attached. Atwood could not,
however, convert AMFORP's officials to the State
Department's views. 30
On June 26, the United States and nine other Latin
American countries requested an emergency meeting of OAS
foreign ministers to consult on Guatemala. However, on
the following day, Arbenz fell from power and both the OAS
meeting and the Peace Committee mission were eventually
cancelled. One day after the fall of Arbenz, Peron sent a
long letter to Milton Eisenhower suggesting that a
hemispheric meeting of consultation on the problem of
communism be held regardless of the outcome of the
Guatemalan conflict and offering Buenos Aires as the site
for such a Conference. Peron expressed his concern about
communist infiltration in Latin America, particularly in
countries such as Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador,
Colombia and Mexico and he argued strongly for a
hemispheric approach to the problem, indicating that
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coordinated efforts should be worked out through "secret
conferences with carefully selected officials in each
government." Milton Eisenhower immediately informed his
brother and the State Department of Peron's letter,
expressing his view that "it would be a serious mistake
not to capitalize somehow on Peron's attitude and offer."
Subsequently, he answered Peron's letter echoing the
President's concerns and acknowledging the need to take
coordinated action against the communist threat. However,
no further action was taken on Peron's proposal. 3
1
On June 29, the EXIM-Bank approved in principle a
$12.3 million dollar guarantee to McKee for the sale of a
blast furnace to Argentina, subject to the raising of
additional financing by the company. The Bank also
announced that it would send a mission to Argentina to
survey the various economic development projects which
U.S. firms were interested in undertaking. 32 The McKee
credit never became effective and, in July 1954, SOMISA
applied directly for an EXIM loan.
While the EXIM-Bank mission was in Argentina,
Ambassador Nufer once again discussed AMFORP's problems
with Peron. Peron told him that since all of AMFORP's
concessions had been granted by provincial and municipal
governments, the federal government had no direct
jurisdiction over the matter. However, he considered it
unjust that no compensatory provisions had been made and
he felt strongly that every effort should be made to
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arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement. Nufer
indicated that AMFORP wanted to sell all its Argentine
properties to the government and not only those which had
been expropriated. The President replied that his
government had no intention of acguiring the
unexpropriated properties, especially in view of "the
unfortunate experiences with public ownership of utilities
in the provinces." It would, however, be willing to work
out an arrangement whereby the company could operate on a




Peron agreed to reopen negotiations with AMFORP
officials in regard to the expropriated properties and, at
Nufer's request, he submitted a memorandum outlining his
government's position along the same lines discussed with
the Ambassador. The memorandum also stated that should
AMFORP insist on selling all its properties, the Argentine
government, in spite of its goodwill, might be unable to
reach an agreement on account of the limitations imposed
upon it by foreign exchange availabilities. The
government suggested an alternative arrangement
contemplating the reinvestment in the country of the funds
obtained from the sale, under the new investment law which
included provisions relative to the transfer of profits
and repatriation of capital. AMFORP representatives
travelled to Argentina in September and negotiations were
reopened under the supervision of the Argentine Minister
of Industry Orlando Santos. The negotiations were long
and complicated and, by the time Peron was ousted from
power, no agreement had yet been reached. One of the main
obstacles was AMFORP's reluctance to continue its
operations in Argentina, and its desire to sell all its
properties to the government and pull out of the country
altogether. 34
Another urgent problem that Peron had to face was
Argentina's growing dependence on imported petroleum
products. Petroleum policy was a highly sensitive
question because of its historical connection with
nationalist ideology in Argentina. In the late 1930s and
early 1940s, YPF had expanded rapidly, tripling its output
and reaching an annual growth rate of 8.2 percent down to
1943. The state company had increased its share of the
market from 38 percent in 1939 to 68 percent in 1943. But
YPF had not been prepared to meet the rising demand for
petroleum products triggered by industrialization. During
the war, it had been almost impossible to import equipment
and, by the time Peron became president in 1946, most of
YPF's capital plant was obsolescent. Imports of machinery
were also difficult in the tight market of the immediate
postwar years, a situation which slowed renovation at
YPF. 35
After the 1943 coup, political considerations rather
than technical knowledge had increasingly become the main
standard in the selection of personnel for YPF and,
between 1943 and 1946, YPF had lost 70 percent of its
senior personnel. Such practices, continued during
Peron 's government, had weakened the institution, creating
low morale and instability. Moreover, Peron's policies of
high wages, low domestic prices for petroleum products and
rising taxes on YPF's products made it increasingly
difficult for the company to amass capital. 36
This damaging policy toward YPF was probably based on
Peron's lack of confidence in the company's capacity to
develop the country's resources fast enough to solve the
problem of increasing dependence on imported oil. The
President's attitude may also have been influenced by the
fact that YPF had traditionally been a bastion of the
Radical Party which had now become the core of political
opposition to his regime. In 1946, Peron discussed plans
to have foreign companies participate in petroleum
development with Ambassador Messersmith. Shortly after
that, Peron began negotiations with Herman Metzger, the
local manager of Esso, on the basis of an earlier proposal
by the company to form a mixed enterprise in which the
Argentine government would keep the power to veto major
decisions in questions involving the national interest.
However, after a tentative agreement had been reached
between Metzger and the Argentine government, New York
officials of Standard Oil insisted on modifications which
would have reduced the mixed company from a joint venture
to a barely disguised concession. The new proposal would
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have required the approval of the Argentine Congress since
it exceeded the provisions of the 1935 law which
prohibited the granting of new concessions, and therefore
the negotiations collapsed. 37
Subsequently, a group of Peronist ministers began to
advocate full scale nationalization of petroleum
resources. The matter was debated in two cabinet meetings
in December, 1947 but this plan was also dropped. In
1949, the government offered exploration contracts to Esso
and Shell but both companies rejected the offer. The
government then began negotiations with a number of
smaller firms but no agreements were reached. In 1949,
the constitutional convention that revised the Argentine
constitution included an article which declared all
mineral resources the inalienable property of the
nation. 38
Subsequently, the government reorganized YPF, and
exploration programs to find new reserves were
intensified, leading to the discovery of new fields of
potentially major significance. But YPF had problems in
developing the new fields, the main shortcomings being
lack of capital and transportation bottlenecks. YPF laid
plans to build pipelines, increase its refining capacity
and acquire equipment. But practically all the machinery
that YPF needed had to be purchased abroad, especially in
the United States and the company expansion plans were
limited by Argentina's shortage of dollar exchange. YPF
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tried to finance purchases from the United States on a
deferred payment basis and from Europe under its various
trade agreements but such arrangements were insufficient
to keep pace with the company's growing requirements. 39
Between 1947 and 1951, YPF's production increased 22
percent. Such an increase, however, fell far short of the
demand triggered by the growth in manufacturing. During
the same period, consumption of petroleum products rose 64
percent. Meanwhile, the production of the private
companies had been steadily declining (from 7,424,800
barrels in 1946 to 5,856,900 in 1946 and 2,586,100 in
1952). Thus, between 1946 and 1951, overall production
increased only 17 percent leaving the country dependent on
imports for 52 percent of its oil requirements. Petroleum
imports represented a heavy drain on foreign exchange
reserves, and they amounted to almost 2 3 percent of total
imports in 1952. 40
One of the stated goals of the Second Five-Year Plan
was to achieve self-sufficiency in oil production. YPF
would undertake an extensive exploration and drilling
program and its transportation and refining capacities
would be increased. The plan also included a clause which
stated that the State would encourage the participation of
private capital in the development of oil. This clause
had been added by Peron and it reflected his determination
to find a quick solution to the problem of fuel shortage.
The provision aroused considerable interest among the
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private companies, which approached the government to
request further amplification of its meaning. 41
During Milton Eisenhower's visit to Buenos Aires, the
Argentine Minister of Economy, Gomez Morales, had told
U.S. officials that the government was planning to invite
private companies to participate in the production of
petroleum on a contract and royalty basis. The private
companies would provide the machinery and the technicians
in return for a portion of the oil to be produced. The
government would have priority in buying that portion of
the oil at world prices, and it would allow the companies
to export the remaining oil. 42
In a subsequent conversation with Gomez Morales,
Metzger, the Esso representative, suggested that foreign
firms be given an area to exploit, with the government
sharing in the profits on a 50-50 basis. Gomez Morales
answered that Article 40 of the Constitution might make it
politically impossible for the government to grant oil
concessions on the usual basis and that it might be
necessary to bring YPF into the picture on a mixed-company
basis, with YPF furnishing the land and the private
companies doing the drilling. The private companies would
receive a percentage of the oil produced. Since YPF was
strongly entrenched in the mind of the public as a symbol
of economic independence, it would be "political death"
for any official to advocate curtailment of its power.
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In August 1953, the Congressional debate on the new
Investment Law brought the question of petroleum
development to public attention. The Radical Party
opposed the provision that gave the Executive power broad
authority to reach agreements with potential investors on
the grounds that it would open the way for concessions to
foreign oil companies. In their view, such concessions
would constitute a violation of Article 40 of the
Constitution. The Peronists defended their position
arguing that the participation of foreign capital in
petroleum development in the form of contracts for work
and services was entirely compatible with the provisions
of the Constitution. Peronist deputies stressed time and
again during the debate that control of the land and the
oil would remain with the State. To illustrate their
position a Peronist deputy, Eduardo Rumbo, presented a
proposal outlining the terms under which private companies
might operate in the petroleum field. The plan stated
that participation would be in the form of contracts for
work, that it would be limited to small and medium sized
companies and that the State would retain the right to
administer all or part of the production. The main
significance of this debate was that it showed the
government's interest in bringing the subject of petroleum
development to public attention. The government used the
debate as a trial balloon to judge reactions and to
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On August 18, 1953, Esso submitted a memorandum for
the consideration of the Argentine government outlining
the basic conditions under which the company would be
willing to engage in petroleum activities. In Esso's
view, the requirements of Article 40 could be met by
leasing an area of the country to a private company for a
limited number of years. The government would share in
the profits on a 50-50 basis and the company would have
control over part of the oil produced, which would be
refined and marketed through the company's installations.
Esso argued that participation should not be limited to
small companies since the larger companies, with their
wider experience and greater resources, were the ones more
likely to find the petroleum that the country needed. The
government also received proposals from smaller companies.
A group formed by representatives of the Texas company
Dresser Industries and of the Gulf Oil Corporation visited
Argentina in late August. They had several talks with
Peron, and they visited the oil fields and the refining
sites. 45
On September 3, 1953, Peron discussed the problem of
petroleum development with Nufer. Peron expressed his
deep concern over the fact that Argentina was producing
only about 45 percent of its oil requirements. He
believed that it was vitally important for Argentina to
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become self-sufficient so that it might contribute
effectively to the defense of the South Atlantic in case
of war. Peron said that the problem with YPF was mainly
political because the institution was so strongly
entrenched, but he believed that a way would be found to
allow private companies to participate in petroleum
production within the limits established by the
Constitution. He mentioned project leases as a
possibility. 46
Peron had begun a campaign to educate different
sectors of opinion on the need for allowing foreign
capital participation in oil development so as to achieve
self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time. In
various public speeches, Peron referred to the growing gap
between domestic production and consumption of oil and to
the large amounts of foreign exchange that could be saved
for other development projects by having foreign companies
work with YPF for a rapid expansion of Argentina's oil
production. 47 His task, however, was complicated by the
traditional political explosiveness of the petroleum
issue, further exacerbated by the high expectations that
Peron' s own prior nationalistic rhetoric had helped to
create. In spite of Peron 's continuous assurances in
public pronouncements that private investment in oil would
not mean sacrifice of economic independence or
constitutional principles, the government's new policy
continued to meet opposition, particularly among the
members of the Radical Party and other nationalist sectors
of Argentine society. Peron's policy also met resistance
among certain groups within the government. YPF
officials, concerned about any developments that might
affect the state company's privileged position, resisted
the idea of private participation in petroleum
development. The Minister of Industry and Commerce,
Rafael Amundarain, supported YPF's position. 48
On December 1, Gomez Morales gave Metzger at the
latter 's request, a memorandum outlining the bases upon
which YPF would be willing to negotiate a petroleum
development contract. The private investor would receive
a specified drilling area from YPF and it would be
responsible for all the work necessary for production and
transportation of the oil. The total volume of oil
produced would be turned over to YPF. A certain
percentage would be the outright property of the state
agency, while the balance would go to the company with the
obligation to sell it to YPF for dollars at the posted
price for U.S. area crude. The percentages going to YPF
and to the company would be negotiated depending upon the
area drilled and the risks involved. From the time YPF
started to receive crude, it would be obliged to pay the
company the exploitation expenses and the amortization of
the invested capital over a previously agreed upon period
of time. Expenses incurred in the construction of oil and
gas lines would be defrayed by a tariff per kilometer and
all the payments received could be transferred abroad in
U.S. dollars. Remittances would be automatically granted
by the Central Bank, and in case the Bank were unable to
remit the dollar sums agreed upon, the company would be
able to export its own quota of crude. This proposal was
still far from meeting Esso's requirements and Metzger
told Gomez Morales that unless the government dropped its
"YPF complex"
,
nothing in the way of large investment
would result. 49
Metzger then saw Peron and suggested that the best
way to solve the controversy over foreign participation in
petroleum development might be for the government to
sponsor an Organic Petroleum Law incorporating principles
such as the ones outlined in the memorandum presented by
Esso. He told Peron that, unless the government offered
clear incentives and guarantees, it would not be able to
attract foreign investors to the petroleum field . Peron
explained his reservations concerning government
sponsorship of a Petroleum Law. The legal procedure
involved before such a law could be passed would take a
long time. A draft law would first have to go to a
Congressional Committee where it would most likely trigger
a heated debate, thus giving the opposition parties a good
opportunity to create trouble. On the other hand, if a
contract were submitted to Congress for approval, it could
be introduced directly on the floor and passed in a matter
154
of days. There would thus be a minimum of disturbance,
and the legal forms would have been observed. 50
As negotiations with Esso stagnated, the government
concentrated on the proposals made by smaller companies.
John O'Connor of Dresser Industries had made a proposal to
invest 200 million dollars in petroleum drilling and
exploration in Neuguen and Mendoza. The oil produced
would be turned over to YPF for marketing and refining and
the investors would receive payment per barrel of oil
produced, depending upon the area and the risk. Dresser
Industries would undertake a geological survey of
petroleum reserves and deposits in Mendoza and Neuguen on
the basis of data provided by YPF. But Dresser's main
problem was how to finance the whole operation. The Gulf
Oil Corporation, which had originally been interested in
joining Dresser, had withdrawn its proposal since its main
interest had been to establish an outlet for its
production from other areas of the world. 51
On May 29, a large group headed by Floyd Odium of the
U.S. Atlas Corporation and O'Connor of Dresser Industries
arrived in Buenos Aires to confer with Peron and his
advisers. In a widely publicized press conference held on
June 11, Odium and Dresser announced that they had formed
a corporation in Delaware called Petroargentina which had
offered the Argentine government a 25-year contract to
take over the Neuguen oil fields currently operated by
YPF. Petroargentina intended to expand petroleum
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production in the Neuquen area from 15,000 barrels a day
to 50,000 in a period of 3 to 5 years. The company
planned to build a pipeline to Bahia Blanca for an
estimated cost of 40 million dollars. All the oil
produced would be turned over to YPF since Petroargentina
was not interested in refining or marketing. The oil
produced from existing wells would be sold to YPF at cost
and new production would be sold at East Texas prices.
The company would also charge a transportation fee on all
the oil moving through its pipeline. Profits to be
remitted by the company would not be subject to the 8
percent limitation of the foreign investment law. At the
end of the contract period, the company's equipment and
installations would automatically revert to the Argentine
government. The contract would be signed with YPF as the




The Atlas-Dresser petroleum proposal met with
considerable opposition within the government, especially
from YPF. YPF argued that granting Atlas-Dresser a
monopoly for all of Neuquen would needlessly limit the
rate of further exploration since the foreign firm would
not be able to exploit the whole area for some time. YPF
vehemently objected to having to turn over fields which it
had discovered and developed plus all its installations
and equipment free of charge. The organization fought
hard to eliminate the pipeline proposal from the deal
arguing that it could build the line itself at less cost.
YPF's objections found receptive ears among government
officials who felt that the Atlas proposal was more a
financial deal than a normal investment and that it was
too costly. The government made a counterproposal
reducing the area to be handed to Atlas to about 2 5
percent of the Neuquen region and eliminating the
pipeline. 53
In the meantime, conversations between the government
and Esso had continued, and the company had submitted a
new proposal directly to Peron. Esso proposed to explore
two unproven areas in Neuquen and Comodoro Rivadavia for a
period of about 6 years after which the company would
choose half of the area for active development over a 40-
year period. The government would share in the profits on
a 50-50 basis and 12 percent of the petroleum production
would be delivered to the government as royalty. Once the
operation reached a profitable basis, Esso would be
allowed to remit the full 50 percent of its net profits. 54
On July 13, 1954, the Argentine government sent a
memorandum outlining the general principles under which it
would be willing to consider petroleum contracts to
several oil companies including Esso, Petroargentina,
Shell, Gulf Oil and Standard Oil of California. This
memorandum was a revision of the one given to the
companies in December 1953, and it represented a more
restrictive concept than the earlier document. The new
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proposal contemplated allocation of a specified area to a
company for exploration and development, with the company
providing all the capital, equipment and personnel it
might need. All the oil and gas produced would belong to
YPF. As payment for its services, the company would
receive reimbursement of its operating expenses,
amortization of its capital investment and a certain
percentage of profit on the gas and the oil delivered. 55
Esso officials considered several features of the
memorandum unacceptable. They principally objected to the
concept of a service contract and its inherent principle
that the total amount of the oil produced automatically
became the property of the government. Esso officials
emphasized that their company would not be interested in
investing in petroleum exploration if it then had to
deliver the oil found to a competitor, YPF, instead of
using it freely to supply its own refining and marketing
networks. They also argued that an agreement of this
nature would set a precedent which might have undesirable
repercussions on the international patterns already
established in other countries in which they operated. 56
As a consequence of the above mentioned
disagreements, negotiations on the Esso proposal came to a
practical standstill. In August, Gomez Morales urged
Tchalidy, who had replaced Metzger as manager of Esso, to
try to accelerate the negotiations and find a solution to
the existing problems. The Minister indicated that there
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was really no basic difference between the two parties.
Tchalidy took the opportunity to raise once more the point
of the desirability of having an organic petroleum law. A
week later, Tchalidy submitted to Gomez Morales a draft
containing Esso's ideas on a satisfactory oil law.
Essentially, the draft contemplated 50-50 contracts very
similar to Esso's original proposal. The draft law made a
distinction between proven and unproven areas and the
methods needed to develop each. Esso feared that
conclusion of a service type contract such as the one
proposed by Petroargentina might set up a pattern for all
future agreements. They believed that, by establishing a
distinction between proven and unproven areas the
government could argue that different patterns were
required for different developments and negotiate drilling
contracts in proven areas while agreeing to the
international pattern for large scale development of
unproven areas by the large oil companies. 57
On August 25, a new player came into the game when
Owen Haynes, an official of Standard Oil of California,
arrived in Buenos Aires to discuss terms for investment in
petroleum development by his company. Haynes had a
meeting with Gomez Morales, and he gave the Minister a
memorandum outlining the general principles under which
his company would consider participation in petroleum
development in Argentina. The memorandum contemplated the
standard international pattern of agreement for
1exploration and development of unknown areas, with a 50-50
split of profits and a 50 year contract duration.
Standard Oil California was not interested in refining and
marketing. 58 Haynes saw Peron on September 1 in the
presence of his cabinet. During the meeting, Peron went
at some length into the history of petroleum in Argentina,
explaining that "long ago the oil companies had free rein
but the country got nothing out of it"; then "the pendulum
swung back with YPF given a virtual monopoly, but it was
unable to produce satisfactory results." The president
said that now he wanted to change the policy and bring
private capital back in. He indicated, however, that this
should be done piecemal through separate contracts since
trying to have an organic law approved would give rise to
considerable political opposition. On the contrary, if
two or three contract laws were established as precedent,
it would be easier for the government to move on to an
overall law embodying the concepts contained in the
contracts. Later, Gomez Morales told Haynes that the
contract would probably have to be for a shorter period of
time. In a final meeting on September 3, the Minister
told Haynes that the company's memorandum was satisfactory
to the government as a basis for further discussion.
Haynes then returned to the United States to prepare a




Meanwhile, the Atlas-Dresser group had returned to
Argentina with a modified proposal. Petroargentina now
offered to undertake a five-year exploration program in a
70,000 square kilometer area in Neuquen. YPF would
provide Petroargentina with 200 proven well locations at
its expense and exploration for the remaining 300 well
locations would be at Petroargentina ' s expense.
Petroargentina would exploit the area under a 15-year
contract. The costs incurred by the company in drilling
and production of oil and gas together with the capital
amortization would be reimbursed monthly by the
government. On termination of the contract, the
government would pay all the remaining amount owed to
Petroargentina plus a net sum after tax equal to 3.30
dollars per cubic meter of oil and 1.08 dollars per
thousand cubic meters of gas for proven and unproven
reserves. The company also planned to build a pipeline.
The government would bear all peso costs and would then
pay Petroargentina 35 million dollars over a 10-year
period. The new proposal also included an offer for a
six-month survey to determine probable areas for uranium
development, followed by a more intensive exploration
period of 18 months after which the company would select
15 mining locations for production of uranium over a 12-
year period.
In an analysis of the Atlas-Dresser proposal Viron
Vaky, Second Secretary of the U.S Embassy in Argentina,
observed that the cost in dollars of the projected
contract was so heavy that it would probably be impossible
for the Argentine government to accept it. In his view
this proposal, if submitted to Congress in its present
form, "would undoubtedly arouse heavy opposition and might
jeopardize all other petroleum negotiations and perhaps
foreign investment in general." Vaky described the offer
to develop uranium as "the sugar coating for the
bundle. 1,61
As the government considered the various proposals
presented by the oil companies, negotiations proceeded in
other areas for investments under the terms of the 1953
law. Several leading U.S. corporations had expressed
their desire to invest in Argentina in the steel and
chemical industries, automobile and farm machinery
manufacturing, transportation and other fields. However,
progress was slow since investors wanted to make sure that
the improved atmosphere regarding the future of private
investment would stand on a firm and permanent basis
before committing large amounts of capital to the
ft ?Argentine market.
Of particular importance to them was the settlement
of arrears in profit remittances. U.S. companies had over
$80 millions worth of blocked pesos in Argentina, which
were continually depreciating in value. Before 1947,
profit remittances had always been allowed without any
restrictions and at the free market rate. But since 1947,
1with the exception of a seven-month period in 1951, U.S.
firms had not been permitted to remit profits owing to
Argentina's lack of dollar exchange. Some companies had
invested their blocked holdings locally to protect them
against depreciation until they could remit them.
However, the parent offices of most companies had been
reluctant to authorize such steps. 63 In addition to his
petroleum project, Floyd Odium had submitted a proposal to
establish an investment company to finance projects in
Argentina whose capital would consist of blocked pesos and
whose shares would be listed in the New York stock
exchange. But this plan had also failed to break the
resistance of the U.S. parent companies to reinvest their
blocked funds in Argentina. 64
Trade issues also continued to complicate U.S.-
Argentine relations as increasing U.S. trade restrictions
threatened to deprive Argentina of some of her few
remaining sources of dollars. Shipments of flaxseed and
linseed oil, formerly a major Argentine export to the
United States, had ceased following increased U.S.
production. 65 The U.S. ban on imports of fresh meat from
Argentina on the grounds of hoof-and-mouth disease
continued in operation, thus keeping this product out of
U.S. markets. To make matters worst, an unprecedented
expansion of U.S. beef production had pushed domestic
prices to extremely low levels leading the U.S government
to spend vast sums to bolster sagging cattle prices
through its farm support program. Consequently, there was
mounting pressure in the U.S. to implement restrictions on
imports of canned meat as well. 66
In July 1953 Eisenhower, following recommendations of
the U.S. Tariff Commission, issued a proclamation limiting
imports of Italian type cheese and imposing a 50 percent
fee, in addition to the existing duties, on imports of
flaxseed and linseed oil. 67 This measure also affected
Argentina since she was a major exporter of such products.
Shortly after that the U.S. Tariff Commission, under
strong pressure from U.S wool producers supported by the
Department of Agriculture, began to consider the
application of restrictions on wool imports under the
provisions of Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act. This was a matter of serious concern to Argentina,
which ranked second among the world wool exporting
nations. Wool was Argentina's principal export to the
United States and as such, the major source of her dollar
income. The Argentine government expressed its
preoccupation about the proposed measure to U.S.
government officials pointing at the inconsistency between
actions of this nature and the U.S. repeatedly stated
commitment to trade liberalization. Argentine officials
also indicated that the proposed restrictions would be in
violation of the provisions of the 1941 Trade Agreement
between the two countries. Eventually, Eisenhower's call
for further study of the proposal by the Tariff Commission
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provided temporary comfort to the Argentines, though the
final decision continued to be a matter of serious concern
to them. 68
In December 1953, the U.S. government established a
quota of 26 million bushels on imports of oats. Canada
was the largest supplier of oats for U.S. markets,
followed by Argentina. The government assigned Canada a
share of 23.5 million bushels of the total quota leaving
only 2.5 million bushels for imports from other countries.
This decision was particularly harmful for Argentine
exporters since it required the cancellation of existing
contracts for several million bushels. It also hurt U.S.
consumers since the Argentine delivered price, duty
included, per bushel was 20 cents below the price of
6 9
comparable quality domestic oats. *
In March, 1954 the Department of Agriculture asked
the Tariff Commission to institute an investigation under
Section 2 2 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to determine
the effects of imports of tung nuts and oil on the
domestic price support program. The Agricultural Act of
1949 had made support for tung nuts mandatory at a level
between 60 and 90 percent parity. In 1953, the support
price for tung nuts was $67.20 per short ton, representing
63.4 percent, of parity, and 2 6.5 cents per pound of oil.
The Commodity Credit Corporation had acquired an estimated
6 million pounds of 1952 production. Since 1949, U.S.
average annual consumption of tung oil was 112 million
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pounds, but it was declining as a result of competition
from cheaper substitutes such as linseed oil and synthetic
materials. 70
Domestic production had reached a peak of 35 million
pounds in 1952. Cultivation of tung nuts in the United
States was limited by climatic and other conditions to a
belt about 100 miles wide stretching from Northern Florida
through Southern Alabama, Mississipi and Louisiana into
Eastern Texas, and even in this area, climatic conditions
made production highly unstable. Tung oil was imported
free of duty under the provisions of the Tariff Act of
1930 and, after the 1950 embargo on Chinese products, the
gap between U.S. production and total reguirements had
been met by increased imports from Argentina and Paraguay.
Out of a total of approximately 30 million pounds of tung
oil imports, Argentina had supplied an average of 18
million pounds per year between 1949 and 1952, with a peak
of 23 million pounds in 1952. These exports amounted to
about $3 million dollars annually and represented
approximately ten percent of Argentina's total dollar
earnings. Conseguently , the prospect of a guota on U.S.
tung oil imports was viewed with great concern by the
7 1Argentine government.
The Department of Agriculture supported a reduction
of imports to 10.5 million pounds on the grounds that it
would help raise the domestic price for tung oil. State
Department officials, seriously worried about the
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psychological impact that still another limitation on
imports would have on U.S relations with Argentina and
with Latin America in general, strongly opposed the
imposition of a quota. In the course of a meeting with
the Administrative Assistant to the President, Gabriel
Hauge, and representatives of the Department of
Agriculture, Holland emphasized the need of avoiding any
action that might be considered offensive by Argentina,
particularly in the wake of the Economic Conference to be
held in Rio de Janeiro in November. In Holland's view, it
was "unjustified to risk seriously detrimental effects on
our foreign relations for one and one-half million dollars
worth of tung." Eventually, Eisenhower intervened
personally and resolved the controversy by negotiating
with Argentina and Paraguay a voluntary cutback in exports
of tung oil to U.S. markets instead of a mandatory
7 ?quota
.
The handling of U.S. agricultural surpluses was
another matter of major concern to Argentina and other
Latin American countries because of the effect such
disposal might have on markets and prices for their major
export commodities. On several occasions, Argentina
vigorously protested certain U.S. actions in this respect,
such as U.S. sales of linseed oil for exports at far below
domestic prices and sales of wheat to Brazil and
Pakistan. 73
1The State Department was anxious about the effects
that the above mentioned and other trade limitations (such
as proposed quotas on lead, zinc and oil imports) might
have on U.S. -Latin American relations. These concerns
became especially pressing as the time for the Rio
Economic Conference came closer. State Department and
Embassy officials viewed the improvement in U . S . -Argentine
relations with satisfaction, particularly because of the
effect it might have on hemispheric relations in general.
After 1952, Peron had dropped all references to the Third
Position and he had begun to move definitely away from
statism, opening the doors to U.S investors. However,
some people in the State Department feared that, if Peron
could not obtain some tangible benefits from the United
States, he might revert to his old position and thus they
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CHAPTER 5
PERON AND THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION II
By mid-1954, the United States and the Latin American
countries had begun to prepare for the economic conference
to be held in Rio de Janeiro in December. Criticism of
U.S. economic policy had been steadily growing in Latin
America as economic, political and social problems
continued to plague the area. ECLA had commissioned a
group of Latin American experts to prepare a number of
studies analyzing the problems of the region and proposing
ways to solve them. Shortly before the Rio Conference,
the group issued a report in which they singled out
insufficient domestic savings and inadequate growth of
export earnings as the major constraints on Latin American
economic growth and development. To counteract the effect
of unfavorable terms of trade and declining exports, the
group advocated international price stabilization
programs, compensatory funding and regional integration
agreements. In the domestic field, the report recommended
self-help efforts, including accelerated
industrialization, fiscal and agrarian reform, and
national planning to establish priorities and allocate
scarce resources. Since such efforts would require time,
an increased foreign capital inflow would be needed to
compensate for the insufficiency of domestic savings and
export earnings during the transition period. The report
advocated an annual foreign investment level of 1 billion
dollars for a period of ten years. ECLA experts predicted
that this development capital, combined with domestic
savings, would increase annual economic growth by 2
percent. Private investors would provide one third of
this total amount of foreign capital and the rest would be
supplied by international financial institutions through
long-term, low-interest loans. To facilitate the latter,
the report proposed the creation of an inter-American
development bank as a new institution designed
specifically for such aims. 1
The Eisenhower Administration rejected both the
proposals and the philosophy of ECLA. There were,
however, important disagreements within the Administration
concerning U.S. economic policy toward Latin America which
would come to the surface as government officials prepared
for the Rio Conference. In April 1954, Eisenhower named a
Sub-Cabinet Committee to review U.S. economic relations
with Latin America and to formulate the basic framework
for the U.S. position at the conference. The policy
statements adopted by this committee would be referred to
an Interdepartamental Committee which would prepare
position papers on specific issues.
As government officials negotiated, the National
Security Council prepared a new policy document for Latin
America, NSC 5232/1, which was approved on September 3.
The new document basically reiterated NSC 144/1, making
hemispheric solidarity and the eradication of Communism
the main goals of U.S. inter-American policy. it restated
the U.S. commitment to "adopt stable, long term trading
policies with respect to Latin American countries,
including gradual selective reduction of U.S. barriers and
tariffs on trade" and to encourage Latin Americans "to
base their economies on a system of private enterprise"
and "create a political and economic climate conducive to
private investment." But the new document also included a
recommendation to permit the EXIM-Bank to finance "all
sound economic development projects, for which private
capital or IBRD financing is not available". Moreover, it
allowed for the possibility of development assistance
loans to Latin America for projects which were in the
interest of the United States.
In the course of the inter-departmental meetings held
to prepare for the Rio Conference, the differences among
government officials and agencies concerning the
interpretation of these general guidelines would come to
the forefront. The Foreign Operations Administration
(FOA) , headed by Harold Stassen, supported Latin America's
position. Stassen believed that the situation in Latin
America was serious and he argued that the U.S. programs
to meet the problems of the region were thoroughly
inadequate. Taking Milton Eisenhower's report as the
basis for its position, FOA advocated extensive
development and technical assistance. FOA also argued in
favor of regional economic agreements, price stabilization
programs, significant expansion of EXIM-Bank lending and
the creation of an inter-American bank. The Department of
Defense and the CIA supported FOA's position. The
Treasury Department, however, vigorously opposed any new
public spending. Under Humphrey's influential leadership,
Treasury officials consistently struggled to limit any
statements contemplating development loans or any
significant expansion of EXIM-Bank lending. In addition,
both Treasury and Commerce also resisted any explicit
commitments to reduction of trade barriers. 3
The State Department took a middle-of-the-road
position. In fact, it adopted the strategy of allowing
FOA and the Treasury to "take the heat of the arguing" in
the hope that its own position "would be put in the most
reasonable light as a follow up to the views of the
extreme elements." 4 State Department officials felt that
NSC 5432/1 contained an adequate program, provided that it
was carried out. Arguing that, in the past, the U.S.
economic performance in Latin America had been "largely
verbal", they urged a change of attitude. The State
Department considered that the EXIM-Bank policy for
Latin America had been too restrictive and they favored
EXIM financing of all sound economic projects in the
region for which private capital or IBRD funding was not
available. On the other hand, the State Department
favored development loans strictly for emergency cases
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and it opposed regional economic arrangements, price
stabilization schemes and the establishment of an inter-
American bank. 5
Henry Holland believed that U.S. trade barriers
against Latin American products were the single most
important problem in inter-American relations. Latin
American leaders had repeatedly expressed to the Assistant
Secretary their deep concern with the growing exclusion of
their products from U.S. markets as a result of
protectionist measures. Holland argued that the time had
come for the Administration to take a strong stand on this
issue and to "determine here and now whether we do in fact
intend to try to prevent any increase in trade barriers
which will reduce existing volumes of trade." 6 However,
he acknowledged the intrinsic difficulties that such a
policy would encounter given the existance of "very strong
sectors within our own people and Government who are




All the above mentioned issues were extensively
discussed in the course of an NSC meeting presided by
President Eisenhower on November 15, 1954. The President
finally resolved the controversy over expansion of EXIM-
Bank lending by authorizing a $500 million increase of the
Bank's overall lending capacity. To counteract Humphrey's
strong reservations against such a policy, he reminded the
Secretary that "the United States was not merely doing
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business in Latin America, but was fighting a war there
against Communism". However, all the other issues
remained unresolved and the liberalization of EXIM-Bank
lending policy was the only significant proposal that the
United States delegation would bring to Rio. 8 When
Humphrey was appointed to head the delegation, Milton
Eisenhower was appalled. He called the choice "tragic"
and he decided not to go to Rio, telling his brother that
he did not want "such little prestige as I have in Latin
America to be identified with the ill consequences that I
fear would flow from the general Humphrey attitude". 9 At
Rio, U.S. delegates repeatedly assured Latin Americans
that the new EXIM program would mean "substantial foreign
lending" and that the Bank was going to supply "ample
sources of credit for healthy economic development." They
also emphasized the government's determination to "expand
Latin America's trade opportunities" and to intensify
technical assistance programs in the region. In spite of
these promises, progress would be slow and between May
1954 and March 1956 EXIM loans to Latin America averaged
200 million per year, far below the amount expected by the
government and Congressional officials who had supported a
change in policy. 10
As preparations for Rio continued, the Administration
decided to adopt a more active strategy aimed at spreading
and explaining its views on economic development. Before
the conference, Holland visited several Latin American
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countries to build up support for the U.S. position in
Rio. Holland feared that the meeting would turn into a
"frontal collision between two schools of economic
thought", on the one side ECLA and on the other side the
United States. The State Department believed that the
position that Argentina assumed at Rio would have a
decisive influence in tilting the balance to one side or
the other. Thus, in his visit to Argentina, Holland did
his best to impress upon Peron the outstanding importance
that his government gave to cooperation between the United
States and Argentina in the context of hemispheric
relations. Peron responded by fully supporting the U.S.
position at Rio and, although no significant agreements
emerged from the conference, the U.S. objective of
1
2
avoiding a stormy confrontation was achieved.
On a second visit to Argentina in December, Holland
urged Peron to consider some solution to the problem of
past arrears of profit remittances. He told Peron that,
in view of continued opposition from anti-Argentine
sectors in the United States, it would be very difficult
for the EXIM-Bank to announce the granting of a loan to
Argentina unless it could accompany such announcement with
evidence of some concrete action by Argentine authorities
to solve the problems of U.S. companies with investments
in Argentina. Peron offered to extend to old investments
the provisions on profit remittances accorded to new
investments by Law 14222, and he instructed Gomez Morales
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to implement the necessary measures to make this
possible. 13
On 19 January 1955, the Argentine government issued
Decree 637 authorizing foreign-owned mining and industrial
enterprises to remit profits earned after August 1953 up
to eight percent a year on their invested capital. The
State Department viewed the provisions of the decree as
"extremely disappointing" since "about half American
companies in Argentina were not engaged in manufacturing
or mining." 14 In an interview with Peron, Nufer pointed
out that the decree fell "far short" of what the State
Department expected since "it afforded little if any
relief to old established American capital," and he urged
action "enabling all U.S. companies to benefit." Gomez
Morales, who was also present at the meeting, told Nufer
that the scope of the decree was necessarily limited
because of the serious dollar shortage in Argentina, but




The U.S. National Advisory Council on International
Monetary and Financial Problems (NAC) had discussed
SOMISA's steel mill loan application in its meeting of
December 22, and had decided to postpone a decision until
they could assess the steps taken by the Argentine
government toward improvement of the situation for U.S.
business interests in Argentina. The NAC met again on
March 1 and decided to approve a $60 million EXIM-Bank
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credit to SOMISA on the grounds that progress had been
made since Holland's trip to Argentina on matters
concerning the position of U.S. investors in Argentina and
negotiations with U.S. oil companies. The Commerce
Department continued to oppose the loan arguing that it
was unwise to build up industries competitive with U.S.
enterprises. EXIM-Bank officials counteracted this
argument by noting that, since the construction of the
mill had become a matter of Argentine pride, its
government, if denied the credit, would look for other
sources of funding and proceed with the mill in any case.
The EXIM-Bank announced the granting of the loan on March
10. However, the signing of the final contract was held
up for a number of reasons including the profit remittance
issue and the AMFORP problems, and the credit only became
effective in 1956 after Peron had been ousted from
power.
Meanwhile, negotiations between the Argentine
government and Standard Oil California had continued. In
October 1954, after several months of technical study,
Standard Oil California presented a proposal for a 40-year
development contract to exploit 50,000 sguare kilometers
in the province of Santa Cruz. Intensive negotiations
between the Argentine government and the company's
officials followed and a substantial area of agreement was
reached. Government officials were enthusiastic and
termed the California offer the best one received so
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17far. By mid-December, a tentative agreement had been
reached when the company suddenly introduced substantial
changes which surprised even its own negotiators in Buenos
Aires. The company now reguested the right to participate
in Argentina's internal market and to sell the oil
produced to other domestic companies besides YPF. The
government negotiators were upset by what they considered
a last minute switch on points that had been already
settled. Standard Oil California also reguested a
revision in the formula for determining the price at which
oil would be sold to YPF and a larger final exploitation
1 R
area.
As a result of these changes in Standard California's
proposal, the talks came to an impasse and no agreement
could be reached. The company negotiators flew back to
San Francisco on January 17. The collapse of the
negotiations came as a considerable disappointment to the
Argentine government which had expected that a final
agreement would be reached soon. The government wanted to
use the agreement with Standard California as a pattern
for further negotiations with other companies. The
breakdown of the talks aroused the suspicion that Standard
California had joined forces with other oil companies to
present a united front and thus obtain greater benefits
from the negotiations. On January 17, Peron sent a letter
to Holland describing the breakdown of the talks and
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expressing his profound disappointment with the company's
• x. 19position. x ^
Peron's letter succeeded in attracting the immediate
attention of the State Department. Secretary of State
Dulles contacted the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires
urgently requesting information on the breakdown of the
negotiations. Always expecting the worst from Peron, he
suspected that the Argentine government could have had
second thoughts on the issue of private participation in
petroleum development and might be using the disagreements
with Standard California as a pretext to postpone further
negotiations with the oil companies. Nufer responded that
that was not the case, citing as evidence to the contrary
the continuing progress of negotiations with Esso. He
confirmed that, according to the Embassy's information,
the stalemate in the negotiations with Standard California
had been caused by the company's attempt to introduce last
minute changes in their original proposal. Holland
immediately contacted the Chairman of the Board of
Standard California, R.G. Follis, and discussed the matter
with him. Follis told Holland that the main obstacle to
an agreement was the Argentine government's insistence
that the company agree in principle to turn over its
entire production to the government upon demand. He
argued that such an agreement might lead to similar
demands in other countries in which the company was
operating, adding that this issue was not new but had been
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present throughout the negotiations. Follis said that all
the other points of disagreement were subsidiary and could
be settled by further negotiation and he offered to travel
to Buenos Aires immediately to confer with Peron
personally in an effort to find a solution along some
middle ground. 2
1
On January 27, Nufer gave Peron a memorandum of the
conversation between Holland and Follis. After reading
the memorandum, the President remarked that he was not
familiar with all the technical issues involved and that
his interest was to expedite negotiations so as to
conclude a satisfactory agreement as soon as possible. He
expressed his concern with Argentina's increasing
inability to meet petroleum demand, indicating that he
wanted output doubled in two years. Peron said that
Argentina needed to become self-sufficient in case of
another war in order not only to satisfy its own needs but
to supply neighboring countries as well. Both Peron and
Gomez Morales, who had joined the conversation, agreed
that the talks with Standard California should be resumed
as soon as possible. Follis and other company officials
travelled to Buenos Aires on February 1 to continue the
discussions
.
The government's disappointment over the breakdown of
talks with Standard California had provoked a hardening of
its position in negotiations with Esso. These
negotiations had been resumed in November, 1954, and
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substantial progress had been made. Leo Welch, a director
of Standard Oil New Jersey, and two other experts had
arrived in Buenos Aires to present a draft contract.
However, on January 21, Esso was informed by the
government that 8 5 percent of the area which the company
had requested in Neuquen was being withdrawn and would be
reserved for YPF. When the matter was protested to Gomez
Morales, Esso was told that YPF felt it needed that area
to maintain its present production level. 23
On January 27, Nufer discussed Esso ' s situation with
Peron. The President told him that YPF did not have the
final word on oil matters, adding that "from now on it
would be just one more producing entity with no special
prerogatives." 24 Immediately after his conversation with
the Ambassador, Peron had a meeting with representatives
of the oil companies and members of his Cabinet. The
meeting was attended by Gomez Morales, the Minister of
Industry Orlando Santos, Vice-President Alberto Teisaire,
the government's spokeman on petroleum policy in the
Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Rumbo and representatives of
Esso, Shell and Petroargentina . Peron told the group that
his only interest was to get oil and to get it quickly.
He then stated that, from then onwards, YPF was to be just
one more producing entity, adding that he wanted all the
oil companies to get together and agree among themselves
on division of territory for exploration and development
and on other matters. After the President had spoken,
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Rumbo took the floor and began a long defense of YPF,
stressing the need to give the state entity a large
acreage on the grounds of national interest. 25
Immediately after the public meeting, Esso
representatives had a private conference with Peron in the
course of which they told the President that his idea of
having the oil companies sit together and agree among
themselves on matters such as acreage distribution would
not work in practice since none of the companies would
give up in negotiations with each other what it considered
to be desirable territory. The best thing to do was for
the State to act as umpire and distribute the areas on a
fair and impartial basis bearing in mind that, if it
wanted to attract private companies, it would have to
offer them desirable acreage since no company would be
willing to come in to take the bits and pieces left by
YPF. Peron agreed with this view, but his position was
not necessarily shared by other members of the government.
In a subsequent conversation with Leo Welch, Gomez Morales
said that YPF had an important position to maintain and
would probably have to retain a large portion of the area
in dispute with Esso.
In the first week of February, there was a
considerable improvement in the climate of negotiations
with the private oil companies. Talks with Standard
California were resumed on February 2. In a meeting with
Peron, Follis explained his company's position on the
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basic point of disposal of the oil and the President
expressed his willingness to accept the firm's
reservations on this issue and to find a satisfactory
formula for compromise. In a conversation with Nufer on
February 3, Gomez Morales indicated that YPF would no
longer insist on being the sole recipient of the oil
produced and he stated his belief that contracts with
Esso, Shell and Standard California could be concluded
before the end of the month if everything went as planned.
Gomez Morales added that "conclusion of the contracts
would be a tremendous boost to the economy, both real and
psychological", and that "this would be the touchstone of
the future." The Minister indicated that the country's
previous nationalistic position had been a mistake
pointing out that, if the private companies had been
permitted to expand and increase their output in
proportion to YPF's, Argentina would be virtually self-
sufficient at the present time. 27 Negotiations with Esso
were also resumed, and YPF withdrew its claim to one of
the two areas requested by Esso. In a later conversation
with Holland, Leo Welch told him that "things were going
so well for his company that he could not believe his own
2 o
eyes and ears."
As negotiations with Standard California proceeded,
Peron pressed the government negotiators to speed up the
process so as to conclude an agreement before the end of
March. Peron wanted the contract sent to Congress in the
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course of its present session because he counted on Rumbo,
whose term expired with the session, to pilot the
agreement through the Chamber of Deputies since he had
been directly involved in the negotiations and was
familiar with the technical points involved. 29 On March
29, Peron announced in a public speech that the government
had reached an agreement with a private company that would
increase oil production in Argentina from its present 4
million cubic meters to 20 million. This announcement
surprised the companies because, in fact, no final
agreement had yet been reached with any of the private
firms. However, Haynes told Nufer that Standard
California was close to a final agreement and that only a
few technical details remained to be negotiated. In his
view, Peron 's statements hinting that a final agreement
had already been reached were motivated by his desire to
avoid giving the impression that the contract would be
slipped through in the last few days of existence of the
old Congress. Haynes considered the figures for
production mentioned by the President completely
unrealistic since it would probably take his company at
least five years to have a clear idea of the
potentialities of the area under exploration. Tchalidy
also informed Nufer that no contract had been signed by
Esso and that the company was not even close to a final
agreement because there still remained important
differences to be worked out concerning the share of
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refining and marketing that would be assigned to the
company. According to Tchalidy, negotiations with Shell
were in the same stage as those with Esso since the
company's marketing share still had to be agreed upon. 30
The agreement with Standard California was signed on
April 2 5 and, on May 6 the Argentine government issued an
executive decree approving the contract and submitted it
to Congress for ratification. The contract gave Standard
California exclusive right to explore for, extract and
exploit oil in an area of 50,000 sguare kilometers in
Santa Cruz over a 4 0-year period. The company would have
the right to refine and market petroleum in Argentina. A
percentage of the crude obtained would be sold to YPF at
the Texas Gulf price, and the company could export any
excess production after Argentina's domestic needs had
been met. The Argentine government would receive 50
percent of the company's profits, and the company would be
allowed to remit its net earnings to the parent firm at
any time. If the government decided to rescind the
contract, the company would be compensated with an amount
equal to that of the investment made plus the net profits
that the company would have obtained in the period of
duration of the contract. Any disagreement between the
government and the company would be submitted to the
arbitration of some internationally recognized business
firm chosen by agreement between the parties. This
contract was closer to the proposals submitted by the
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private companies than to the Argentine government's
original position, especially on issues such as lease
duration and refining and marketing rights. 31
The State Department welcomed the signing of the
contract as a valuable precedent for other Latin American
countries such as Brazil which had started to move in the
opposite direction of state monopoly over petroleum
development. Holland sent a letter to Peron
congratulating him for the results achieved. The State
Department also expected that the Standard Oil contract
would open the way for a successful conclusion of the
negotiations that were being conducted with the other
private oil companies.
In Argentina, the initial public reaction to the
announcement of the Standard California contract was
mostly favorable. Several local newspapers published
editorials supporting the contract and highlighting the
various positive effects it would have on the national
economy. The enthusiasm of the press comments provoked
concern among Standard California representatives who
feared that, if public expectations were built up too
high, an unfavorable reaction might set in when no
immediate results were evident. In private conversations
with Nufer, these officials pointed out that it would be
"several years in any case before any appreciable
production can be achieved and the possibility exists that
no oil may be found at all." They added that official
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press releases which repeatedly emphasized that the oil in
its entirety would be delivered to YPF for refining and
marketing and that YPF would share in the profits as
partner in the enterprise were misleading since the
contract gave Standard California the right to refine and
market petroleum products in direct competition with YPF.
YPF was not in any customary or legal sense a partner and
the 50 percent profit would not go directly to YPF but to
the government in the form of taxes. By distorting the
reality the government had put itself in a difficult
position since, when it released the text of the contract
to Congress, the opposition would publicize these
discrepancies charging the government with deliberate
3 3deception and betrayal of the national interest.
As details of the contract became known, opposition
mounted rapidly throughout the country. The Radical
Party, under the leadership of Arturo Frondizi, bitterly
denounced the contract as a move toward the destruction of
YPF. The Radical block in the Chamber of Deputies issued
a declaration expressing its "decided intention to defend
Argentine petroleum and its full nationalization,
rejecting any type of negotiation or agreement with
private foreign companies which affects our independence
O A
and sovereignty."
Radical Party leaders also warned about the danger of
allowing a foreign company to build airstrips, roads and
other support facilities contemplated by the contract in
an area that was strategically important because of its
closeness to Antartica. A chorus of critics, including a
sector of the military, denounced the contract as a
reversal of Peron's earlier stand in defense of economic
independence and charged that there was a contradiction
between the contract and the provisions of the 1949
Constitution which prohibited the alienation of petroleum
deposits. Pamphlets attacking the contract were
circulated throughout the country and the entire subj ect
soon became a political football.
Peron tried to defend his petroleum policy with
nationalistic arguments too, urging the legislators to
approve the contract as the fastest way to achieve
petroleum self-sufficiency. He described his policy as
representing the true interest of the nation and attacked
his opponents as "comic-opera nationalists" whose "stupid
policies have hurt the country as much as the tricks of
the colonialists." 36 In the course of a press conference,
Gomez Morales made a strong defense of the government's
petroleum policy, and he answered criticisms of the
contract point by point. The Minister provided figures
showing the development of oil fields by YPF from 1946 on,
pointing out that the state company's production only
covered 48 percent of the country's consumption. He
reiterated that the contract would not be to the detriment
of the national sovereignty, adding that "it is a
downright falsehood to assert that this contract implies
the concession of bases to any foreign power." 37
The opposition campaign also found supporters among
the Peronists. Critics of the contract resented the
compensation provisions, which they considered
exaggerated, and the arbitration provisions, which
sidestepped the jurisdiction of the Argentine law courts.
After it became evident that even Peronist Congressmen
were unwilling to approve the contract without certain
modifications, the Argentine government reopened
negotiations with Standard California to discuss
revisions, mainly on the parts dealing with termination
rights and compensation payments. The California
representatives were willing to accept changes as long as
they did not affect the economic aspects of the
3 ft
contract.
Simultaneously, the government tried to speed up
negotiations with Esso and Shell. The companies, however,
did not want to resume negotiations until they knew what
changes were to be made in the California contract. On
July 28, Gomez Morales called Tchlidy and asked him to
present Esso's draft contract to the Minister of Industry.
Upon receiving clearance from the company's headquarters
in New York, the draft contract was given to Santos on
August 4. Tchalidy believed that the Esso contract might
prove more palatable than the California contract since it
was free from many of the features to which the Peronist
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Congressmen had been objecting and he thought that the
government would try to use this contract to break the
deadlock. 39
Meanwhile, the political situation in Argentina had
continued to deteriorate and opposition to Peron was
becoming increasingly vocal. The oil guestion had
fortuitously provided an issue around which opponents of
the Peron regime could mobilize at a time when the
government was already in a weak position. Peron 's new
Five-Year Plan had brought about only partial and short-
lived recovery. In 1953, the GDP rose by 6.1 percent
after a 5.9 percent drop in 1952. The balance of payments
showed the largest surplus since 1946, but mainly as a
result of curtailment of imports, and the cost of living
increased by only 4.3 percent compared with 40 percent the
year before. But there was no growth in manufacturing and
only 3 percent growth in agriculture after the 15 percent
drop in 1952. In 1954, the GPD grew by 5 percent,
industry by 9 . 1 percent and the cost of living rose by
only 3.5 percent. The balance of payments was favorable
but there was very little growth in agriculture. In 1955,
the GDP grew by 7 . 2 percent, industry by 12 percent and
agriculture by 3 . 7 percent. But farm production in 1955
was no higher than in 1950. Besides, there was a $240
million deficit in the balance of payments and a 12.1
percent rise in the cost of living. The energy crisis had
worsened and, in 1955, Argentina imported 90 percent of
its coal and 60 percent of its oil. 40
Peron 's program to attract foreign investors under
Law 14222 was making very slow progress. On January 19,
1955 Peron had reached an agreement with Henry Kaiser for
the establishment of an automobile factory in Cordoba
.
Under the contract, Kaiser would invest $8 million worth
of equipment and Argentina would contribute $16 million to
import machinery, 1031 Kaiser automobiles, and parts. The
contract stated that production would gradually move from
assembling of imported parts to local production of the
automobile components. Other contracts signed with U.S.
firms under the new investment law included a $200,000
investment by Merck & Co. for a cortisone plant and a
$700,000 investment by Monsanto to produce polystyrene.
German, French and Italian companies also signed contracts
to produce tractors, automobile parts, and chemical
products. However, by the end of the Peron government,
the total amount of net foreign investment was only $50
• i i 41million.
The problem of blocked profit remittances continued
to trouble U. S . -Argentine relations. On March 31, 1955,
Argentina signed a new Trade and Payments Agreement with
Britain after long and complicated negotiations which
lasted for a whole year. Under this agreement, Argentina
would export $337 million worth of meat and other
agricultural products to Britain in return for imports of
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manufactured goods and petroleum. Britain would provide
credit facilities, and Argentina would authorize sterling
profit remittances up to a limit of 1.5 million pounds
under the Central Bank's circular 1406 of 1950. 42 This
agreement provoked a strong reaction among U.S. investors
in Argentina who felt that they were being discriminated
against and claimed similar concessions. They assailed
the Embassy and the State Department with complaints,
demanding immediate action. 43
On April 5, Holland sent a letter to Peron commenting
on the impact that the agreement with Britain had had
among U.S. investors and urging the president to find a
way to address the problem of blocked remittances. On
April 15, Peron answered Holland's letter assuring him
that he would do his best to work out some mutually
satisfactory agreement within the financial possibilities
of his country. Peron explained the difficult dollar
exchange position that Argentina was facing as a result of
the low level of its exports to the United States. This
problem was enhanced by crop failures and by the fall in
international prices for agricultural exports. His
government was trying to find a solution to the dollar
shortage through its foreign investment program and the
contracts with the oil companies. The dollars that would
enter the country through these contracts combined with
the savings from reduced imports, particularly of
petroleum products, would enable the government to deal
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with the problem of profit remittances. However, he had
instructed Gomez Morales to discuss the matter with Nufer
and with representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
in Argentina with the purpose of finding a formula that
would at least make possible the remittance of an amount
equivalent to the sum authorized for British investors. 44
As negotiations between the Argentine government and
representatives of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce proceeded,
the State Department continued to exert pressure for a
quick solution of the problem. In early June, the
Director of the Office of South American Affairs, Henry
Dearborn, invited Dr. Juan Scarpati, a high level officer
of the Argentine Ministry of Economic Affairs who was
negotiating the details of the steel loan with the EXIM-
Bank, to discuss the problem of profit remittances.
Scarpati reiterated Argentina's sincere commitment to
solve this problem, and he explained that the main reason
for the delay in reaching an agreement was that Argentina
simply did not have the necessary dollars to authorize the
remittances. Dearborn insisted on the need for some
action on the part of Argentina, suggesting that at least
some token remittances should be allowed. He added that,
although the United States government was very sincere in
its desire to cooperate with Argentina in the realization
of her economic objectives, "it was becoming increasingly
difficult for us to follow through on this cooperation
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principally because of the failure of the Argentine
government to do something about remittances." 45
While the domestic situation in Argentina continued
to deteriorate, Peron' s rule became more authoritarian and
personalistic. As real wages declined, labor unrest
mounted, and throughout 1954 there were more strikes than
in the past three years combined. Peron lifted the wage
freeze imposed two years before. This decision alienated
the urban industrialists who now joined forces with the
agrarian interests , which had always opposed Peron . As
opposition mounted among charges of corruption, tyrannical
abuses of power and, after the deal with Standard
California, betrayal of national sovereignty, the regime
grew more and more repressive. To make matters worse,
Peron took several measures that alienated the Catholic
Church including the legalization of divorce, the
abolition of compulsory religious education in the schools
and the granting of equal rights to illegitimate as well
as legitimate children. The Church soon became a symbol
of resistance. On June 16, there was a failed coup
attempt. Navy planes dropped bombs on the presidential
palace killing several hundred people. That evening, mobs
burnt Catholic churches and the headquarters of opposition
parties
.
The mounting violence and the attack against the
Church had a very negative impact on public opinion in the
United States. The press campaign against Peron led by
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the New York Times escalated. Several U.S. Congressmen
proposed resolutions to condemn Peron's persecution of
religion; others criticized the Eisenhower Administration
for its policy of rapprochement with the Peron regime. 47
On June 22, Holland defended the administration's policy
at a secret session of the Latin American Sub-Committee of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Holland explained
that the U.S. policy toward Argentina followed by the
previous Administration had not been productive. The U.S.
government was currently pursuing a constructive policy of
friendliness and cooperation which produced positive
results. Outstanding among these were Peron's cooperation
in hemispheric affairs, his petroleum policy and the
progress made on the problems of AMFORP and remission of
profits. Some members of the Committee expressed concern
that U.S. economic assistance might have strengthened the
regime of Peron. State Department officials observed that
U.S economic aid could hardly be regarded as having
propped up the Peron regime since Argentina had never
applied for U.S. aid and had consequently not been
included in the U.S. technical or economic assistance
programs. The EXIM-Bank credit granted to Argentina in
1950 had been used to pay U.S. exporters. Shortly after
the Hearing, some newspapers reported that State
Department officials had expressed their belief that Peron
had lost control of the government to the Army and that he
might eventually be eased out of the picture. The State
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The State Department, meanwhile, increased pressure
on Peron to solve the problem of profit remittances. On
June 16, Gomez Morales informed Nufer that the Argentine
government would authorize remittances for a dollar sum
equivalent to 1.5 million sterling to be made in two
quotas in 1956. The State Department rejected this
proposal insisting that remittances should start right
away on the grounds that a postponement to 1956 would put
the United States in an embarrassingly disadvantageous
position compared to Britain. 49 Nufer counselled caution,
arguing that it would be inadvisable to push Peron to the
point of endangering the whole project. The State
Department, however, insisted that since the recent revolt
had provoked considerable U.S. public pressure against
further economic cooperation with Argentina, prompt action




Holland, however, had become very pessimistic about
the future of the U . S . -Argentine relations under Peron.
In his view, only a really significant gesture by Peron
could change U.S. public opinion. In analyzing possible
courses of action, he considered arranging for the return
of La Prensa to Gainza Paz, an action that would
contribute to reconcile the U.S. press with Peron but
which might be politically unacceptable to the Argentine
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president. In August, Holland had an interview with
Herbert Matthews of the New York Times in the course of
which the Assistant Secretary explained the importance of
U.S. -Argentine relationships in the context of U.S.
security interests. Holland told Matthews that "the U.S.
was obtaining more help from Argentina in the fight
against Communism than from any other Latin American
country", and he referred to "the outstanding
collaboration which Argentina had offered the U.S. at the
Rio Conference." He then mentioned Peron's efforts to put
through petroleum legislation that would make it possible
for foreign companies to engage in petroleum development
in Argentina, pointing at the influence that such a step
might be expected to have on Brazil. He indicated that
Peron's policy of receptiveness to foreign investment was
having a political cost for the President. J
Holland commented that "there are many dictatorships
in this hemisphere and some are more cruel, more
reprehensible and more lacking in freedom than the
government in Argentina." In Holland's view, "if the U.S.
followed the policy advocated by Mr. Matthews we would see
the end of inter-American solidarity." In a later report
of this interview to Nufer, Holland said that he was
"really startled to find for the first time how sterile
and unconstructive is the attitude that Matthews would
have us take." Nufer attributed Matthew's ill-will to
Peron to the latter 's refusal to receive him when he
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visited Argentina in 1951. This personal grievance with
Peron probably made Matthews "unable to view the situation
objectively or from the standpoint of our national
interest. ,|54
Meanwhile, negotiations continued between the
Argentine government and representatives of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. An agreement was finally reached on
September 8 , and the government announced that it would
authorize U.S. firms to remit $4.5 million of past
arrears. Chamber members were quite pleased with the
results which "exceeded their expectations." The State
Department issued a press release expressing its
satisfaction with Argentina's action in this respect. 5
However, Peron 's gesture was too little and too late.
On September 20, Peron was ousted by a military coup
and went into exile. The coup was accomplished by a
coalition of divergent forces. Opposition to Peron had
been gradually forming around dissatisfaction with his
actions in four principal areas: his retreat to more
conservative orthodoxy in dealing with the economic
problems of the country; his foreign investment policy,
particularly as it concerned the field of petroleum
development; his conflict with the Church; and his
dictatorial abuses of power. By mid-1955, these diverse
opposition forces were beginning to coalesce. However, as
long as Peron could retain the support of the Army, his
regime had pretty good chances of survival. But the
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increasing violence and repression, combined with Peron's
attack against the Church, at last pushed the Army into
the opposition camp. While it is difficult to know
exactly how much weight to give to the oil issue in the
overthrow of Peron, it is evident that it helped intensify
the deepening alarm with which many military officers
viewed his administration. Indeed, shortly after the
coup, the provisional military government called off the
negotiations with Standard Oil of California, and the
prospect of foreign participation in petroleum development
in Argentina was shelved once again. 56
Peron's ambitious plans to transform Argentina's
predominantly foreign-financed, export-oriented economy
into a more autonomous and diversified industrial one had
failed. Nevertheless, he had faced an enormous task.
Indeed, the industrialization of countries like Argentina
with vulnerable export-dependent economies is hardly ever
easy, notwithstanding the policies adopted, since it
reguires large financial and technological resources.
The Peron regime was, in many ways, a pioneer and, as
such, did not have the benefit of previous experiences.
Many of his policies that appear unenlightened on
hindsight had analogues in other countries at the times,
not only in Latin America but also in Europe. The inward-
looking, import-substitution industrialization model was
tried in the post-war period not only in Argentina but
throughout Latin America and it was still postulated by
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ECLA as late as 1952. In fact, Peron's performance was
not as bad as his critics would have us believe. He
succeeded in accelerating the country's economic growth in
1946 and 1947 and, when the economy began to stagnate, he
managed to change direction and implement a stabilization
program which had partial success in 1953 and 1954.
However, Peron's policies also had high costs. He
alienated the landowning class at a time when the
resources provided by agriculture were most needed; he
overburdened the state sector and triggered damaging
inflationary and balance-of-trade pressures; and he
intensified the class hatred and political divisions that
• 57
continue to plague Argentina today.
Peron's efforts to build an alliance with the United
States had also failed. Washington had continually
pressed Peron for solutions to the problems of AMFORP and
of profit remittances as a pre-condition to expanded
economic cooperation. This attitude put Peron in a
difficult position for, in spite of his clear disposition
to make pragmatic arrangements with foreign investors, he
was constrained from taking drastic measures by the need
to protect himself politically. In addition,
notwithstanding his image as a dictatorial figure, Peron
was not completely free to impose his own solutions, and
there were certain constitutional and legal restrictions
that he could not ignore even if he wished to do so.
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Moreover, in spite of a good deal of pragmatic
disposition from both U.S. and Argentine government
officials, mutual hostility and distrust based on deep-
rooted stereotypes, highly publicized by the press, had
continued to dominate public opinion in both countries.
Peron's inflammatory nationalist-populist rhetoric, which
he used primarily for domestic consumption, aggravated the
conflict by reinforcing both Argentina's stout nationalism
and U.S. suspicion. Public hostility complicated efforts
to improve relations since both governments had to be
cautious in their moves and keep the domestic political
situation in mind.
The Eisenhower Administration viewed the ouster of
Peron with a certain sense of relief. Although Washington
had welcomed Peron's conciliatory gestures and had tried
to make the most of the opportunity to nail down
Argentina's collaboration in security and economic
matters, Administration officials had never been
comfortable with Peron. Through the years of negotiations
with the Argentine President, U.S. officials had kept
wondering whether he had "really reformed" or at any time
he would "fly off on another anti-American tangent."
58 In
1957, President Eisenhower told La Prensa owner Gainza Paz
that "nothing had pleased him more than the removal from
the American scene by the Argentine people of the Peron
59dictatorship.
"
In Argentina, the military government that replaced
Peron viewed Peronism as a temporary aberration in the
history of the country and tried to purge it from the
public memory. But Peronism had come to stay, and it
would remain as one of the strongest political forces in
the country for many years to come.
U.S
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CHAPTER 6
ARAMBURU AND THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
The military government that took control of
Argentina after the overthrow of Peron viewed itself
caretaker, transitory government whose main tasks were to
dismantle Peron's administrative structure and political
power base, deregulate and revitalize the economy, and
prepare the country for a return to constitutional order.
However, a simple return to the pre-Peron past was
impossible. After ten years of Peronism, Argentina was a
different country altogether, with an organized and
militant working class, and a growing industrial sector
which required increased amounts of energy, capital and
intermediate goods. The international environment had
also changed significantly, and Argentina was now part of
a world economy which had witnessed the decline of
Britain, the rise of the United States, and the emergence
of a new international financial order. It was against
this background that the military would undertake the task
of the country's political and economic reconstruction.
Under the leadership of General Pedro Aramburu, the
new government set out to destroy Peronism by resorting to
repression and intimidation. The Peronist party was
dissolved, the General Confederation of Labor placed under
an interventor, and hundreds of union leaders were
arrested. All those persons who had held congressional,
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governmental or union office since 1946 were prohibited
from doing so again. The Peronist insignias and slogans
were banned and even the mention of Peron's name was
forbidden. Through these actions, the government hoped to
eliminate Peronism as an organized political movement
while, at the same time, reintegrating its followers into
other political parties. However, these repressive
tactics backfired, alienating labor and strengthening its
loyalty to Peron. The military returned La Prensa to its
owners and abolished the 1949 Constitution. They also
created a National Consultative Council made up of 20
representatives from different political parties and a
National Economic Council, with representatives from
industry, farming, trade finance, professional, and labor
groups to function as advisory bodies. 1
The government commissioned Raul Prebisch, who had
been director of the Argentine Central Bank until Peron
took over, to assess the economic situation of the country
and to develop an emergency economic plan. A month
later, Prebisch issued a preliminary report in which,
after emphasizing the serious nature of the crisis facing
Argentina, he focussed on the need to eliminate economic
controls and to stimulate the rapid expansion of
agricultural exports to alleviate the balance of payments
problem. Prebisch recommended devaluation of the peso,
reduced government spending, and elimination of price
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The government accepted Prebisch's recommendations.
Government officials addressed the public, describing the
situation of the country in gloomy terms and stressing
their strong determination to adopt all the necessary
measures to deal with the crisis. They informed
Argentines that the overseas deficit for 1955 would
approach $200 million, which would bring the country's
total short-term external debt up to $750 million dollars
at a time when reserves were only $450 million. The
internal debt would be approximately 70 billion pesos.
Argentina would have to make a substantial investment in
the rehabilitation of the transportation and electricity
systems which had been allowed to decay under Peron. 3
The government immediately proceeded to dismantle the
IAPI, restore autonomy to the banks, devalue the currency
and eliminate exchange controls and multiple rates. A
free foreign exchange market was established through which
earnings, royalties and capital could be unrestrictedly
remitted. This measure, intended to attract foreign
capital, was welcomed by foreign investors.
^
Prebisch had estimated the country's capital
requirements for the following 3 years at approximately
$1,2 billion, and he had warned that Argentina would have
to make a decided effort to attract foreign investment and
obtain foreign loans, since it would not be possible for
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the country to tighten its belt enough to recover under
its own resources. 5 Once again, this meant approaching
the United States, the country that was in the best
position to provide the capital, both private and public,
that Argentina needed. The government had announced its
intention to "strengthen relationships between Argentina
and the United States to the utmost", and government
officials had informally approached U.S. functionaries to
indicate Argentina's eagerness for U.S. credits. 6
In the United States, Assistant Secretary Holland had
already begun to prepare the ground among the relevant
U.S. agencies for a favorable response to an Argentine
request for aid. Holland was convinced that the Argentine
situation offered a "unique opportunity for the
establishment of U . S . -Argentine relationships on a
cooperative and mutually beneficial basis" which should
not be allowed to "go by default", and he explained his
position on this issue in several memoranda addressed to
those officers who would be in charge of making decisions
concerning Argentina. He told them that the new Argentine
government was "dominated by people who are wholeheartedly
devoted to the private enterprise system and to those
governmental economic principles which we support in the
United States." This government, convinced that it cannot
succeed in the economic field without strong assistance
from abroad, "appreciates realistically that this
assistance will not be forthcoming unless Argentina is
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prepared to adopt a frankly pro-United States and anti-
communist attitude and it is willing to follow that
course." Holland thus argued that it would be to the U.S.
advantage to "strengthen this group by generous
assistance" so as to "insure that Argentina will abandon
the state interventionist theories with which she has




Holland expected that such a turn of events in
Argentina would "exert a powerful influence on a number of
other governments of South America", particularly in
Chile, Brazil and Uruguay "where the efforts of
socialistically-minded politicians and economists would be
considerably weakened." Moreover, he argued, if Argentina
adopted a policy of "frank hostility to communism" and
cooperated with the U.S. "effectively in hindering the
operation of the international communist apparatus, the
effect throughout South America will be very significant."
Holland cautioned, however, that this opportunity was a
"passing one" since Argentina "cannot wait to find help in
solving her urgent problem." The Assistant Secretary
feared that if the United States failed to give help to
Argentina, "she will welcome it from other sources
prepared to give it and whose participation will prejudice
United States interests." Holland urged the
Administration to "respond to Argentina's requests
generously and constructively", under terms and conditions
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"consistent with our policies as they have been announced
on many occasions."
Holland's position was supported by Ambassador Nufer.
The Ambassador described the Argentine government as
-the
friendliest toward the U.S. which has existed here for
many years." He counseled the Administration to "help
nurture this tender plant and do what we can [to] ensure
its continuance and further growth." Warning that "the
alternatives of a return to oligarchic government,
resurgence of Peronism under whatever name, or rapid
spread of Communism are certainly not reassuring", Nufer
recommended that "when specific reguests for credit [are]
received, they be considered promptly and not only in
light [of] present Argentine ability to repay but that
good credit record, future economic growth potential and
politico-security factors also be taken into
consideration. 1,8 At Holland's request, Secretary of State
Dulles gave the NSC a comprehensive report on the
financial and economic situation in Argentina, warning the
group that U.S. economic assistance would be "essential if
Argentina were to recover its stability in any reasonable
time." 17 Subsequently, as he prepared for a visit to
Argentina in November, Holland requested authorization to
convey to the Argentine authorities the U.S. desire to
"extend generous financial and military assistance" for
programs "which we believe will contribute effectively to
l othe reconstruction of the Argentine economy."
The Administration, however, reacted cautiously. The
Bureau of Economic Affairs of the State Department turned
down Holland's suggestion that Argentina be offered a
Treasury stabilization loan arguing that, since the new
exchange rate established by the Argentine government
might increase Argentina's competitiveness with respect to
certain U.S. agricultural products, aid in this field
would meet political opposition in the United States* 11
Undersecretary of State Hoover told Holland that he did
not believe "we should be in the position of giving the
Argentines a blank check on economic aid." The State
Department instructed Holland to "adopt a sympathetic
attitude toward the Argentine government during his
meetings with them" but to restrict his commitments to
inviting them to a "fact-finding conference at which all
the circumstances might be reviewed." 12
The U.S. mission, headed by Holland and EXIM-Bank
Director Samuel Waugh visited Argentina between November
30 and December 2, 1955. The group held two formal
discussion sessions with Argentine economic officials
headed by Prebisch, and it participated in informal
exchanges of views with representative groups of the local
U.S. and Argentine business community. The discussions
focused mostly on Argentina's economic problems and on the
possibility of U.S. financial aid. Prebisch gave a
detailed description of Argentina's situation and of the
government's plan to cope with it. He emphasized
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restoration of agricultural production as the key to
Argentine economic recovery, and he described other
pressing problems, such as the need to rebuild the
nation's transportation and energy systems and to import
essential machinery and equipment for industry and
agriculture. Specific problems in U . S .
-Argent ine
relations were also considered. The group discussed the
planned expansion of CADE's power facilities, the
unresolved AMFORP problem, U.S. sanitary restrictions on
imports of Argentine meat, and the possibility of
Argentina joining the IMF and the IBRD. Waugh explained
the EXIM-Bank's functioning and expressed his hope that
the bank could be useful to Argentina. He stressed the
bank's policy of not financing public projects for which
private capital was available, referring specifically to
the petroleum industry. The Argentines made no specific
requests, and it was agreed that they would send a special
representative to Washington in the near future to follow
up economic discussions more concretely. 1 ^
During a reception at the Embassy, Holland had an
informal exchange of views with President Aramburu.
Aramburu stated that Argentina "would adhere at the first
feasible opportunity to the anti-Communist resolution
passed at the Caracas Conference." He also indicated that
the "sometime Argentine-espoused x Third Position' was a
silly fiction" and informed Holland that his government
was considering passage of a resolution outlawing the
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Communist party. Holland applauded these announcements
and mentioned
-the favorable effect- that the return of La
Prensa to its owners had had in international circles. 14
Subsequently, during a luncheon offered by the
Argentine authorities, Holland and Nufer were involved in
a curious incident. The Argentine Vice-President Admiral
Rojas asked the two U.S. officials to meet with him
privately and informed them of the Navy's desire to
purchase equipment from the United States, specifically
mentioning an aircraft carrier and equipment for a marine
regiment. Rojas then emphasized the political need to
strengthen the Navy vis-a-vis the Army since the former
was "a hundred percent" behind the government while the
loyalties of the latter were "more divided." Holland
mentioned the difficulties involved in the sale of a
carrier, but he suggested, as a purely personal and
tentative idea, the possibility of seeking U.S. Congress
approval for loaning a carrier. Rojas agreed that this
might be an adequate solution but only so long as it did
not imply "any corollary commitment to enter a bilateral
military agreement", since Argentina could not make such a




Rojas had not informed President Aramburu of his
intention to speak to Holland and Nufer privately, and the
President was visibly surprised when he saw the three
emerge from a private hotel room to join him for lunch.
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Aware of Aramburu's reaction, Holland thought it
convenient to inform him of the general tenor of his
conversation with Rojas. Clearly annoyed, Aramburu told
Holland that Argentina did not need an aircraft carrier,
since the country had other much more urgent economic
needs. This episode was highly revealing of the divisions
and rivalries inside the Argentine government and it must
undoubtedly have created a very poor impression among the
envoys from the country on which the Argentine government
so desperately counted for help. 16
Nufer later summed up the results of the Holland's
group visit as "constructive in a general and exploratory
fashion." According to Nufer, the U.S. envoys "listened
sympathetically, asked guestions, agreed to further
exploration of the Argentine financial problem, but left
Buenos Aires without commitment, except for formal
signature of the already approved Eximbank steel credit."
The group left behind it "an aura of optimism for the
Argentines to savor" and "the overall impression that the
US is prepared to advance as much credit for sound
Argentine projects to improve the Argentine economic
position as Argentina will be in a position to repay in
dollars within a reasonable banking period." 17
Meanwhile, Holland had continued to urge the
Administration to develop a policy position in advance so
as to be ready to act swiftly when a specific reguest came
from Argentina. Following his recommendations, a NAC
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working group was formed under the chairmanship of Henry
Bitterman of the Treasury Department to study prospective
requests for economic assistance from Argentina, Brazil
and Chile. 18
In mid-January, Prebisch submitted two more reports,
which dealt mainly with internal economic problems. In
the first one, entitled "Sound Money or Uncontrolled
Inflation", Prebisch indicated that the government's
budget deficit for 1957 would be approximately 9 billion
pesos. in order to offset this prospective inflationary
force, Prebisch urged a 10 percent increase in
productivity. He also acknowledged that an upward
increase in wages had become necessary because of the
effect that the devaluation of the peso had had on the
cost of living. However, he warned that such wage
increases should be held down to a minimum and should not
be transferred to prices. Instead, they should come out




In analyzing this report, the U.S. Embassy commented
that the premises on which it was based were "highly
unrealistic." A 10 percent productivity rise was
"incredible, in view of the worn out state of most
industries due to a decade of neglect and decline, apart
from the adverse effects on management from extensive
state control and ownership." Prebisch ' s expectation that
wage increases would not be transferred to prices was
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"highly optimistic"
, particularly since the
"responsibility for keeping prices at their current levels
would rest with the employers" who would be "allowed to
make agreements amongst themselves for this purpose and to
propose price control measures to the government." m
this respect, the Embassy wondered how Prebisch, with his
knowledege of Latin American countries and his experience
in ECLA, could propose that "groups of entrepreneurs be
relied upon to hold down their own prices." The Embassy
then indicated that the only way to stop inflation would
be through "severe measures to curb increases in personal
income and consumption." 20
In his second report entitled "Plan for Economic
Restoration", Prebisch singled out development of
petroleum resources, expansion of electric power
facilities, and reconstruction of the railroads as the
three sectors of the economy in most urgent need of
attention. In the field of petroleum, he recommended that
further development be carried out by YPF, "with firm
continuance of the traditional policy against private
concessions to safeguard the country from the actions of
combinations or international monopolies." Such
recommendations were in line with the policy already
adopted by the military government, which had cancelled
the contract with Standard Oil California, suspended
negotiations with the other foreign companies, and
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announced its intention to make YPF solely responsible for
the development of the country's oil resources. 21
Argentine officials were convinced that, with
adequate equipment and transportation facilities to bring
in additional output from proven fields, YPF could
increase its production substantially in a relatively
short period of time. The government had commissioned
George Elliot, a well-known United Nations expert, to make
a survey of the country's oil reserves, and his report had
confirmed the existence of large reserves estimated at
about 370 million cubic meters. The Aramburu
Administration planned to strenghten YPF by making it
autonomous, reconstituting its team of experts and
technicians, and building new oil and gas pipelines.
Through these measures, combined with further drilling,
YPF expected to double its production in three years.
YPF's expansion program would have an estimated cost of
200 million dollars for imported equipment and 3,000
million pesos for local expenditures. Foreign companies
would be invited to participate in the program through
service contracts or under mixed company arrangements with
YPF. If YPF failed to obtain foreign financing for its
program, Prebisch advocated using the country's monetary
reserves to buy the necessary equipment from abroad. 22
The U.S Embassy reported that Prebisch's discussion
of petroleum had "a decidedly political flavor" which
"unfortunately conformed to the announced belief of most
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Argentine political leaders and also to the opinion of
most Argentine citizens." Embassy officials believed that
YPF's plans to increase production by nearly a 100 percent
in 3 years, chiefly by the construction of pipelines, were
"highly unrealistic-
,
and they regarded the position
adopted by the military government on the petroleum issue
as a drawback which "flatly rejected the principal hope
that existed a year ago for improving the Argentine
economic situation in the near future." 23
In his report, Prebisch had also highlighted the
urgent need to expand existing electric power facilities,
which had become thoroughly inadeguate to supply
increasing demand. Over 60 percent of all the electricity
generated in the country was produced and consumed in the
Buenos Aires industrial area, which was serviced by two
foreign-owned companies, the Belgian CADE, with an
installed capacity of 600,000 kilowatts and the Swiss
ITALO, with a total capacity of 270,000 kilowatts.
Prebisch estimated that generating capacity in the Buenos
Aires area would have to be expanded immediately by at
least 300,000 kilowatts. During the Peron government,
CADE had added 100,000 kilowatts to its installations with
a 500 million peso loan from the Argentine Industrial
Bank. The company also intended to acguire two new
125,000 kilowatts units, but it had so far been unable to
obtain the necessary funding. In his report, Prebisch had
suggested that this problem might be solved through the
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sale of stock to the public under government auspices.
CADE's expansion, however, would only provide a partial
solution to the power shortage problem since the new
capacity would soon be offset by the growth of demand.
The government was thus planning to build an additional
600,000 kilowatt plant at Dock Sud in Buenos Aires. The
two above mentioned projects would require an investment
of $150 million. Power supply in the rest of the country
totalling 600,000 kilowatts had also become thouroughly
inadequate and would have to be augmented by at least
300,000 kilowatts. 24
Another pressing problem facing the government was
the need for a comprehensive and massive program of
rehabilitation of the railroad system, which had been
allowed to decay under Peron. Railroad rehabilitation was
particularly urgent, since the availability of adeguate
transportation would be an important pre-requisite to the
success of the government's plans to increase agricultural
exports. Prebisch had estimated the cost of this program
at approximately $1.4 billion and, since there were no
private groups interested in taking over the railroads,
the government would have to find a way to finance these
costs. Prebisch also recommended rate increases and
gradual elimination of excess personnel to cover operation
costs. 25
In his report, Prebisch also indicated that it would
be necessary to raise the country's agricultural
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productivity through improved incentives and technology
and to promote the establishment of new industries in the
fields of steel, railroad and agricultural machinery,
paper and pulp, chemicals and petrochemicals, principally
through private initiative. since Argentina did not have
the resources to put the different aspects of his program
into effect, Prebisch had also indicated that the
government would have to borrow extensive funds from
abroad. He thus advised the government to join the IBRD
and the IMF and to send financial missions to the United
States and Europe to negotiate loans. The government
should complement such measures with reforms in domestic
banking and taxation policies, progressive elimination of
all price and exchange controls and conversion of the
country's bilateral trade agreements into a multilateral
system. 26
The U.S. Embassy viewed Prebisch's plans with
skepticism, indicating that they "hardly constituted a
blueprint but rather pious hopes that all will go well."
The Embassy also noted "certain variations between these
two last reports and the more hard-headed one prepared by
Prebisch in October", and pointed out that it had "reason
to believe that Prebisch [had] modified his
recommendations under domestic political pressure." 27
On January 27, Prebisch's recommendations were
approved by both the Consultative and the Economic
Councils. Subsequently, the government began to explore
possible solutions to the electric power problem. Aware
of its financial limitations, the Administration wanted to
find a formula that would enable the private companies to
cooperate with the state in supplying the additional
generating capacity needed. However, given the existence
of strong public sentiment against the companies because
of the circumstances under which they had acquired their
concessions, the Administration had to be cautious
concerning the solution it adopted. 28
Initially, the government proposed to cancel CADE's
and ITALO's 1936 concessions and substitute provisional
contracts which would enable the companies to continue
operating until the state had the necessary funds to
purchase their facilities. The new contracts would
include rate increases and more favorable terms so as to
make it easier for the companies to attract new
investment. However, when the government communicated its
plans to the Consultative Council, this body reacted
strongly against the project and issued a recommendation
advocating the immediate nationalization of both CADE and
ITALO. 29
The Council's strong and unanimous stand for
nationalization surprised the government, which
subsequently began to search for a formula which would
both satisfy the Council and spare the government from
having to nationalize the companies. The Administration
then proposed the "Argentinization" of the companies.
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CADE and ITALO would be merged into a single new unit,
their assets would be revalued and the shareholders would
be given shares in the new corporation proportional to the
value of the original companies' properties. The
Argentine government would then acquire main equity in the
new corporation by contributing the additional capital
needed for the expansion of CADE's facilities plus taking
over CADE's debt to the Industrial Bank. The government
planned to obtain the capital for this project through
loans, and it subsequently intended to transform its part
in the new enterprise into shares for public subscription
by private investors. 30
CADE and ITALO were willing to go along with this
plan but there was disagreement on the method by which the
value of the companies' assets would be determined. The
companies insisted that peso devaluation be taken into
account, whereas the government wanted to use book value
plus depreciation as the basis of its estimate, since this
was the system customarily employed by the Argentine
courts in similar cases. The method of valuation adopted
was particularly important in this case because it would
help determine which group would retain majority control
in the new corporation. Company and government officials
continued to explore different options in an effort to
find a compromise acceptable to all. 31
Meanwhile, several aspects of the government's
economic program had come under attack from different
domestic groups. The rise in the cost of living brought
about by the peso devaluation and the curtailment of food
subsidies had undercut workers' living standards creating
growing labor unrest. The government's announcement of
its decision to remove price controls on some consumer
items had produced such an outburst of protest from
political party leaders and the press that the
Administration opted to retreat. it continued to
subsidize some basic foodstuffs rather than risk
alienating large sectors of the population. in February,
the government authorized a 10 percent upward wage
adjustment. 32
Simultaneously, other groups criticized the
government for not going far enough with the
liberalization of the economy. Some of Prebisch's January
recommendations had met opposition, especially among
businessmen. The government was in a difficult position,
since it could neither provoke social tensions that might
undermine its campaign for a peaceful return to
constitutional order nor alienate anti-Peronist
,
nationalist and interest group leaders, whose cooperation
was essential for the achievement of its political and
economic aims, particularly in the presence of a hostile
working class. 33
In 1956, Argentina ratified the OAS Charter and the
Caracas anti-communist resolution, joined the IMF and the
IBRD and strengthened the relationships between the U.S.
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and Argentine military by signing an Air Force Mission
agreement and by authorizing its Navy to participate in
joint anti-submarine exercises with a U.S. task force. 34
Although these steps were welcomed by Washington, a number
of obstacles still remained in the way of smoother U.S.-
Argentine relations. in January, the Argentine government
had placed several hundred companies and individuals
suspected of improper business dealings under the Peron
regime on an "interdicted" list. Kaiser was included in
the list. Although no public charges were brought against
the company, interventors were installed in its offices to
audit current and past operations and the company's
contract was re-opened for revision. Kaiser's problems
were closely watched by other U.S. investors who
considered the firm's intervention arbitrary and unjust.
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American
Affairs Edward Miller, who had resumed his position in the
law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, went to Buenos Aires
and talked to high government officials including the
President and the Vice-President, urging them to
regularize Kaiser's situation as soon as possible. The
company was eventually removed from the interdiction list
and its contract was renewed. 35
The problem of the meat-packing companies also
continued to plague U. S . -Argentine relations. Throughout
the postwar years, this industry had been under strict
governmental control, and the government had fixed the
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prices at which the packers bought livestock and sold meat
as well as the exchange rates for the industry's exports
and imports. since the prices of meat for local
comsumption were set up at figures below cost, the
government was supposed to make up for the companies'
losses through a subsidy which allowed for a percentage of
profit calculated on the basis of the original capital
invested by the company. The companies considered this
method of calculating the profit margin unfair, since it
did not take peso devaluation into account. The Aramburu
government had removed many of the regulations and
controls that affected the meat packing industry, but some
of the past accounts for losses sustained during the Peron
regime remained unsettled. The packers wanted to reach an
agreement for settlement of past claims based on a formula
that would authorize a 1.5 percent profit on domestic
sales and a 5.75 percent profit on export sales, which was
the margin permitted prior to the Peron period. They also
wanted the government to authorize a 10 percent profit
margin on present and future sales for export on the
grounds that this higher amount was required to finance
the rehabilitation and modernization of their plants. The
Aramburu Administration had promised to give a fair
solution to this problem, but negotiations proceeded at a
slow pace and the companies were constantly putting
presure on both the State Department and the embassy to
intervene in their favor. 36
The situation of AMFORP, which still remained
unsolved, continued to cast a permanent shadow on U.S.-
Argentine relations. The Aramburu Administration had
expressed its desire to reach a satisfactory solution but
the old problem of how to determine the value of the
company's properties would, once again, complicate the
negotiations. 37
Trade issues were another constant sore point in
U.S.
-Argentine relations. Argentine officials had, once
again, unsuccessfully tried to persuade Washington to
revise its sanitary regulations so as to permit imports of
livestock from those areas in Argentina that were free of
hoof-and-mouth disease. The Argentine Ambassador in
Washington had also proposed to discuss with U.S.
officials a list of commodities which could be sold in the
United States to expand trade between the two nations.
The State Department had turned down this proposal,
arguing that there was "very little the U.S. government




Meanwhile, the Argentine Navy had continued to
explore the possibilities of obtaining an aircraft
carrier, equipment for a marine regiment and a squadron of
jet aircraft in the United States, and they had suggested
that some of these purchases might be made under section
401 of the U.S. Mutual Security Act. Section 401,
however, contemplated military grant aid only for those
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countries that had signed bilateral military agreements
with the United States or that were under direct military
Soviet threat. Several Argentine military supported the
idea of negotiating a military agreement with Washington,
but others feared that such negotiations might seriously
expose the government to public attack. Washington
expressed understanding of Argentina's political problem
but it reiterated that, in the absence of a bilateral
agreement, the United States was limited in what it could
do by non-availability of funds and statutory limitations.
Eventually, the Navy bought part of the marine regiment
equipment for $2 million. 39
The resumption of the Soviet economic offensive in
1957 added a new element to the picture of u. S . -Argentine
relations. The U.S. Embassy suspected that Bulganin's
offer of technical and economic aid to Latin America had
been "intentionally timed to coincide with Argentina's
forthcoming request for financial assistance from the
United States." 40 Such fears were reinforced by reports
of Soviet approaches to Argentine government officials
with specific offers for trade deals. In February, the
Soviet Union offered to sell Mig 15 and other aircraft to
Argentina at very low prices. In March, a Soviet mission
visited Argentina to discuss purchases of mutton and beef.
In April, Soviet envoys contacted YPF officials to offer
drilling and other petroleum industry equipment on long-
term, low-interest financing and the Soviet Commercial
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Attache circulated newly printed catalogs of Soviet
machinery among different government agencies. m the
spring of 1956, the Embassy reported "increasing
indications that a Soviet offensive is developing in
Argentina. 1,41
The Argentine government, however, reacted to Soviet
approaches cautiously. During a conversation with
Aramburu, Nufer brought up the subject of Soviet economic
overtures and was relieved to find that the President was
"well aware of the specious and dangerous character of the
recent Soviet offers." Nufer also reported that "the
Soviet effort to place technical representatives in places
where Russian equipment is in use has aroused a very
strong reaction among many Argentines, who are worried
about the sinister possibilities of this infiltration." 42
Holland discussed the subject with the Argentine
Ambassador in the United States. The Assistant Secretary
expressed his fear that some Argentine military officers,
in their eagerness to acquire more material, might be
tempted to negotiate arm purchases with Soviet bloc
countries. He warned the Ambassador that a deal of such
nature would surely produce a violent reaction among the
U.S. public and Congressional opinion and would make it
hard for the Administration to continue with its policy of
expanding trade, private and public investment and
technical aid in Latin America. Holland commented that,
in the course of a recent appearance before the House Sub-
Committee on Latin American relations, he had been "rather
closely interrogated on this point"
, which "might signify
a rumour of impending arms operations somewhere in the
hemisphere." The Argentine Ambassador reassured Holland
that there was "no chance that Argentina would acquire any
arms from iron curtain sources", adding that his
government was "fully aware of the implications of such
operations." Holland indicated that he realized the
United States "had not given Argentina the arms outright
as she had thought" but he expressed his certainty that,
if Argentina wanted credit terms for further arms
purchases, all the areas of the government would be glad
to consider her applications and make arms available at
reasonable prices. 43
While Washington continued to keep an alert eye on
these developments, the NAC study group completed its
report on Argentina. After rating Argentina as "one of
the ten leading trading nations of the world", with
substantial resources, a 90 percent level of literacy, and
the highest standards of living and of technically-skilled
labor in Latin America, the report concluded that
Argentina's problem was "mainly one of recovery: of
regaining former production and export levels, of making
up a lag in technological advances, of repairing the
damage done by negligence to her industrial and
transportation facilities." To recover its "productive
rhythm", Argentina would have to: 1) bring inflation under
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control; 2) develop a long-range agricultural and
livestock program; 3) rehabilitate and overhaul the
railway system both physically and administratively; 4)
increase electric generating capacity; 5) seek to earn or
save foreign exchange by investigating the possibility of
new products, eliminating excessive government control,
and increasing petroleum production as rapidly as
possible. However, the NAC group warned that if
Argentina's recovery was "not to be indefinitely postponed
or slowed down, she will need large amounts of external
financing", since she had "neither the necessary domestic
savings nor the necessary foreign exchange to undertake
all these projects out of her own resources." 44
According to the NAC, Argentina's most urgent need
was to improve her balance of payments situation so as to
generate the capacity to service additional new long term
private or public foreign investment or loans. The report
explained that Argentina's balance of trade position had
been "seriously affected by the postwar inconvertibility
of most currencies", aggravated by "a domestic pricing
policy which resulted in declining production and exports
of agricultural products", by "lower world prices for some
of Argentina's staple exports" and by "the virtual loss of
her formerly important markets in the United States for
linseed, hides and skins." In the NAC's view, sterling
convertibility was the key to Argentina's success. The
report also indicated general agreement with Prebisch's
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recommendations for Argentina's economic recovery, though
it expressed reservations concerning the feasibility of
offsetting the inflationary effects of government deficits
mainly through increased productivity. 45
On June 22, 1956, an Argentine economic mission
headed by the President of the Argentine Central Bank,
Carlos Coll Benegas, arrived in Washington to continue
with the economic discussions begun during Holland's visit
to Argentina. Shortly after his arrival, Coll had an
interview with Holland in the course of which the
Assistant Secretary indicated that he was "somewhat
disturbed over indications that the Argentine government
was planning to expropriate CADE and apply for government
loans to expand its operations." Holland warned him that
such plans might have "unfortunate consequences", since
they would probably make it impossible for the EXIM to
collaborate with Argentina in the power field. The
Assistant Secretary expressed concern about the negative
effects that the expropriation of CADE might have in
investment circles. Coll showed general agreement with
Holland's views, but he explained that CADE had an
extremely bad reputation in Argentina owing to its
fraudulent practices in the past and that most sectors of
public opinion felt that CADE would have to be
nationalized. He then explained the government's plan
concerning the company in detail, stressing the fact that
the government's intervention would be only an
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intermediate step in the eventual taking over of the firm
by private interests. This temporary intervention was
necessary both for political reasons and because Argentine
private capital was not at the moment available in
sufficient amounts to handle the job. Holland expressed
understanding of the political problems involved in the
CADE case, but he insisted that it would be preferable to
base the ultimate solution on private capital rather than
on government expropriation. 46
Coll also told Holland that the AMFORP case was
"entirely different", since both governmental and public
opinion were "sympathetic to the company's problems". The
Argentine government intended to settle AMFORP'
s
expropriation claims on an equitable basis and to
establish conditions that would permit the company to
continue operating and expanding its remaining properties
on satisfactory terms. Coll announced that a special
committee was being set up by the government to negotiate
these issues with AMFORP. 47
Between July 2 and 17, the Argentine Financial
Mission held a series of meetings with a U.S. delegation
composed of representatives from the Departments of State
and Agriculture, the Treasury, and the EXIM-Bank. The
Argentine envoys provided extensive data on their
country's economic situation and explained their projects.
They estimated Argentina's most urgent capital needs for
the next 5 years at $1.2 billion: $328 million for
246
transportation; $204 million for electric power; $292
million for petroleum and coal and $373 million for
industrial and agricultural re-equipment. The government
intended to seek private financing for most of the above
mentioned items, with the exception of power and
transportation. In the last two fields, Argentina
expected to obtain EXIM and IBRD loans to cover the costs
of the most urgent programs, estimated at $160 million for
transportation and $102 million for power. 48
However, it soon became evident that it would not be
easy for Argentina to obtain the loans it wanted. The
IBRD was reluctant to make loans to a provisional
government, and it announced that, in any case, it would
not be able to make a decision for at least a year, since
it would previously have to send a study mission to
evaluate the economic situation of the country. The EXIM-
Bank refused to consider loans for government projects in
the power field as long as the existing private companies
were willing to undertake these projects on their own.
The Bank was also unwilling to consider loans in other
fields because of Argentina's limited capacity to sustain
dollar debts. 49
Holland, concerned about the effects that an outright
refusal to make any loans available might have on U.S.-
Argentine relations, urged the Administration to keep
political considerations in mind when making its final
decision. Citing the "huge grant programs" based on
"security rather than on fiscal or banking grounds" that
the United States had in other parts of the world, he
suggested that Washington
-consider realistically the
amount of credit that in [its] best judgement represents
the minimum necessary to keep the country [Argentina]
sturdy in its new close relation with the United States."
Holland argued that "the margin, if any by which this sum
may exceed that which can be justified on sound banking
principles may well be a reasonable price for the security
in this hemisphere." However, he also indicated that any
loans given to Argentina should be conditioned upon
"reasonable assurances" that the government would allow
the electric and meat-packing industries to expand under
"reasonable regulation and without increased government
competition", as well as provide adeguate assurances




On July 16, Dulles, Humphrey, Holland and EXIM-Bank
officers met to discuss the Administration's position on
financial aid to Argentina. Holland suggested that the
United States could offer Argentina a $200 million loan
for railroad rehabilitation, if she agreed to meet
"certain conditions" concerning the situation of AMFORP,
CADE, and the meat-packing companies. Humphrey opposed
this idea, citing 20 or 30 million dollars as the maximum
amount the Administration should be prepared to lend
Argentina. Humphrey indicated that the Argentine
248
authorities were "entirely unrealistic in the amount of
borrowing they want to do", and he referred to Argentina's
steel mill investment as a "very unwise one." Dulles
asked what would happen in case Argentina did not get some
assistance from the United States. Holland answered that
"the present government would fall, and the Radicals and
Socialists, who don't like the U.S., would probably take
over." The meeting ended without the group having reached
any specific conclusion. 51
At the conclusion of the series of conferences
between the U.S. and Argentine delegations in Washington,
Maurice Bernbaum, head of the U.S. group, summed up his
impressions indicating that his group had been favorably
impressed by Argentina's general program for internal
economic reform. However, they regretted that, while
Argentine estimates of capital needs were very large, the
government felt unable to utilize all possible resources
at its disposal to the full extent that it could for
political reasons and was, consequently, unnecessarily
diluting its own resources and undertaking heavy burdens
when private capital was available to meet its
requirements. Bernbaum then referred specifically to the
government's plan to invest $300 million on a petroleum
development program which would, at best, do "little more
than keep up with the increase in fuel consumption and not
solve the basic fuel deficit." Assistant Secretary
Holland then reminded the Argentine delegates that it
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would be "tremendously important if the American firms
with problems in Argentina such as the meat-packers and
AMFORP could inform this government that they were
satisfied", particularly before the mission began specific
conversations with the banks. Coll reassured him of his
government's commitment to solve AMFORP 's case, but he
also indicated that he had received definite instructions
to the effect that the CADE problem could not be handled




The mission then proceeded to New York whore it spent
two weeks in conferences with private financing
institutions. The bankers expressed considerable interest
in doing business with Argentina, but they indicated that
no loans of conseguence would be possible until the IBRD
and the EXIM positions became known. 53 The Mission then
returned to Washington to begin direct discussions with
the i:xim and the I hid). Alter several days oi
conversations, the prospects for a satisfactory solution
did not look any better. I hid) officials remained firm in
their position that it would take six months to a year
before the Bank could make any decision on a loan program
for Argentina. EXIM-Bank oil icials were not much more
encouraging. They informed Coll that they were
considering a joint, approach with the IBRD, a course
which would also necessarily involve a considerable amount
of time. 54
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Coll conveyed deep disappointment over the progress
of the negotiations to state Department officials, and he
expressed his intention to return to Argentina for
consultations. After noting that he had already spent a
month and a half in the United States without achieving
any concrete results, he commented that, if he had to
inform his government that it might take a year for the
Banks to make a decision on credits to Argentina, he might
as well "crawl into a hole and cover himself up." The
U.S. officials urged him to be patient, pointing out that
he had now reached "the point of decision" and stressing
"the fine impression" which his group had made during the
preceding six weeks. Coll decided to stay and proceed
with the negotiations. 55
On August 10, Dulles called Humphrey prior to a
meeting between the Secretary of the Treasury and
officials of the EXIM-Bank at which the Argentine case was
going to be discussed. Dulles urged Humphrey to support a
$50 million EXIM-Bank loan for urgent programs in
Argentina. After referring to the IBRD plans to make a
lengthy survey of the Argentine economy before making any
commitments, Dulles pointed out "that it would be
disastrous for our relations with Argentina to expect that
country to wait such a long period before getting any
assurances of economic assistance." 56
On the first week of August, Henry Sargent of AMFORP
informed the EXIM that his company was interested in
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"getting into the Buenos Aires power picture- by forming a
new mixed company with the Argentine government to replace
CADE and ITALO. AMFORP would take over the assets of
these two companies through the contribution of its claim
against the government for previously nationalized
properties plus the amount resulting from the sale of its
remaining installations. The Argentine government could
participate in the new company on an eguity or debt basis,
and AMFORP would retain majority control. The new company
would then apply for a $100 million EXIM loan for
expansion of its facilities. 57
The EXIM-Bank informed the State Department of this
new development during a meeting held on August 13. EXIM
officials expressed their strong support of AMFORP's
proposal which, in their view, offered an "ideal solution"
to the problems of AMFORP 7 s claims, CADE ' s debts, and the
reorganization of the Buenos Aires power set up while, at
the same time, making it possible for the EXIM to confine
its new lending in Argentina to a private American
corporation with which it had already had extensive
dealings. State Department officials pointed out that,
although the proposed concentration of EXIM lending in the
power field appeared "reasonable and logical", it still
left Argentina's pressing problems in the transportation
field unsolved. Waugh responded that the bank would
prefer not to get involved in the transportation problem.
Holland then indicated that any new EXIM loans to
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Argentina should be made conditional on the solution of
the meat-packers' problems as well as those of AMFORP and
CADE. Waugh disagreed but he assured Holland that he
would bring up the packers' issue in his conversations
with the Argentine Mission. 58
While U.S. officials continued to discuss these new
developments, Ambassador Willard Beaulac, who had replaced
Nufer in June of 1956, called on the Argentine Ministers
of Commerce, Treasury, and Labor to reiterate that
reaching a "prompt and adequate" settlement with the
packers, AMFORP and CADE would have an important effect on
the negotiations being carried out in Washington. Each
Minister in turn reassured him that the government was
doing its best to solve these problems and that
satisfactory settlements would be soon reached. However,
the three Ministers coincided in the view that the
solution of CADE's problem would be more difficult because
of the political problems involved. 59
In his conversation with the Minister of Finance
Eugenio Blanco, Beaulac brought up the subject of
petroleum development. He pointed out that Argentina's
credit was "necessarily limited by the circumstance that
it was spending some $180 million per year unnecessarily
on imports of petroleum." Blanco replied that petroleum
was a more difficult problem because both the military and
the Radical Party had "a closed mind on that." However,
he indicated that the government's decision to make YPF
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autonomous was partly intended to make it easier for the




On August 14, EXIM directors informed Coll that the
bank was not interested in extending loans for
transportation but that it would be willing to collaborate
in the power field under a program in which AMFORP could
participate. Later, in the course of a conversation with
Viron Vaky, the Department of State Desk Officer for
Argentina, Coll expressed his great concern over the
results of the negotiations. Clearly discouraged, Coll
pointed out that transportation rehabilitation was an
extremely urgent matter, and he explained that the EXIM
was the only source of help Argentina could turn to in
this field. Waugh had suggested that Argentina draw $37.5
million from the IMF but, as Coll indicated, such an
amount would be "nothing more than the gold which
Argentina would have to contribute in the first place."
Coll also told Vaky that his government would be "very
disillusioned" over the Bank's proposal with regard to
power and that he doubted that it would be accepted. He
explained that the CADE problem had given rise to such a
"strong sentiment against any private foreign capital in
the Buenos Aires power field" that the government might
not be able to find "any other acceptable alternative to
initial government participation in power projects." 61
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On August 22, Beaulac was invited to a meeting with
the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Podesta
Costa, the Minister of Finance Eugenio Blanco, and the
Sub-Secretary of the Navy, Arturo Rial. Podesta Costa
informed Beaulac of Aramburu's concern over the lack of
progress in the financial negotiations in Washington and
he asked the Ambassador to help speed them up. Beaulac
responded that since Argentina's needs for capital were
very large, most of this money would have to come from
private enterprise. He then mentioned the cases of the
meat-packing and power industries as examples of "the
government's failure so far to solve urgent problems and
encourage private enterprise to make new investments which
the country's economy badly needs." Blanco expressed
agreement with these views and he informed the Ambassador
that a committee had just been formed to work on the
packers' problem. The Special Committee on the power
industry had also been instructed to speed up negotiations
with AMFORP.
The Ambassador then raised the question of CADE,
expressing doubts that Argentina could "sell" its plan
concerning that company to the Banks. Blanco indicated
that, if CADE did not want to enter into an arrangement
such as the one suggested by the government, it "would not
be persecuted", and its rates would be adjusted so that it
could keep on working. The government would go ahead with
its own plans to build a new electric generating facility,
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which a British company had offered to finance. Admiral
Rial broke into the conversation to state that the problem
with CADE was that "they had bought an entire Chamber of
Deputies." Blanco added that CADE had handed him a
proposal outlining the company's evaluation of its assets
and the percentage desired for revaluation, so
"objectionable" that he was going to "lock the paper in
his personal safe to protect the company and the
government." m spite of this, he said, the government
was "quite willing to talk to CADE if CADE had acceptable
proposals to offer." Rial pointed out that if the
governement agreed to revaluate CADE's assets, it would be
charged with another "sell out." 62
When Beaulac reported this meeting to the State
Department, he pointed out that "Aramburu's fear that
failure by Argentina to obtain some prompt concession may
have adverse political effects" was correct. The
Ambassador then recommended that "urgent and favorable
consideration" be given to Argentina's request for
transportation loans since adequate transportation
facilities would be critical to the success of the
government's plans to revive agriculture and increase the
country's exports. 63
On September 5, the EXIM informed the NAC of its
decision to offer Argentina a $100 million line of credit,
with $85 million earmarked for public transportation and
$15 million for loans to private enterprises. A technical
mission would be sent to Argentina to make a survey of the
transportation field and the Bank would subsequently
consider specific credit proposals on the basis of the
mission's findings. In making these credits available,
the Bank would also take into account the progress made by
Argentina toward financial stability and satisfactory
treatment of foreign private investors. The Bank,
however, would not consider any loans in the electricity
field "until the present uncertainties regarding
Argentina's policy toward private capital in this field
are clarified." The EXIM proposal was approved by the NAC
on September 6. 64
When the State Department communicated the EXIM
decision to Coll, the latter expressed disappointment at
what he considered the inadequacy of the amount offered.
Subsequently, Coll requested an upward adjustment of the
sum to $125 or $130 million so as to cover Argentina's
minimum requirements in the transportation field. EXIM
officials responded that it would not be possible to
change the figure already agreed upon by the various
interested U.S. agencies, but they indicated that the
Bank was prepared to consider additional funding in the
power field in the event of a satisfactory resolution of
the AMFORP problem. 65
Subsequently, the Argentine Ambassador Adolfo Vicchi
called on the Secretary of State to convey his
government's disappointment over the limited results
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achieved by the Financial Mission and to request
consideration of an upward adjustment of the loan. He
then made reference to the much larger financial
assistance given by the United States to other countries
(the EXIM and the IBRD had just authorized loans amounting
to 1 billion for Brazil). The Secretary told him that,
given Argentina's dollar limitations for repayment, the
credit had in fact exceeded his own expectations, adding
that it represented "a distinct achievement" for the
Argentine Mission. 66 other U.S. officials repeatedly
assured Coll and Vicchi that this loan was only an
"excellent and promising beginning" for what they expected
to be a "close and warm financial relationship with
Argentina. 1,67
On October 5, an EXIM-Bank mission headed by Vance
Brand arrived in Argentina. In his first report, Brand
indicated that the emergency requirements of the
transportation system were far greater than what had been
originally estimated and he commented that he had been
favorably impressed by the quality of management and
technical personnel in the Argentine railroad system.
Brand also used his stay in Argentina to convey to high-
level government officials the EXIM's strong support of
AMFORP 's project to replace CADE and ITALO. AMFORP had
officially presented this new proposal to the Argentine
authorities, who were in the process of evaluating it.
AMFORP offered to expand CADE ' s facilities by adding
300,000 kilowatts and to build a new 600,000 kilowatt
plant. Both projects would be financed by the EXIM-
Bank. 68
The Aramburu goverment had simultaneously continued
to explore ways to reach a settlement with AMFORP for its
expropriated properties. On October 22, in an important
intra-governmental meeting, the administration decided to
consider an out-of-court settlement, as a means of
expediting a solution, and Aramburu instructed the Special
Commission on the power industry to recommend a procedure
through which such a solution might be implemented. 69
As these negotiations proceeded, Argentina made the
U.S. news again when, in the course of the 1956
presidential campaign, the Democratic candidate Adlai
Stevenson accused the Eisenhower Administration of having
contributed to keeping Peron in power by permitting Milton
Eisenhower to call on him and by approving loans to
Argentina. Secretary of State Dulles answered back
promptly, reminding reporters that it had in fact been the
Truman Administration that had given a $125 million Exim
loan to Peron in 1951. 70
Other problems continued to complicate U . S-Argentine
relations. In October, the Department of Agriculture
asked the White House to negotiate voluntary restrictions
of tung oil exports with the governments of Argentina and
Paraguay. The State Department strongly objected to
Agriculture's recommendation, arguing that restrictive
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measures were not necessary. Concerned about the effects
that such measures might have on U. S .
-Argentine relations,
State Department officials pointed out that it would be
"rather awkward- to ask the Argentine government to put
restrictions on Argentine producers, while simultaneously
pressing it to move away from direct control of the
economy. The discussions between State and Agriculture
continued until, finally, the latter requested a Tariff
Commission investigation. Subsequently, the White House
imposed a three-year limitation on tung imports, in
accordance with the Tariff Commission's recommendation.
P.L. 480 sales of wheat to Brazil were another permanent
source of concern for Argentine officials, who feared that
such sales would eventually deprive Argentina of its
traditional market in the neighbor country. 71
After more than a year of military rule, the economic
situation in Argentina had not improved much. Following
the balance of payments surpluses in 1953 and 1954, the
country's trade deficit had shot up again reaching a
figure of $250 million in 1955 and $200 million in 1956,
with the negative balance predominantly concentrated in
the dollar area. The government's efforts to stimulate
agricultural output through incentives and high prices had
rendered only limited results. Beef production rose in
1956, but corn and wheat dropped sharply. Total exports
increased by only 1.6 percent in 1956. The slow response
of the agricultural sector was aggravated by
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capitalization, insufficient credit, lagging technology,
and inadequate storage and transportation facilities. 72
The country's internal situation had also worsened.
The share of salaries in total national income had
declined from a 46.9 percent high in 1952 to 43.0 percent
in 1955 and 42.6 percent in 1956 and the cost of living
had increased by 17 percent in 1956. 73 After a small
upward wage adjustment in early 1956, the government had
imposed an 18-month wage freeze and, as their living
standards continued to decline, workers had increasingly
begun to show their discontent by resorting to strikes.
The government was in a difficult position. Prebisch had
warned that, unless wage increases were kept to a minimum,
inflation could get out of control, destroying producers
confidence and making any long-term solution to the
economic problems of the country impossible. The
government shared this view, but it also had to find a way
to ensure enough domestic tranquility and stability to
make elections possible in 1958. At the end of 1956,
after a series of strikes, the government authorized a
18.6 percent wage adjustment which brought wages
approximately to their 1954 level. 74
Other political problems and internal divisions
compounded the Administration's task. In December of
1956, the Electric Power Commission concluded the
investigation requested by Aramburu and submitted a report
supporting an extra-judicial settlement of the AMFORP
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case. The report proposed the establishment of a
settlement commission to be chosen jointly by the company
and the government and subdivided into two sub-
commissions, one to evaluate the properties and the other
to examine forms of payment and reinvestment. 75
In the meantime, CADE had presented its own plan for
the creation of a new company partly owned by AMFORP.
This plan differed from AMFORP' s in that it only
contemplated a 300,000 kilowatt addition to the company's
assets, and it did not mention the building of a new
generating facility. CADE's proposal was, thus, more
attractive to the government, which could then go ahead
with its own plans to build this new facility at Dock Sud.
Opinions, however, were divided and, whereas a group led
by the Minister of Commerce Martinez favored the approval
of CADE's proposal, another group led by the Minister of
Finance Blanco, opposed it arguing that the government
should retain control over any new generating capacity
added. The Cabinet was also divided on the issue of
AMFORP. In February, disagreements about these and other
issues led to a Cabinet crisis that ended with Blanco's
dismissal. Blanco was replaced by Roberto Verrier, an
economist known primarily for his advocacy of liberal
economic policies and tougher austerity measures. Other
ministers were also replaced or resigned. 76
The Cabinet, however, remained divided on the issue
of power. The newly appointed Ministers of Interior,
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Alconada Aramburu, and of Justice, Acdeel Salas, opposed
the idea of an out-of-court settlement with AMFORP and
proposed instead that the judicial procedures already
initiated on AMFORP's expropriation claims be allowed to
continue, while simultaneously negotiating an extra-
judicial evaluation and award, to be adjusted, if
necessary, when the courts issued their verdicts. AMFORP,
however, rejected this compromise and insisted on an out-
of-court settlement based on market value for the totality
of its properties. 77
In March, Verrier proposed an economic program which
would have involved the elimination of subsidies on
transportation, fuel, and electric power, heavier
taxation, tighter fiscal and monetary policies, removal of
price controls, further freezing of wages and reduction of
official expenditure through personnel rationalization.
This proposal produced an outburst of protest from press
organs, and political party leaders and five civilian
members of the Cabinet threatened to resign. Aramburu
called in the leaders of twelve major political parties
and asked Verrier to give them his appraisal of the
country's economic situation. These leaders, however,
showed little sympathy for the proposed austerity
measures, particularly in the wake of elections.
Eventually, Aramburu decided to retreat back to his
original program and Verrier was replaced by Adalberto
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Krieger Vasena, an economist who had been a member of the
Argentine Financial Mission to the United States. 78
The Argentine government had called for elections to
choose a Constitutional Assembly for revision of the 1853
Constitution. These elections, to be held on July 28,
were also intended to serve as a test of electoral
preferences before the general elections scheduled for
1958. The Radical Party had split into two rival
factions, the Union Civica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP) led
by Ricardo Balbin and the Union Civica Radical
Intransigente (UCRI) led by Arturo Frondizi. The UCRI had
become a strong critic of the government, particularly of
its economic policies. UCRP leaders, on the other hand,
supported the government and many of them had come to
occupy important positions in the administration. The
Peronist Party remained proscribed, but a sizeable portion
of the electorate retained loyalty to Peron, who continued
to issue directions from his exile. 79
As the July elections approached, the government
intensified its efforts to obtain some tangible evidence
of U.S. support. At the end of March, Aramburu sent
Gainza Paz, the owner of La Prensa , on a private mission
to the United States to make a new plea for financial
help. Gainza Paz had interviews with President
Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Undersecretary of
the Treasury Burguess, EXIM-Bank directors Samuel Waugh
and Vance Brand, and IBRD director Eugene Black. During
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these interviews, he described the critical situation in
which the Aramburu government had found the country after
ten years of Peronist rule, and he stressed the progress
the government had made in moving the nation toward
democratic institutions and a free enterprise system. He
reminded U.S. officials that the present Argentine
government wanted to move closer to the United states and
had given clear evidence of this intention by reversing
Peron's isolationism and ratifying the OAS Charter,
adhering to the Caracas resolution, joining the IMF and
the IBRD and increasing military cooperation with the
United States. The government, however, had to move
slowly on certain issues because the Argentine people
needed a virtual "brainwashing" after so many years of
Peronist rule and it had to adjust the "economically
desirable to the politically possible."
The Administration faced serious political and
economic problems and it needed Washington's help.
Aramburu feared that, if his government could not show
progress in meeting the country's urgent needs, people
might turn to other alternatives and more extreme
solutions. It was thus of the "utmost importance" for his
regime to face the July elections with a record of
achievement which proved to the people that it "paid" to
collaborate with the United States and that what the
government stood for should be supported in the polls.
Gainza Paz urged U.S. officials to help consolidate those
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elements in Argentina which were advocating democracy,
free enterprise, and international collaboration. 80
Gainza Paz's efforts were complemented by those of
Ambassador Vicchi but everywhere they went they met the
same response: the United States was sympathetic to
Argentina's situation and desirous to help but it was
handicapped in what it could do so long as Argentina did
not take the steps that she had to take and which no one
else could take for her. Argentina had failed to fulfill
promises given by the Coll mission concerning AMFORP and
the meat-packers and progress in these fields was
essential to place the EXIM in a position in which it
could justify further loans to Argentina. The Argentine
envoys admitted their government's failure to fulfill its
commitments in these two areas, but they reassured U.S.
officials that satisfactory solutions would be found as
soon as possible. They pointed out that negotiations had
already started with the meat-packing companies,
indicating that progress was necessarily slow because the
examination of accounts for the past ten years was no
simple job. With respect to AMFORP, the government had
offered the company a plan by which judicial litigation
and an out-of-court evaluation and settlement would be
pursued simultaneously, but the company had rejected this
proposal. In spite of this, the government continued to
look for ways of reaching an agreement. As regards
petroleum, Gainza Paz told Eisenhower that both Aramburu
?.(>(,
and Rojas believed YPF would not be able to develop
Argentina's oil resources alone. He also told the
President that the Argentine government was now propped
to enter into a military defense pact with the United
States. 81
State Department and EX fM officials discussed the
situation and, after considering different possible
courses of action, they decided to continue with the
policy of denying further loan:; to Argent ina, until the
problems of the U.S. firms operating in that country had
been settled. 82 However, the EXIM-Bank decided to
authorize allocation of the $44 million balance in the
line of credit opened for transportation in 1956, as a
gesture of goodwill. 83 Vance Brand returned to Argentina
and, in his conversations with government officials, he
reiterated that Argentina would have to "do something to
permit the participation of private capital in basic
fields such as electric power, canned meat and oil
industry", if it wanted to obtain further loans. 84
On June 3, the United States and Argentina signed a
Technical Cooperation Agreement. 85 Concurrently, the
Argentine Foreign Minister informed Beaulac of his
government's desire to begin talks on a bilateral military
agreement. After consulting with Washington, Beaulac told
the Minister that the United States would be receptive to
negotiations, but he pointed out that, because of
budgetary limitations, it would not be possible to include
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Argentina in the budget for fiscal year 1958. The
Minister then decided to leave the matter in suspense for
the time being. 86
In July, the Argentine government reached an
agreement with the meat-packing companies for the
settlement of old accounts. The agreement, covering the
payment of claims for losses sustained between 1946 and
1954, authorized a 1.57 percent profit for local sales and
a 5.75 profit for export sales on operations for the above
mentioned period. The meat-packers informed the Embassy
that they were "greatly heartened" by this development and
"optimistic that satisfactory arrangements could now be
worked out for 55-56 accounts and future operations."
Subsequently, Coll Benegas asked Thomas Taylor, the
manager of International Packers, to inform Roy Rubottom,
Holland's successor as Assistant Secretary of State, of
the progress made, and to transmit to him Coil's desire to
return to Washington to discuss possible additional EXIM
loans. Rubottom answered that it would not be necessary
for Coll to visit Washington, since all the persons that
he would wish to talk to would be coming to the OAS
Conference in Buenos Aires and would be happy to talk to
him there. 87
In the meantime, negotiations with the electricity
companies had continued. The Argentine Minister of
Commerce Cueto Rua had made a proposal by which AMFORP's
expropriation suits would be allowed to remain in the
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courts, while an extra-judicial settlement would be
negotiated for the intervened and seized properties on the
basis of their market value. AMFORP, however, rejected
this proposal, insisting on an overall out-of-court
settlement based on market replacement value for all of
its properties. 62,04 percent of AMFORP's assets in
Argentina was still controlled by the company, 17, 51
percent had been expropriated and 20 percent seized or
intervened. 88
Meanwhile, CADE had also presented a new proposal to
the government which contemplated the substitution of a
provisional service contract for the 1936 concession, rate
revision to provide an 8 percent net profit based on the
present day value of CADE's assets and subseguent
expansion of the company's installations. Once again, the
issue of valuation would become the main obstacle in the
negotiations. The government was willing to accept CADE's
proposal but it insisted that rates be adjusted on a book
value basis. After a period of unfruitful conversations
between government officials and CADE directors, the
Administration unexpectedly issued a decree which
cancelled CADE's and ITALO's 1936 concessions and
reinstated the 50 year concessions of 1907 and 1912
respectively. The government alleged that the 1936
concessions were illegal because they had not been awarded
by public tender. 89 The decree was published on July 23,
three days before the elections for the Constituent
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Assembly, and seems to have been an effort by the
government to influence their outcome. The government's
action had a negative impact in international financial
circles, however, and brought about strong protestations
from the Belgian and Swiss governments. The companies
petitioned for revocation of the decree, arguing that it
was unconstitutional since, by unilaterally declaring the
1936 concessions invalid without previously having tested
this argument in the courts, the government had violated
the precept of separation of powers. 90
The results of the July elections for the
constitutional convention were not totally reassuring for
the government. The UCRP obtained 24.2 percent of the
vote, followed by the UCRI with 21.2 percent. There was,
however, 24.3 percent blank vote, presumably cast by
Peronist voters. The remaining 3 0 percent was divided
among several smaller parties. These results seemed to
suggest that, if any of the two major candidates could
swing the blank vote to his side for the 1958 presidential
elections, he would stand a good chance to win. The
Constitutional Convention was scheduled to begin its
sessions in the following month. 91
In August, a group of U.S. officials who had come to
Buenos Aires for the OAS Economic Conference and which
included Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, State
Department representatives Dillon and Rubottom, EXIM
director Waugh, Special Assistant to the President Gabriel
Hauge and Senator Church, met with the Argentine Minister
of Finance Krieger Vasena, the Minister of Commerce Cueto
Rua and the president of the Central Bank Coll Benegas at
the latter 's invitation. Krieger Vasena opened the
meeting and, after making a detailed exposition of
Argentina's situation and listing all the steps that the
government had taken to improve the international and
domestic position of the country, he called the attention
of the U.S. representatives to the critical importance
that the present moment could have in determining
Argentina's future direction, and he urged them to help
bolster the Aramburu government by giving it financial
aid.
Secretary Anderson responded that the United States
wanted to help and had helped Argentina but he pointed out
that, because of its balance of trade problem, Argentina
would have to make a decisive effort to build up new
sources of dollars either through increased exports or
foreign investment. After stressing the importance of
creating a favorable climate to attract foreign capital,
Anderson indicated that "much attention would be given by
persons outside Argentina to the deliberations and
decisions of the Constitutional Assembly." Rubottom and
Dillon then referred to the lack of progress in the
negotiations with U.S. investors, stressing that the
government's failure to compensate AMFORP had "greatly
damaged Argentina's credit."
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Cueto Rua reacted heatedly, pointing out that
AMFORP's properties represented only 3 percent of
Argentina's total plant and a small percentage of U.S.
investment in Argentina. He added that the company had a
bad record in the country and that many of its plants were
rundown and inefficient. The Minister explained that
reaching a settlement on AMFORP's terms would be difficult
since it would require the government either to change the
law which prevented the courts from taking peso
devaluation into account or to bypass the courts
altogether. However, he added, the government intended to
continue negotiations with the company until a
satisfactory solution had been found. Rubottom said that
AMFORP was quite flexible and that it was willing to
reinvest the pesos it might receive from the government in
Argentina under "fair conditions." Waugh put an end to
this discussion indicating that it would be useless to
continue talking about the details of the AMFORP case
since they had already been discussed many times. He then
reiterated the EXIM's firm decision to make no loans to
Argentina in the power field until AMFORP's problem had
been solved. 92
Subsequently, Coll and Krieger Vasena called on Waugh
to inform him of their government's desire to send a new
financial mission to the U.S. They gave Waugh a
memorandum outlining Argentina's estimate of its further
needs for financing in both the public and private
on
c
sectors. These needs totalled $150 million, 60 milli
for the private sector and 90 million for the publi
sector, with the latter divided into 60 million for
railroad rehabilitation, 23 million to develop a coal mine
in Tierra del Fuego and 6 million for sanitary works.
Waugh was clearly discouraging. He told the Argentine
officials that the EXIM would not consider any further
loans in the public sector until AMFORP's situation had
been settled, adding that "it would be a serious mistake
to even apply to the Export-Import Bank for further
railroad credits." He also pointed out that there would
be no logic in applying for further loans for the private
sector since the $15 million assigned for this purpose in
the 1956 credit had not yet been used. 93
On his return to Washington, Rubottom informed
AMFORP's president Henry Sargent of the conversations held
in Argentina, underlining that "Secretary Anderson, Under
Secretary Dillon and Mr. Waugh of the Eximbank had made it
quite clear that very little if any financial aid would be
available to Argentina until certain problems involving
American interests and including the AMFORP issue were
settled." Rubottom also referred to the general feeling
in Buenos Aires that AMFORP had no future in the power
business in Argentina. Sargent said he was aware of this,
adding that his company might eventually have to accept
the government's proposal to pay book value compensation
for the expropriated properties and market value for the
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rest of the company's assets. Rubottom pointed out that
"such a compromise would be a very high-minded and far-
looking step for any company to take." 94
In September, Coll went to Washington in a further
effort to obtain financial aid. In his conversations with
State Department, Treasury and Exim officials, Coll
reiterated the crucial importance that a symbolic gesture
of support from the United States could have in
influencing the outcome of the 1958 elections. 95 Coil's
efforts in Washington were reinforced by similar actions
in Buenos Aires. The Argentine Minister of Foreign
Affairs called Beaulac to his office and asked him to
support Argentina's request for financial aid on political
grounds. Beaulac once again explained the obstacle posed
by the lack of solution in AMFORP's case, and he also
indicated that some of the proposed amendments that were
being debated by the Constitutional Assembly might be
"interfering with Argentine credit abroad." The
Ambassador was referring to a UCRP proposal to place
exploitation of petroleum resources and other sources of
energy in the hands of the state and prohibit private
concessions. The Minister responded that "everybody was
afraid" that the Constituent Assembly would commit some
"stupidity" which would interfere with Argentina's
recovery, and he expressed his hope that the assembly




Meanwhile, the EXIM-Bank had begun to analyze the
possibility of sending a technical mission to study the
Rio Turbio coal project as a way of showing "moral
support" for the Argentine government without having to
make any concrete commitments. EXIM officials considered
this project "economically sound", since it would save
Argentina substantial foreign exchange, and it did not
compete with private capital. The Bank also felt that it
would be "unwise to slam the door" on the Argentines at
that particular moment, and it believed that sending a
technical mission would be a way of "keeping the door
ajar" while studying Argentina's performance. The Bank
also proposed to authorize allocation of the 15 million
fund reserved for the private sector in the 1956 credit
i • 97line. '
Ambassador Beaulac, however, opposed "any new
gestures by our government in [the] financial field while
[the] Constituent Assembly [is] in session." He argued
that any new promise of U.S. help while the Assembly was
considering a state monopoly of petroleum might be
"interpreted by some persons as evidence that [the] US
Government credit agencies give no importance to possible
restrictive amendments." 98
Beaulac's position was not shared by all U.S.
officials. In a lengthy and detailed memorandum
circulated among different government officers, Viron Vaky
argued that the Administration's policy of denying further
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aid to Argentina had ceased to serve any useful purpose.
Moreover, he pointed out, this policy was based on a
number of false assumptions, namely: a) it took for
granted that the Argentine government had the capability
of doing the things Washington wanted it to do without
grave political risk and b) it assumed that Argentina
would eventually have to accept Washington's demands
because it had no other alternatives. Vaky indicated that
the Aramburu Administration had "taken all the steps it
felt it reasonably could to meet its problems and improve
its situation" and he reminded fellow officers that
"although we might argue that the present leadership is
too timid, too ready to give up, the fact remains that the
political difficulties seem as real to them as they may
seem exaggerated to us." He then cited as examples of the
government's good faith the creation of a free capital
market which had made unrestricted capital movements
including remittances of earnings possible, the removal of
state controls, the restriction of state trading
activities, the settlement of the packers' claims and
other things. Vaky warned that the assumption that denial
of loans would inevitably work because Argentina had no
other alternatives was unwarranted, since Argentina could
also return to more nationalistic and statist economic
policies or resort to Soviet bloc aid as an alternative to
private foreign capital and U.S. assistance.
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He then cautioned that the U.S. might be trying to
apply a "hard-headed" economic policy in a country that
should rather be considered a "crisis area" in terms of
basic U.S. goals. Vaky argued that, in view of the
"chaotic political condition" in Argentina, it would be
"unrealistic to expect any decisions on power and
petroleum policy before the February elections or before a
new government takes over." He was concerned that
Washington's unrelenting pressure might backfire and "hurt
those elements supporting the present policy of close
relations with us, who are fighting desperately to avoid a
shift of political power to nationalist elements."
Therefore, he counseled the Administration to "adopt a
policy of frankly assisting the Provisional government
economically in every way we can provided that the
proposed measures are economically sound and consistent
with over-all established policy and principle". He
specifically advocated favorable consideration of
Argentina's requests for financing in the fields of
transportation and coal mining."
While different alternatives were being discussed by
EXIM and State Department officials, there was an incident
which had a negative impact on the course of the
negotiations. At a meeting of businessmen held in San
Francisco and attended by EXIM director Samuel Waugh,
Herman Abs, the Director of the Deutsche Bank of Frankfurt
spoke in strongly condemnatory terms about the
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cancellation of CADE's concession in Argentina. Sensing a
sudden hardening in the EXIM position after this incident,
the Argentine government immediately sent Attorney General
Sebastian Soler to Washington to present the Argentine
side of the story to U.S. authorities. The Aramburu
Administration felt that its motives and actions in the
CADE case were being misrepresented in U.S. circles, and
high-level goverment officials made strong protestations
before the State Department for what they considered an
unfair situation. 100 The EXIM-Bank finally decided to
limit its action concerning Argentina's request for loans
to an announcement that it was prepared to authorize
allocation of the 1956 $15 million credit for the private
sector and, thereafter, to consider additional private
loan requests on a case-by-case basis. 101
Coll was greatly disheartened by these results.
Before returning to Argentina, he had a long conversation
with Vaky in the course of which he indicated that it was
very difficult to be "treated like a schoolboy with the
school master saying you did fine on that problem but you
forgot the comma over here, so let's see how you do next
term and maybe you will get a better mark." He pointed
out that he had worked very hard with Krieger Vasena to
get the right economic measures pushed through, including
the banking reform, and it was therefore "doubly
discouraging to be patted indulgently on the head and told
only that there is much more to be done." Vaky reassured
him that the EXIM had not "closed the door- on Argentina
and that it was "carefully considering Argentina's
situation." coll remarked sadly that the door might be
open but that he certainly could not get through it. He
said that, at one point, he had had some hope that
additional assistance could be obtained in some field but
that later, he felt "as if the roof had collapsed and
everything suddenly hardened." After that, he had had the
impression that "people felt it would be best if he left
Washington as soon as possible." He had realized that
CADE had a great deal of influence in the United States
and that the CADE incident had obviously prejudiced a good
number of people. He admitted that the CADE problem had
been "badly handled" by the government but he pointed out
that, since this problem had become a "moral issue" in
Argentina, the people who handled it had done what they
thought to be the "honest and right thing" and thus, "it
hurt to be accused of being dishonest." Vaky hastened to
assure Coll that the U.S. was not concerned with the
problem of the company as such but with its repercussions
in trade and financial circles. 102
The Constitutional Assembly broke down prior to its
official date of termination because of lack of a quorum
to continue with its sessions. The UCRI delegates had
withdrawn from the convention shortly after its
inauguration and they had been later followed by other
groups. The remaining delegates endorsed the abrogation
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of Peron's constitution and, unable to master the
necessary votes to pass any of the proposed reforms, they
revalidated the 1853 Constitution with only minor
changes. 103
By the end of 1957, the foreign exchange bottleneck
and the decapitalization of the economy continued to pose
serious obstacles to Argentina's economic recovery. in
1956 and 1957, Argentina had surpluses in her trade with
Europe and her total exports increased by 1 . 6 and 3.3
percent respectively. 104 But her trade deficit,
predominantly concentrated in the dollar area, remained at
over $200 million. To finance this deficit, the
government had to resort to measures such as further
reduction of the nation's reserves and increased short-
term indebtedness. Argentina obtained a 20 million
sterling pound loan from the British Baring Brothers, $24
million from New York banks and it drew $75 million from
its IMF holdings. Its gold and foreign exchange reserves
dropped to $171 million. 105
Imports of petroleum constituted a heavy burden on
the country's balance of payments. Whereas in 1955
Argentina had spent approximately 2 0 percent of her trade
earnings on petroleum imports, this figure had gone up to
22 percent in 1956 and to nearly 30 percent in 1957. An
increasing number of people both inside and outside the
government had begun to view the solution of the petroleum
supply problem as the fastest way to Argentina's economic
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recovery. In 1957, YPF increased its production by 9 .
5
percent reaching an output of 5.4 million cubic meters,
the highest in the nation's history. But with consumption
of petroleum products growing at an annual rate of 8
percent, such an increase was clearly insufficient to
catch up with the nation's demand. in that same year,
Argentina had to import 9.5 million cubic meters of
petroleum at a cost of $270 million. 106
Meanwhile, YPF's reactivation plan, constrained by
the agency's limited financial resources, had been moving
at a slow pace. In October 1957, YPF signed a contract
with TIPSA, an Argentine company representing the U.S.
firms of North American Utility and Construction and the
Fish Engineering Corporation, for the construction of two
pipelines and a gas treatment plant. This project had an
approximate cost of $180 million: $27 million in dollars,
$107 million in European currencies, and the reminder in
pesos and TIPSA had offered six-year financing for the
foreign exchange costs. Subseguently , YPF signed a
contract with a U.S. company for the drilling of 40 wells
in Tierra del Fuego at an estimated cost of $3 million in
foreign exchange and 120 million in pesos. YPF intended
to raise peso funds for these and other projects from the
sale of public bonds and, in December 1957, it issued a
500 million pesos bond series, which was oversubscribed
within a few days. 107
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YPF had simultaneously continued to explore the
possibility of negotiating service contracts with private
foreign companies. Several smaller U.S companies
including Union Oil of California, Continental of Ohio,
Cities Service, Sinclair Oil, and Conorado had expressed
interest in petroleum development projects in Argentina.
In May 1956, Alexander Chapman, former vice-president of
the Arabian-American Oil Company, had visited Buenos Aires
and offered his services as oil consultant to YPF. On his
return to Washington, Chapman had called on the then
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs Henry
Holland and informed him of his activities in Argentina.
Chapman was very optimistic about the possibilities of
working out some kind of arrangement that would enable
U.S. companies to participate in YPF's expansion plan. He
had suggested service contracts of the CIMA-type used in
Mexico through which YPF could engage the services of U.S.
companies to explore and drill for oil. The companies
would then deliver the oil to YPF which would pay for it
at world market prices, with profits split on a 50-50
basis. 108
Chapman ' s activities had caused some concern in the
State Department, which would have preferred to see
"strong and experienced" petroleum companies operating in
Argentina. The State Department consulted Standard Oil
New Jersey and Shell but both companies responded that
they were not interested in entering service contracts or
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mixed company arrangements. Subsequently, the state
Department sent R.G. Leddy from the Office of South
American Affairs to Buenos Aires with the confidential
mission of following developments in the petroleum
field. 109
Chapman stayed in contact with YPF officials and
returned to Argentina several times as representative of
the Monterey Oil Company of California to discuss the
possibility of a contractual arrangement with YPF. He
also served as intermediary for other independent U.S.
companies. The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires continued to
monitor his activities closely and, in February of 1957,
Leddy recommended that the State Department contact
Chapman to let him know that, "while appreciating his
interest and cooperation", the State Department did not
"in any way extend approval to his plans." Leddy
specifically opposed Chapman's advocacy of the CIMA-type
contracts on the grounds that "no representative American
oil company" approved of them, because they "deprived the
company of independent control of its own operations and
of the right to export oil." 110
In July 1957, Henry Holland, who had resumed his
private legal practice after retiring from his position as
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, announced
his intention to visit Argentina and seek an appointment
with Aramburu to present a proposal for petroleum
development from Carl M. Loeb & Co. Beaulac, however,
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dissuaded him on the grounds that the President might
refuse to see him because of his association in the public
mind with the Standard California contract negotiated
under Peron. 111
Meanwhile, time went by, and no contracts
materialized. State Department officials warned that
Argentina might eventually be forced to switch from dollar
to sterling oil imports, an action that would save the
country as much as $100 million a year. 112 m December of
1957, the new Argentine Ambassador in the United States
Mauricio Yadarola approached Standard Oil of New Jersey to
explore the possibility of reaching some kind of agreement
by which this company could participate in the petroleum
development plans in Argentina. Subsequently, Standard
Oil gave the Ambassador a memorandum outlining the
company's position. For the first time, Standard
contemplated the possibility of entering into "some form
of contractual arrangement with YPF", but it specified
that any such arrangement should assure the company
complete control over all phases of operation and
management, long term lease rights, ownership of the
petroleum produced and 50-50 sharing of profits with the
government. 113
On January 2, the Argentine government announced its
intention to send a trade mission to the Soviet Union and
other bloc nations to purchase materials for
industrialization, transportation, and exploitation of
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resources such as petroleum and coal. According to the
government, the main purpose of the mission was to make
use of trade agreement balances and credits accumulated in
favor of Argentina, amounting to approximately $4 0
million, as well as to reactivate trade and enlarge the
market for Argentine products. The mission, headed by the
Under Secretary of Commerce Raul Ondarts, would include 15
officials from other state agencies and enterprises. 114
This announcement raised apprehension among some U.S.
officials who feared that the Soviet Union might use this
opportunity to offer Argentina a "sizeable credit" for
propaganda purposes. The Argentine government might be
tempted to accept such an offer, particularly if it would
enable the country to save foreign exchange in petroleum
imports or to push forward YPF's expansion plans. 115 in
fact, shortly before the announcement of the mission, the
Fuels Coordination Committee in Argentina had informed
private oil companies that it might have to shift part of
its petroleum purchases to Eastern European sources,
specifically mentioning the possibility of obtaining 2
million cubic meters of petroleum per year from the Soviet
Union. 116
When news of the Ondart mission appeared in U.S. and
Argentine newspapers, Standard New Jersey officials called
at the State Department to discuss this new development.
After pointing out that Soviet activities in Latin America
appeared to be "increasing appreciably", they indicated
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that it might be time for their company "to reconsider our
policy in this light-. They also expressed hopes that "no
one would get panicky and act precipitously", and they
commented that Standard Oil had decided to modify its
policy in Argentina and had informed the Argentines that
it was "willing to work with YPF . " Rubottom responded
that "no one around the Department was being panicked",
adding that he felt confident that the present U.S. policy
on petroleum development financing was a sound one and
would be continued in the future. 117
Four days later, Yadarola informed the press that he
was working on a plan for foreign oil companies to invest
in oil development in Argentina under service-type
contracts. The investors would be paid in money or in
petroleum and Yadarola reported that three big companies
had shown interest in the plan. The Ambassador's
announcement brought an immediate response from YPF
officials, who informed the press that Yadarola's
assumption that investors might be paid in oil was utterly
contrary to YPF's policy. Subsequently, the president of
YPF issued a clarification stating that YPF was unable to
comment on Yadarola 's plan until it was known in its
complete details. 118
The announcement of the Ondart mission had also
brought to the surface the divisions among Argentine
government officials. The Ministers of Commerce and
Finance strongly supported the mission but the Minister of
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Foreign Affairs, Admiral Teodoro Hartung, opposed it and,
consequently, resigned from his position in the
government. The Argentine Military Intelligence Service
was also against the mission. in spite of these
disagreements, the Ondart mission left Buenos Aires on
January 16, and it returned a month and a half later,
after having signed 59 contracts for purchases valued at
$27.3 million. 119
As internal divisions continued to plague the
government, the electoral campaign in Argentina was
reaching its peak. with the Peronist party proscribed,
Balbin and Frondizi had become the two leading candidates.
Balbin was the favorite candidate of the Administration,
and he had come to represent, in the public eye,
continuity with the Aramburu regime. Frondizi, on the
other hand, had focused his campaign on opposition to
almost anything that the military government stood for.
Rogelio Frigerio, an ambitious entrepreneur and the editor
of the weekly magazine Que, had joined the Frondizi forces
in 1956, and he had soon become one of Frondizi 's chief
economic advisers. Que became the mouthpiece of the UCRI
and the main critic of the government, primarily as
regards economic policy and the persecution of Peronists.
Frondizi 's nationalist-populist rhetoric made him more
attractive than any of the other candidates to Peronist
voters. Eventually, Frondizi reached a secret agreement
with Peron as a result of which the latter ordered his
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followers to vote for the UCRI candidates. Peron's
decision had a decisive impact on the outcome of the
elections. !20 On February 23, Frondizi obtained a
landslide victory with 4,070,000 votes against Balbin's
2,6 million. His party won complete control over both
Houses of Congress and carried all the provincial
governorships. 12
1
The new government was scheduled to take office on
May 1. The Aramburu Administration intended to use the
time left until the inauguration to push forward some of
the measures it believed necessary for the country's
future economic recovery. However, internal divisions
continued to obstruct decisive action. The Ministers of
Commerce and of Finance were determined to reach a
settlement with AMFORP before the new government came into
power. Frondizi, aware of the much larger political and
legal problems that an elected government would face in
trying to reach a fast and satisfactory solution, had
privately expressed his support for this course of action.
However, Aramburu, who had not forgotten Frondizi 's
attacks during the electoral campaign, had asked him to
state his approval in written form. 122
In fact, once the election was over, Frondizi had
considerably toned down his nationalist-populist rhetoric
and, in private conversations, he had given clear hints
that he intended to follow a much more moderate and
pragmatic course than his electoral campaign had
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suggested. In a series of conversations with U.S. Embassy
officials, Frondizi had expressed his desire to work in
close cooperation with the United States and his hope that
the problems afflicting U.S. companies would be solved
before May 1.123 He had ^ ^ Hartung
that he planned to make a determined effort to "attract
foreign private capital of all kinds", specifically
mentioning the field of petroleum. 124
Meanwhile, top-level government officials had
undertaken a campaign to educate public opinion on the
need to attract private capital, particularly in the
petroleum and power fields. Cueto Rua held a series of
press conferences on the issue of energy development in
which, after providing detailed statistical information,
he indicated that Argentina would have to permit foreign
capital participation, if it ever intended to achieve
self-sufficiency in oil. His statements brought about a
strong response from the Minister of the Interior,
Alconada Aramburu, who declared that Cueto Rua's opinions
on the issue of petroleum development were totally
personal and did not represent the position of the
government. Cueto Rua immediately responded that, quite
to the contrary, he had made his statements in his
capacity as Minister and with the approval of the
President and the Military Junta. As a result of this
clash, both Alconada Aramburu and the Minister of Justice
Acdeel Salas submitted their resignations. Two other
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Balbinist Ministers also threatened to resign. Cueto Rua,
however, continued his campaign unabated. Meanwhile, the
negotiations between Yadarola and Standard New Jersey had
become stalemated on the issue of petroleum ownership. «5
The negotiations with AMFORP had also failed to bring
about any concrete results. Consequently, by the day of
Frondizi's inauguration, all these issues remained
unresolved. 126
The peaceful return to elected civilian rule was,
undoubtedly, Aramburu's main achievement. This was no
small accomplishment since there were many military and
civilian groups who would have preferred to see military
rule continue for a longer period, particularly given the
results of the election. But the military Administration
also left behind enormous problems for the new president
to solve. For one thing, the military's decision to
exclude the Peronists from the electoral process was to
handicap the newly elected president from the very start
by raising doubts about the legitimacy of his mandate.
Moreover, after two years and a half of military rule, the
old problems of labor unrest, inflation, unbalanced
budgets, chronic foreign exchange deficits, and exhaustion
of national financial reserves remained unresolved and
had, in many respects, become aggravated. Thus, once
celebrations were over, the new leaders were left face to
face with a difficult and complex task.
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CHAPTER 7
EISENHOWER AND LATIN AMERICA: THE ROAD TO BOGOTA
Even while the Eisenhower government was denying
Argentina the financial assistance it had asked for in the
hope of pressuring that country into adopting a free
market policy, factors external to both nations were going
to influence a reconsideration by Washington of its
treatment of the South American country. By the mid
1950's, it was becoming increasingly obvious that
Eisenhower's "trade not aid" program had not lived up to
the Administration's expectations. Although some
important advances had been made in the liberalization and
growth of trade among the industrialized nations, the
volume of trade between North and South had failed to
expand in a similar proportion and the rate of economic
development in the Third World continued to be
disappointing. Confronted with these facts, the
Eisenhower Administration undertook a thorough revision of
its foreign economic policy, and it gradually began to
move from an exclusive emphasis on trade and private
investment to a combination of trade, investment and aid.
The intensification of the Soviet economic offensive in
the Third World provided an added stimulus to Washington's
change of direction.
In 1955, Eisenhower had made a new effort to obtain
more liberal trade legislation. In his 1955 message to
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Congress on foreign economic policy, he had emphasized the
need to increase U.S. purchases abroad so as to enable
other countries to obtain the dollars they needed to pay
for their imports, profit remittances on U.S. investments
and development projects. Failure to grant developing
nations access to U.S. markets, he had warned, would
reduce the effectiveness of other techniques for promoting
economic growth, and it would inevitably lead to increased
pressure for economic aid. Congress voted a three-year
extension of the Trade Agreements Act, as well as
authorization to reduce tariffs gradually by 15 percent.
But it retained all the restrictive amendments to the 1951




The Administration's record in the area of
agricultural trade policy had remained inconsistent with
its proclaimed commitment to the principles of free trade.
The government continued to limit imports of farm
products, subsidize agricultural exports and expand the
farm surplus disposal program. Domestic support for P.L.
480 remained strong, especially in Congress. Title I
authorization for local currency sales of surplus
agricultural commodities was increased from the initial
$700 million to $1.5 billion in 1955 and $3 billion in
21956. But as the surplus disposal program continued to
grow, the Administration was faced with the problem of
what to do with the accumulating foreign currency reserves
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generated by P. L
.
4 80 sales. m 1956, Congressman Harold
Cooley proposed an amendment to the surplus disposal bill
to authorize the use of a portion of the foreign currency
funds for loans to U.S. investors interested in
development projects abroad. in 1957, these local
currency loans, which were administered by the EXIM-Bank,
were incorporated as a permanent feature of P.L. 480
legislation. 3
As the three-year deadline for P.L. 480 approached,
it became evident that this program, which had originally
been intended as a temporary emergency measure, would
become a permanent feature of U.S. policy. Agricultural
surpluses had continued to accumulate, and Commodity
Credit Corporation storage costs were running at over a
million dollars a day. CCC obligations from price support
programs mounted to $6 billion in 1955 and 8,5 billion in
1957. 4 Administration officials, however, were divided in
their opinions on the benefits of P.L. 480. Congress and
the Department of Agriculture were the most enthusiastic
promoters of extension and expansion of the program. The
State Department, on the other hand, sought to restrict
P.L. 480 because of its negative effect on U.S. relations
with other agricultural exporters. Clarence Randall, head
of the Administration's Council on Foreign Economic
Policy, also criticized the program on the grounds that it
conflicted with sound foreign economic policy. The
Commerce Department resisted local currency sales, which
competed with dollar sales. Treasury Secretary Humphrey
joined the critics of p.l. 480, arguing that it was too
costly and urging a thorough rationalization of the whole
domestic farm program. 5 m spite of these dissenting
voices, Eisenhower decided in 1957 to request the renewal
of P.L. 480 for another year. Congress extended the
program for 18 more months and increased Title I authority
by $2.5 million. 6
Meanwhile, the situation in Latin America had
continued to deteriorate. The 1950 's were characterized
by a sustained and widespread decline in the markets and
prices for most of Latin America's basic export products,
particularly coffee, grains, cotton, wool, sugar and
certain metals. Slackening demand, aggravated by measures
taken by both the United States and the Western European
countries to protect their own producers, resulted in
surpluses and drastic reductions of the foreign exchange
receipts on which the Latin American countries depended to
finance imported items for current consumption and
economic development. Faced with recurring unfavorable
trade balances and rapidly diminishing gold and foreign
exchange reserves, the Latin American governments often
resorted to inflationary fiscal policies in an attempt to
keep up the pace of economic development. Economic
problems, enhanced by inflation, population growth, and
rising demands for better living standards, had led to
increasing political and social unrest in the region.
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Latin American leaders continued to look to the United
States for help, pressing for commodity stabilization





the Soviet bloc trade and aid
campaign, originally concentrated in Asia and the Middle
East, had begun to spread to Latin America. Exports from
Latin America to the Soviet bloc had jumped from $4 0
million in 1953 to $150 million in 1954 and $182 million
in 1955, while imports had increased from under $40
million in 1953 to $100 million in 1954 and $153 million
in 1955. The commodities exchanged in this new East-West
trade were predominantly coffee, rye, wheat, meat, hides,
wool and sugar from Latin America and machinery, fuel,
steel products and cement from the Soviet bloc. Trade
with the Soviet bloc still constituted only a minor
percentage of Latin America's total trade: 2.3 percent for
exports and 2.2 percent for imports and 95 percent of this
trade was concentrated in Argentina, Cuba and Uruguay.
But the prospects for further trade expansion were
promising since communist countries could potentially
absorb large amounts of Latin America's surplus commodity
stocks while, at the same time, providing a non-dollar
source of capital equipment, petroleum and arms. 8
Soviet bloc officials actively promoted trade
expansion, visiting developing countries to advertise
their products, participating in fairs and exhibitions,
sponsoring international conferences and offering
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technical assistance and loans to finance their sales.
Soviet bloc credits usually carried attractive terms, such
as 2.5 percent interest rates, long repayment periods
(generally 12 years), and the possibility of repayment in
goods. 9 on January 16, 1956, the Soviet leader Nikolai
Bulganin announced his government's intention to expand
diplomatic, economic and cultural relationships with the
Latin American nations, extend technical assistance and
conclude new trading arrangements. This announcement was
followed by informal approaches to several Latin American
governments, including those of Argentina, Colombia,
Ecuador, Uruguay, and Brazil with offers to sell arms,
petroleum and other industrial equipment on long-term,
low-interest credit terms. 10
This departure from traditional Soviet policy was
viewed with considerable alarm in Washington. The
Administration regarded Bulganin' s offer as simply another
communist scheme to "disrupt our friendly relations with
Latin America, to subvert the countries in the area and to
destroy the inter-American system." 11 U.S. officials
feared that the Soviet Union would try to participate in
petroleum exploration and development activities in the
region by offering large scale, government-to-government
assistance. Such a development would, in Washington's
view, pose a serious strategic threat to the United States
and endanger the private enterprise system which
Washington had been so untiringly promoting around the
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world. A Soviet offer of assistance for petroleum
development might be particularly tempting for countries
like Argentina and Brazil, which were facing serious
economic problems aggravated by surplus production of
exportables and costly petroleum imports. 12
In late March, the NSC began a revision of the Latin
American policy outlined in NSC 5432/1 with the purpose of
adjusting it to the changed circumstances. Meanwhile,
Administration officials continued to monitor Soviet
activities in the Third World closely, and issued periodic
intelligence and summary reports on the subject. 13
In the spring of 1956, President Eisenhower decided
to attend a celebration to be held in Panama to
commemorate the 131 anniversary of the first Pan American
Congress. This event would give him an opportunity to
meet all the other American Presidents personally and to
discuss with them the problems affecting their respective
countries as well as the future direction of inter-
American relations. Eisenhower's gesture met with an
enthusiastic response. 14 The U.S. President later
described the meeting as "a great success from the
standpoint of public relations." He also commented that,
of all the Latin American presidents he had met, the ones
who had impressed him the most were Stroessner of Paraguay
and Somoza of Nicaragua. At the closing ceremony,
Eisenhower proposed the establishment of a Presidential
Committee made up of special representatives from each
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country to review the activities of the OAS in the social
and economic fields and to develop recommendations to
strengthen this institution and make it a more effective
instrument of inter-American collaboration. He
subsequently announced the appointment of his brother
Milton Eisenhower as the U.S. representative. The Latin
American countries accepted the proposal and the first
meeting of the Special Committee of 21, as it came to be
known, was scheduled for September. 15
U.S. officials had long been concerned with the OAS
poor record, particularly in the economic and social
fields. This failure, they felt, was mainly due to the
fact that the governments of the other American Republics
were not sufficiently interested in supporting the inter-
American organization and preferred to operate through the
U.N. ECLA. Washington hoped that the establishment of the
Committee of Presidential Representatives would contribute
to strengthen the OAS and, consequently, make the U.N.
regional activities unnecessary. 16 The psychological
impact of the Committee's work would also serve as a
deterrent to the Soviet trade and aid campaign. U.S.
officials expected that the committee would give them an
opportunity to "exert significant influence on the
economic thinking of the other American Presidents", many
of whom were "men of little experience or knowledge in
this field" and "often influenced and guided by men whose
advice is either unsound or really harmful." 17
The Latin American presidents, on the other hand,
expected that the committee would provide a new forum to
address those problems that concerned them, such as prices
of raw materials, terms of trade, reduction of trade
barriers and lack of adequate sources of financing for
development projects. 18 Their hopes, however, would soon
be dampened as Washington proceeded to define and limit
the number and nature of the issues to be discussed by the
Committee. The State Department instructed embassy
officials to make it "abundantly clear" that any efforts
to use the committee as a means of trying to change U.S
established policy with respect to issues such as price
stabilization agreements, establishment of new financial
institutions or international agreements on agricultural
surplus disposal would not be successful because the
United States would not be able to accept them. Instead,
the Committee should concentrate upon the "constructive"
consideration of useful projects such as, for example,
additional training, research and technical assistance in
the fields of agriculture, housing, education and health,
peaceful uses of atomic energy and programs to broaden
contacts between U.S. and Latin American professional and
business groups. 19
The Committee of 21 convened for the first time in
Washington in September 1956, and it completed its task in
May 1957. It held three sessions: the first one, between
September 17 and 19, to select the topics for discussion;
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the second one, between January 2 8 and 29, to draft an
agenda under which proposals would be submitted and the
third one, from April 2 9 to May 8, to evaluate the




In the last meeting, the Committee members submitted
a total of 62 proposals, some of which were considered
unacceptable by the U.S. delegate, because they referred
to matters that Washington had ruled out from
consideration from the start. in an effort to reach a
compromise, Milton Eisenhower eventually agreed to include
in the final report a statement acknowledging the
existence of these issues and recommending that further
efforts be made to work out satisfactory solutions through
the appropriate channels. The final report, approved by
all the members of the Committee, included 27
recommendations, the most important of which referred to
additional cooperation in agricultural experimentation,
expanded scholarships, a plan to eradicate malaria, and a
proposal to establish a regional atomic energy commission.
After submitting its recommendations, the Committee
dissolved, leaving the discussion of the most
controversial issues pending for the OAS Economic
Conference to be held in Buenos Aires in August of 1957. 2
1
As the time for the conference approached, some State
Department officials began to express concern that
Washington had failed to live up to the commitments made
at the Rio Conference, particularly as regards removal of
trade barriers and expansion of EXIM lending. They feared
that lack of progress in these fields would leave the U.S.
delegation exposed to "a renewed campaign for grant aid,
soft loans, new lending institutions and price support
programs" at the Buenos Aires Conference. 22 The total
volume of EXIM loans to Latin America had increased from
the low level of $52.2 million in 1954 to $280 million in
1955. But, in the first half of 1956, it had dropped
again, reaching a total of only $18 million. 23 Holland
urged EXIM officials to speed up consideration of the
numerous loan applications pending before the Bank's board
so as to raise the total of credit authorizations for 1956
to at least $250 million. His concern was shared by other
Administration members, including Dulles, Hoover and the
Special Assistant to the President Nelson Rockefeller,
who also agreed on the political importance of reaching a
much higher level of EXIM lending in Latin America before
the end of the year. 24
These officials were also worried about mounting
efforts by a group of U.S. legislators, particularly the
Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, to increase the amount of grant aid destined to
Latin America. In June 1956, Florida Senator George
Smathers had introduced an amendment to the foreign aid
bill, over the opposition of the White House and the State
Department, to earmark a small amount of money for medical
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and other social projects in Latin America. The White
House and the State Department argued that legislation of
this nature worked at cross-purposes with Washington's
policy of encouraging self-help and reliance on private
investment and hard loans in the region. 25
In fact, between 1956 and 1957, the Administration
was exposed to a number of reports originating in academic
and government circles, which stressed the limited
effectiveness of these methods to bring about economic
development in the Third World. The most influential of
these studies, was one prepared by Professors Walt Rostow
and Max Millikan of the Center for International Studies
at the Massachussetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
.
Framed in the political context of the Cold War struggle,
this study called for a reorientation of Washington's
foreign economic programs away from military and defense
support and toward a program of economic aid aimed at
fostering self-sustaining growth in the world's
underdeveloped countries. Rostow and Millikan advocated
the creation of a $20 billion international fund for
development programs, with a United States contribution of
$10 billion over a 5-year period. 26
Subsequently, the White House and both branches of
Congress initiated independent studies of the national
foreign aid program. The reports generated by these
studies agreed on the need to foster development in the
Third World as a way to preserve international stability
and counteract Soviet advance. They recommended the
creation of a soft loan fund to provide long-term
development aid. When Eisenhower submitted his Mutual
Security proposal in June of 1957, he asked Congress to
establish a $500 million Development Loan Fund ( DLF) under
the control of the State Department and with authority to
make loans repayable in local currency for development
projects in Third World countries. Congress concurred but
it cut down the initial capital to $300 million and
required that the fund be administered so as not to
compete with private investment capital, the EXIM-Bank or
the IBRD. 27
As the time for the Buenos Aires Conference
approached, the U.S record in the field of trade continued
to create problems. Protectionist groups had been
pressing the Administration to increase duties on imports
of lead, zinc, petroleum, fluorspar, tung oil, and other
products. State Department officials warned that further
restrictions on the imports of "products of such
importance in our trade with Latin America" would have
disastrous effects and would "undermine our argument that
grant aid is not required because of the ready access
which these countries have to the U.S. market." However,
in the spring of 1957, the White House raised the duties
on imports of lead and zinc, imposed new quotas on imports
of woolen textiles and tung oil and negotiated a system of
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voluntary restrictions for exports of petroleum
products. 28
The OAS Economic Conference was held in Buenos Aires
between August 15 and September 4. This conference had
been convened to negotiate an inter-American economic
treaty in compliance with a resolution adopted at the Rio
Conference in 1954. The Inter-American Social and
Economic Council had prepared a draft text for
consideration by the delegates. But this draft contained
several provisions dealing with price stabilization
schemes, terms of trade, international agreements on
agricultural surplus disposal programs, regulation of
foreign investment, creation of financing institutions and
other issues that were considered unacceptable by the
United States. Fearing that it would be very difficult to
reach an agreement acceptable to all, the U.S. delegates
had come to the conclusion that it would be preferable,
from the U.S. point of view, for the conference to issue a
Declaration of Principles rather than a treaty. Such
declaration would have the status of a recommendation to
the governments, but it would have no binding force. 29
The Latin American delegates, however, were not
satisfied with the prospect of still one more declaration,
and the negotiations in Buenos Aires were long and
complicated. The U.S. delegation was presided over by the
newly appointed Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson.
Anderson stayed in Buenos Aires for a week in the course
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of which he met with representatives from different Latin
American countries to discuss their problems and
positions. After making sure that the larger Latin
American republics would support a U.S. proposal to vote a
declaration rather than a treaty, Anderson left Buenos
Aires, turning the leadership of the U.S delegation to the
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Douglas Dillon. Two weeks later, the delegates reached an
agreement and the conference concluded with the approval
of a rather vague Declaration of Economic Principles and a
renewed promise to continue discussions of the issues that
worried the Latin Americans in future meetings. The U.S.
delegates were pleased with the results obtained but press
reports in Latin America described the conference as a
failure and pointed at U.S opposition as the main reason
for the dismal results achieved. 30
In the meantime, the NSC had completed the review of
NSC 5432/1 begun in March. The new policy document,
approved as NSC 5613/1, was hardly innovative, and it
basically reiterated the main guidelines established in
NSC 5432/1. It called, however, for greater flexibility
in extending credits to Latin America and declared the
EXIM and the IBRD co-equal in the sphere of development
loans. 31 At the end of September, the NSC issued a
progress report on Latin America in which it concluded
that there were "at present no critical or strategic
problems or difficulties which are major threats to US
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security or which seem likely to cause changes in the
generally satisfactory status of US relations with the
area." The Soviet economic offensive had apparently
failed. soviet offers of large scale credits had not
materialized, Latin American businessmen and consumers
were reluctant to purchase Soviet goods, which they found
inferior in quality to those provided by the Western
countries and the total volume of Latin American trade
with the bloc had fallen from its $335 million peak in
1955 to $220 million in 1956. NSC officials thus saw no
need, at least for the time being, to alter the policy
outlined in NSC 5613/1. 32
This complacency, however, was not destined to last
long. in November, Milton Eisenhower warned Roy Rubottom,
who had replaced Holland as Assistant Secretary of State
for Latin American Affairs, that U.S. relationships with
Latin America were degenerating due to the feeling among
Latin Americans that their countries were being neglected
in comparison to the treatment given to countries in other
regions of the world. 33 Rubottom acknowledged the
problem, pointing out that the two "most valid grievances"
that the Latin Americans had were "the drop in the world
market prices of their exportable commodities" and "the
threat to impose increased tariffs on lead, zinc, tuna,
and other products by the United States." In lieu of
other alternatives, Rubottom recommended good will tours
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by high-level U.S. officials as a way of demonstrating
Washington's continued interest in Latin America. 34
Meanwhile, the declining trend in markets and prices
for Latin American exports had continued, aggravated in
part by the slackening of business activity in the United
States. The amount of private and public capital going to
Latin America remained insufficient to meet the growing
requirements of the region. IBRD loans in Latin America
had declined from an already low total of $75 million in
1955-1956 to $50 million in 1956-1957. The rate of EXIM
lending had improved, reaching an annual average of $330
million between 1956 and 1957. However, the interest
collected by the bank on previous loans had actually
exceeded the amount lent to the region by $47 million in
1956 and, in 1957, the capital disbursed by the bank had
been $113 million. The establishment of the DLF had not
meant much change for Latin America, since this
institution had assigned priority to South Asia, the Far
East and Africa and, by May of 1958, only $7.5 million of
its funds had been assigned to Latin America. 35
U.S. private investment in the area had increased
from the $6 billion total of 1953 to $8.8 billion by 1958.
But the largest share of this new investment had been
channeled into the extractive industries, especially
Venezuelan oil. Thus of the $800 million invested in
Latin America by U.S firms in 1956, $400 million had gone
to oil development in Venezuela and, in 1957, this
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industry had absorbed $770 million, or one third of U.S
total new investment in Latin America. 36
An increased awareness of the above mentioned
problems combined with a renewal of the Soviet economic
offensive in early 1958, led the Eisenhower Administration
to reconsider some of its Latin American policies,
primarily as regards commodity agreements and loans. The
U.S. had consistently refused to participate in price
stabilization agreements on the grounds that such
agreements introduced rigidities in the trade, impaired
the elasticity of the natural laws of supply and demand,
and were harmful to free private enterprise. However, as
the damaging effects of the violent fluctuations in
commodity prices became increasingly evident, some groups,
principally in the State Department but also in private
industry, became alarmed at the probability of economic
and political chaos that might result from a further fall
in the prices of Latin America's main export products.
State Department officers Thomas Mann and Douglas
Dillon had become convinced that commodity agreements
could provide a legitimate solution to the problem of
fluctuating prices and they had begun to lobby for a
change in U.S. policy in this area. The crisis in the
coffee market had given special urgency to their efforts.
Mann and Dillon pressed the Administration to join the
convention that had been set up by the main coffee-
producing countries in Latin America to regulate the
marketing of their surpluses. Their efforts were
supported by the U.S Board of Directors of the National
Coffee Association and by some of the members of the Latin
American Subcommittee of the Business Advisory Council.
These groups argued that violent price fluctuations
benefited nobody but speculators and had the added
negative effect of reducing Latin America's capacity to
import from the United States. They dismissed the
ideological constraints that prevented U.S participation
in a coffee agreement by pointing out that the U.S was
already a member of the International Conventions for
Wheat and Sugar. The Council on Foreign Economic Policy
(CFEP)
,
however, continued to resist any change in its
established policy on the grounds that commodity
agreements conflicted with the basic principles of private
enterprise and free markets. 37
Several State Department officials had also begun to
press for a change in U.S. policy regarding loans for
state oil and public utility companies. These officials
were concerned about the damaging effects that an
excessively rigid loan policy in these fields might have,
particularly in the cases of Brazil and Argentina. They
argued that continued refusal to lend U.S. public funds to
government petroleum monopolies would not, in and of
itself, lead these countries to modify their policies and
might, on the contrary, help harden nationalist feelings
and result in further restrictions on the activities of
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private companies. Conversely, a more flexible U.S.
policy would have a favorable psychological effect, and it
would help strengthen those groups that favored foreign
capital participation by nullifying the propaganda
arguments of the nationalist groups. These officials
suggested that, while still reserving the financing of
exploration and developing activities for private capital,
Washington could authorize liberal exporter credits for
the sale of petroleum eguipment and supplies as well as
loans for the industrial-commercial phases of petroleum
operation, namely marketing, refining and
transportation. 38
The intensification of Soviet diplomatic, cultural
and trading activities in Latin America in early 1958
strengthened the position of those who believed that some
changes in U.S. foreign economic policy had become
necessary. The State Department feared that the Soviet
Union might try to take advantage of the growing economic
problems and political instability in the region to gain
increased control over commodity and raw material markets
through trade agreements or barter deals and to encourage
nationalist sentiments by offering loans to state
enterprises. The risks would be higher in the case of
those countries that were having problems in marketing
surplus commodity products (such as coffee in Brazil and
Colombia or wool in Uruguay) or that were suffering from a
heavy drain in their hard currency receipts as a result of
large petroleum imports (such as Argentina and Brazil).
The negotiation of an agreement between Uruguay and the
Soviet Union to exchange wool for oil, as well as the
departure of an Argentine trade mission to purchase
industrial, transportation and oil equipment in Soviet
bloc countries seemed to give substance to the State
Department's misgivings. 39
On January 3 of 1958, the State Department issued a
report to the press describing Soviet Bloc activities in
Third World countries. Subsequently, Congress requested a
country-by-country report, which was completed and
published by the State Department on January 15. state
Department officials also begun to prepare a more complete
study titled "The Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc in the Less Developed Countries" for distribution to
all U.S. embassies. Concurrently, at Dulles' request, a
Cabinet group chaired by Vice-President Nixon initiated a
study of the potential risks of Soviet economic activities




As discussions continued among different government
officials and agencies, the Administration decided to send
Vice-President Nixon on a goodwill tour of Latin America.
The main purpose of the trip was to attend the
inauguration of Arturo Frondizi, the new president of
Argentina, but Nixon also planned to visit Uruguay,
Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela.
The trip had a totally unexpected outcome which
contributed to accelerating Washington's review of its
Latin American policy. m some of the countries he
visited, Nixon was harassed by angry demonstrators who
expressed their deep discontent with U.S. policies for
Latin America. This trend culminated in Venezuela, where





These violent demonstrations against Nixon came as a
great shock to both government and public opinion in the
United States and triggered a widespread debate on the
adequacy of the Administration's policies in Latin
America. Congress ordered several hearings on the trip as
well as on other aspects of inter-American relations. 42
The Administration initially blamed communist agitators
for the unhappy incidents but some of its members,
including CIA Director Allen Dulles, privately admitted
that limiting the explanation to a communist conspiracy
would be an oversimplification of the facts since "there
would be trouble in Latin America even if there were no
communists" at all. 43
At the end of May, the NSC Operations Coordinating
Board (OCB) recommended that, in view of the "continuing
instability and intensified economic problems in most of
Latin America", coupled with "an increase in the
propaganda and activities of the Soviet Bloc in the area",
a revision of the U.S policy outlined in NSC 5613/1 had
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become necessary.^ on June 19, the NSC met to discuss
the OCB's recommendation. in the course of this meeting,
President Eisenhower suggested that the United States
should exploit the power of nationalism in Latin America
by joining it rather than trying to fight it.
Secretary of State Dulles pointed out that
"throughout the world and certainly in Latin America-
there had been in recent years "a tremendous surge in the
direction of popular government by peoples who have
practically no capacity for self-government and indeed are
like children in facing this problem." since this
situation was particularly convenient for the communists
to exploit, Dulles suggested that the U.S. should find a
way to "move in, take control over or guide the mass
movement toward democracy in many of the Latin American
republics." in his view, this was the only "correct
approach", since he was sure that "the problem of
irresponsible self-government would remain even if and
even after all the concrete problems between the United
States and the Latin American Republics had been solved."
Nixon then suggested that, when preparing the draft of the
new policy document for Latin America, the NSC should
consult with an unofficial non-governmental group of Latin
American experts, and he specifically suggested the names
of Nelson Rockefeller and Milton Eisenhower. He also
added that it might be necessary for the Administration to
adopt a more flexible policy regarding public loans to
nationalized enterprises in several Latin American
republics. 45
Meanwhile, administration officials had continued the
revision of certain specific aspects of U.S. policy. On
May 20, the CFEP had authorized the State Department to
participate in an international coffee study group and
discuss an international coffee agreement, provided that
the U.S. would not have to either participate in or assist
in policing such an agreement. This group, formed by 2 0
producing and consuming countries, held its meetings in
Washington. The United States also began to participate
for the first time in the work of a U.N. Commission on
International Commodity Trade. 46
On June 3, the Business Advisory Council of the
Commerce Department met to discuss the issue of loans for
state and private petroleum enterprises. After a
presentation by Thomas Mann in which he outlined the State
Department's ideas on this issue and a report by the
former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland on the
petroleum situation in South America, the Council
expressed its general approval of the proposals to grant
more liberal credit terms to U.S suppliers of petroleum
equipment and to authorize loans to both public and
private enterprises for the industrial-commercial phases
of petroleum development. In order to become established
policy, however, this State Department proposal would have
to be submitted to and approved by the CFEP. 47
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Nixon's trip had also had strong repercussions in
Latin America. Shortly after the riot in Caracas, the
Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek had sent a letter
to President Eisenhower regretting the incident and
expressing grave concern regarding the explosiveness of
the situation in Latin America. Kubitschek suggested that
a high-level inter-American meeting be held to discuss
hemispheric problems. 48 Eisenhower responded promptly,
expressing his interest in further conversations, and he
sent Roy Rubottom to deliver his letter personally and to
discuss Kubitschek' s ideas in more detail. In his
conversations with the Assistant Secretary, the Brazilian
President stressed his belief that "the problem of
underdevelopment would have to be solved if the Latin
American nations are to be able more effectively to resist
subversion and serve the Western cause." 49 He later
proposed a comprehensive development plan for the
hemisphere which he called Operation Pan America. This
program was intended to address the problems with which
the Latin Americans had long been concerned, including the
stabilization of prices of raw materials, expanded trade
and investment and increased access to long-term, low-
interest international financing. 50
In August, Secretary of State Dulles visited Brazil
to hold further discussions with high-level Brazilian
officials. It was finally agreed that an inter-American
Conference of Foreign Ministers would be held in
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Washington in September to consider Kubitschek's
proposal. 51 The Eisenhower Administration, however, had
certain reservations concerning Kubitschek's grandiose
plan. Although Washington recognized the need for
continued coordinated action to further economic
development in Latin America, it was "neither willing nor
able to undertake a commitment of the sort which Brazil
appears to have in mind." 5 2 U.S. officials refused to put
"exclusive emphasis on underdevelopment as the root of all
evils" and insisted that the Latin American governments
should make more decisive efforts to combat communist
subversion and penetration as well as to put their
financial houses in order. 53
In the meantime, the Administration had also sent
Milton Eisenhower on a second fact-finding tour, this time
to Central America. Dr. Eisenhower was warmly welcomed in
all the places he visited and his trip was highly
successful. On his return, he issued a statement warning
that the problems he had identified in his 1953 report
were still evident, but had now become more pressing. He
reiterated his previous recommendations, emphasizing the
urgent need to implement measures that would provide
expanded access to loans for Latin America, more stable
relationships between the prices of commodities and
manufactured goods and wider discussion with the Latin




Meanwhile, the NSC had continued with its revision of
NSC 5613/1 and, following Nixon's recommendation, it had
requested Nelson Rockefeller, Milton Eisenhower, Henry
Holland and Walter Donelly to make suggestions for the new
policy document. 55 While this revision went on, the
Administration made a surprising announcement. On August
12, Dillon informed the OAS Inter-American Social and
Economic Council that the United States had decided to
support the creation of an Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB)
.
This announcement was enthusiastically received
by the Latin Americans, who had been lobbying for the
establishment of an inter-American financial institution
for at least 20 years. 56
Part of the reason for this change in U.S. policy was
Eisenhower's intention to announce the creation of a
regional development bank for the Middle East, a step that
would have made it very difficult for Washington to
continue resisting Latin American requests for a similar
institution. But the decision also reflected a growing
conviction among several high-level U.S. officials that,
given the magnitude and persistence of the economic
difficulties in Latin America, it had become necessary for
the United States to provide larger amounts of financial
assistance so as to prevent more serious problems in the
region. Washington believed that the Bank could serve the
double purpose of providing a constructive response to
Latin American demands while, at the same time, preserving
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the principles on which sound international financing was
based. The Bank would have to raise most of its capital
in the same financial markets as the other international
lending institutions and it would thus have to prove that
its activities were "sound- to gain the confidence of the
bankers. On the other hand, since the Latin Americans
would have a larger measure of control over the way in
which these funds would be used, it might be easier for
them to accept the conditions attached to the loans. The
Bank could also become a useful source of technical
assistance in planning projects and a screening mechanism
by which loan applications could be directed to the
appropriate institution. 58
The U.S. announcement raised hopes in Latin America
that the funds available for development projects in the
area would soon be augmented. Thus, when the Foreign
Ministers met in September to discuss Operation Pan
America, an atmosphere of friendliness and optimism
prevailed. The delegates recommended that a special
committee of the Economic and Social Council be set up to
draft the articles of the new bank. A Special OAS
Commission was also created to continue studying further
measures for economic cooperation. The Foreign Ministers
were to meet again in Buenos Aires in April of 1959 to
evaluate the conclusions and recommendations prepared by
the committee. 59
The Eisenhower Administration followed its acceptance
of the IADB with further concessions. Before the end of
the year, it approved the extension of the IBRD lending
authority from $10 to $20 billion, authorized an increase
in IMF quotas, raised the lending authority of the EXIM-
Bank from $5 to $7 billion and endorsed the creation of a
new multilateral soft lending agency, the International
Development Agency (IDA), affiliated to the IBRD. 60
The OCB recorded this change of attitude in a
progress report on Latin America issued at the end of
November, in which it commented that "the principal
advances to date in US/Latin American relationships have
been in the adoption by the US of a more sympathetic and
constructive interest in the problems of the area." The
agency warned, however, that the magnitude of the problems
afflicting the region "should dispel any expectations that
the steps recently initiated by the United States will of
themselves provide quick solutions to the deep-seated
maladjustments in the area" and it concluded that
"continued progress will depend on the ability of the US
and Latin American governments to move smoothly from the
phase of consultation to the phase of concrete action
which is immediately ahead." 61
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CHAPTER 8
FRONDIZI AND THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
Arturo Frondizi started his administration with
ambitious and far-reaching designs. The new President
determined to transform Argentina into a modern,
industrialized nation and, with Rogelio Frigerio's
collaboration, he had formulated a comprehensive economic
program, labeled Developmental ism
, aimed at reducing the
country's external dependence through expanded
industrialization assisted by foreign capital. The
Developmentalists believed that the major obstacle to
rapid and sustained economic growth in Argentina was the
persistence of an economic structure in which further
growth was largely constrained by the country's declining
capacity to finance its imports. since stagnant
agricultural production and worsening terms of trade did
not seem to offer any immediate prospects of increased
gains through agricultural exports, Frondizi and Frigerio
had concluded that any solution to the country's by then
chronic balance-of
-payments problems would have to come
through the progressive substitution of the country's main
imports by domestically produced commodities
.
1
In their view, Peron's industrialization plans had
foundered because he had neglected to develop the heavy-
industry base on which sound, self-sustaining economic
growth depended. By indiscriminately encouraging the
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expansion of light industry without simultaneously
developing the country's basic industries and resources,
Peron had helped aggravate the foreign exchange
bottleneck, as expanded industrial activities had brought
about a steep increase in imports of fuels, industrial raw
materials, machinery, and equipment. The
Developmentalists intended to avoid Peron's mistake by
giving first priority to the expansion of the country's
petroleum and steel industries as well as to the mining of
domestic coal and iron ore deposits. since Argentina
spent annually approximately $250 million on imports of
petroleum and $150 million on imports of steel, increased
domestic output of these products would bring about
immediate relief in the balance of payments. Moreover,
progress in these two areas would contribute to create the
basis for the establishment of other industries, such as
automobiles, machinery and petrochemicals, which had also
been assigned high priority in Frondizi's plans.
Simultaneously, a mature industrial base would contribute
to the expansion of agriculture by providing sustained
access to new technology, fertilizers, insecticides and
machinery.
As domestic savings would not be sufficient to
finance these ambitious projects, the Developmentalists
planned to seek the assistance of foreign capital, both
private and public. It was expected that a massive and
sustained injection of foreign capital, stimulated by
special incentives, would enable Argentina to sustain the
required level of imports and meet resulting foreign debt-
service commitments, until the moment when the development
Plan began to show results. The government also planned
to seek long-term financing for infrastructural
development projects in areas for which private capital
was not available. Frondizi wanted to improve the
country's transportation and communication facilities
through the construction of an extensive highway network
complemented by new airports and hotels. He also intended
to promote the development of the Southern part of the
country through the building at El Chocon of a
hydroelectric complex similar to the U.S Tennessee Valley
Authority.
Successful implementation of the Developmental ists
'
plan would, however, depend on a number of factors
including consumers' acceptance of short-term sacrifices,
labor support for the government's economic policies,
financial stability and a substantial and sustained inflow
of foreign capital. To his misfortune, Frondizi began his
administration with serious political and economic
handicaps, which would force him to postpone his ambitious
long-term development plans to deal with the short-term
problems. At the time of his inauguration, the country's
reserves were $250 million and the trade deficit for 1958
was projected at $315 million. Argentina's exports were
approximately $1 billion, of which $120 million was in
dollars and the rest in other currencies from Western
European and Latin American countries. The country's
foreign debt was $930 million, $350 of which were payable
in dollars, and debt service payments for 1958 were
estimated at $95 million, $40 million in dollars and the
remainder in other currencies. When Frondizi took over,
there was a carryover of $350 million of outstanding
import licenses and his administration's first action was
to suspend the issuance of import permits for an
indefinite period of time. The internal borrowing
capacity of the government was also severely limited, and
the budget deficit for 1958 had been estimated at 14
billion pesos or $750 million. 2
Frondizi's political situation was also precarious.
The military would not easily forget the charges that UCRI
candidates had made against the Aramburu administration
during the electoral campaign nor would they forgive
Frondizi for having taken the election from Ricardo Balbin
by courting the Peronist vote. The Armed Forces
distrusted Frondizi and Frigerio for their past leftist
leanings as well as for their attempts to work out an
alliance with the Peronists, and they were determined to
exert a close surveillance over the new government. The
weakness of Frondizi's electoral coalition made him
particularly vulnerable to the pressures of the military.
For one thing, his dealings with Peron had left him with a
costly political debt, and the new President would soon
find himself caught in the squeeze between the demands of
the Peronists on the one hand and those of the anti-
Peronists in the military, industrial, and rural sectors
on the other. 3
Moreover, half of his own party affiliates had
followed Balbin after the split of the Radical Party and
had now become zealous critics of the new administration,
while the other half was also deeply divided by rivalries
and disagreements between those who had been with Frondizi
since earlier times and the newcomers, represented by
Frigerio and his followers. Older party members resented
Frigerio's influence over the President and were
determined to prevent him from occupying any important
position in the government, a situation that Frondizi
tried to sidestep by creating the post of Secretary of
Socio-Economic Affairs for his close friend and adviser. 4
Frondizi expected to consolidate his popular base of
support by bringing about a rapid reactivation of the
economy, and he spent his first year in the government
trying to establish the conditions necessary for the
implementation of his program. Shortly after his
inauguration, he authorized a 60 percent across-the-board
wage adjustment, restored collective bargaining, issued a
general amnesty law and repealed the anti-CGT legislation
promulgated by the military in 1956. The Peronist Party,
however, remained proscribed. 5
346
The President then took a number of steps that he
believed necessary to win the confidence of foreign
investors, whose contribution was essential for the
implementation of his development plan. when Vice-
President Nixon had visited Argentina for the presidential
inauguration, Frondizi informed him of his desire to
attract large-scale private investment for the development
of Argentine industries, and he had expressed hopes that
U.S. credits would contribute to the successful
instrumentation of his program. After reassuring Frondizi
of Washington's desire to cooperate, Nixon had emphasized
the advantages of private capital over government loans,
and he had indicated that a prompt settlement with AMFORP
and the meat-packing companies would contribute to clear
the air for other potential investors. Nixon had then
inquired about the possibilities for private investment in
petroleum development and Frondizi had told him that his
government expected to work out some kind of contractual
arrangement which could be both acceptable to the
Argentine people and fair to the investors. The Vice-
President had reiterated the U.S. policy of refusing
public loans for state enterprises where private capital
was available, but he also suggested that there were
certain sectors in the petroleum industry where loans
might be feasible. 6
Frondizi and Frigerio had assigned top priority to
the attainment of self-sufficiency in petroleum. They
hoped that increased domestic production would provide
immediate relief to the balance of payments deficit, thus
liberating foreign exchange resources which could then be
used to develop other areas of the economy. Petroleum was
a field in which results could be obtained fast since,
given the existence of large proven reserves, output could
be substantially increased through the expansion of
drilling and the construction of additional transportation
facilities. Frondizi, who had always been an ardent and
vocal defender of statist petroleum policies, had now
become convinced that Argentina did not have the means to
develop her petroleum resources on her own and would thus
have to resort to foreign capital participation if she
ever wanted to become self-sufficient. 7
Upon taking office, Frondizi had announced that he
was personally assuming control of Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF)
, and he had appointed Arturo
Rumors as his delegate to the organization. Subseguently
and with the direct assistance of Rumors and Frigerio,
Frondizi opened negotiations with several foreign
petroleum companies. The Argentine negotiators had
approached Esso first, but the company had indicated that
it was not interested in the kind of arrangement proposed.
The Argentines had then proceeded to work out agreements
with several medium- and small-sized companies. All these
negotiations were conducted guickly and secretively, with
no participation of the management and technical staff of
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YPF and, on July 24, the President surprised the nation
with the announcement that he had completed a series of
contracts and general agreements with several foreign oil
companies for petroleum drilling and production. The
companies involved were Carl Loeb, Rhodes & Co.
,
Pan
American International Oil Co. (Standard of Indiana), Lane
Wells (Dresser Industries), Sea Drilling, Conorada, Astra,
a Belgian firm Petrofina, and a group consisting of Atlas
Corporation, Williams Brothers, Mid-Continent Exploration
and the German firm Ferrostahl. 8
The contracts and proposals approved took different
forms. For example, the agreement with Pan American
provided that the company would make an investment of
about $60 million and receive a 20-year right to drill and
produce on a proven 4,000 square kilometer area, with the
oil produced to be delivered to YPF at a cost of $10 per
cubic meter (approximately $1.60 per barrel). The Atlas
Group agreement involved an investment of about $700
million broken down into $240 million for drilling 4,000
wells, $240 million for equipment and supplementary work
on those wells, $130 million for gas pipelines and $100
million to finance oil imports until domestic production
increased. Petrofina planned to invest $35 million on a
10-year work and service contract for development of 200
wells. Lane Wells proposed to use $7.5 million for the
installation of a plant to manufacture oil well drilling
bits and other equipment and to repair YPF wells. Sea
Drilling offered a contract for drilling in off-shore
lands, with the oil found to be delivered to YPF at $10 a
cubic meter. Astra would drill 30 wells over a 2-year
period and would be paid in pesos for the oil obtained.
The contract signed with Loeb & Rhoades differed from all
the others in that it was really a $100 million bank loan
which would be used to hire qualified companies to drill
and develop four areas chosen jointly by representatives
of the bank and YPF. Under all these contracts, the oil
produced would be delivered to YPF and the companies would
be paid partly in dollars and partly in pesos.
Concurrently with the announcement of the contracts,
Frondizi informed the nation that, two hours before his
speech, the Soviet Union had made an offer to sell
Argentina $100 million in petroleum equipment in return
for agricultural goods. A month later, a five-man mission
headed by UCRI Deputy Jose Liceaga flew to Moscow to
discuss this offer as well as other trade matters. 9
In the next months, the government signed the
agreements with the above mentioned companies and opened
negotiations with Union Oil California, Esso and Shell.
Esso had changed its initial position and, on July 11, it
had approached the Argentine negotiators to present a
general proposal for exploration and development of an
area to be selected jointly with YPF. Esso would put up
the capital and all the oil produced would be sold to YPF
at world market prices, with profits split on a 50-50
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basis after deduction of operating expenses. The company,
however, insisted on receiving an area of sufficient size
and for a reasonably long period of time so as to make it
worth the effort, and it requested a guarantee for its
current share in the internal consumer market for
petroleum products. 10
On December 4, YPF signed contracts with Esso and
Shell. Esso received a proven area of 4,800 square
kilometers for exploration and development over a 30-year
period. Compensation for operation costs and for the oil
delivered to YPF would be made in pesos but, the Central
Bank would guarantee conversion into dollars when
requested by the company. Esso was allowed to continue
developing its refinery, transportation, and distribution
operations, and it received the requested guarantee for
its 2 0 percent share in the internal consumer market. The
Shell contract covered an unexplored 30,000 square-
kilometer area which, after an initial 10-year exploration
period, would be reduced to 3,000 square kilometers to be
exploited for 20 additional years. Shell would be
compensated for its expenses in oil, and the remaining
production would be split 50-50 percent with YPF. The
company also received a guarantee for its 20 percent
participation in the supply of the internal market for
petroleum products. 11
Frondizi's complete reversal of his well-established
nationalistic stance on the petroleum issue had shocked
the nation and triggered strong protests throughout the
country. Led by the UCRP, nationalist groups condemned
the contracts as "disgraceful giveaways" to the foreign
companies, pointing out that they were nothing but
disguised concessions. They specifically questioned the
way in which the agreements had been negotiated, without
public bidding, and they demanded that the contracts be
sent to Congress for examination and ratification.
Frondizi defended the methods used to negotiate the
contracts, arguing that the critical external situation
did not allow time for the delays that public bidding
implied, and he reiterated his decision not to send the
contracts to Congress, stating that YPF had the necessary
legal authority to sign them without further consultation
with any other national institutions. 12
To charges that he had betrayed his campaign platform
as well as his own well-publicized state monopoly
principles, the President responded that, when assuming
the presidency, he had realized that his previous
ideological position did not correspond to the reality,
because the state did not have the necessary resources to
develop the country's oil reserves on its own. In the
face of the national emergency, he had decided that it was
more important to "save the country" than to preserve his
"intellectual prestige" as a writer, and he was now
determined to proceed on the course that he had chosen,
since he was convinced that it would serve the country's
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best interests by allowing it to become self-sufficient.
Meanwhile, as Argentines continued to argue, the companies
began their operations. 13
The State Department had initially held some
reservations on the contracts, since it would have
preferred to see the larger companies like Standard New
Jersey develop Argentine oil under the standard 50-50
formula. Some Administration officials, however, had
become convinced that the traditional pattern of
concessions was not politically feasible in Argentina, and
they welcomed Frondizi's solution as a practical and
ingenious way of obtaining a formula acceptable to both
the companies and the Argentine people. From their
viewpoint, the most important thing was that Argentina had
taken a significant step to break its traditionally
nationalistic oil policy, a development which could have
an important impact on petroleum policies in other
countries such as Brazil and Bolivia. 14
Thus, when former president Aramburu approached the
U.S. Embassy to express his concern over the way in which
the contracts had been negotiated and the conseguences
that this might have on U . S . -Argentine relations, Embassy
officials hastened to reassure him of Washington's
satisfaction with the policy adopted by Frondizi.
Subsequently Henry Holland, who had had an instrumental
role in the negotiations, called on Aramburu to dispel any
doubts he might have on the advantages of the contracts
for Argentina and to reassure him that any allegations of
peculation in connection with the negotiations were
totally ill-founded. 15
Concurrently with the negotiation of the petroleum
contracts, Frondizi had taken further steps designed to
solve Argentina's pending problems with foreign investors.
In May, the government had returned to their former German
owners a group of enterprises which had been expropriated
in 1945. 16 m September, the Administration reached an
out-of-court agreement with CADE which provided for a
revaluation of the company's assets and the formation of a
mixed State-private enterprise (SEGBA)
. in return, CADE
had offered to obtain financing for the immediate
installation of 125,000 kilowatt generating capacity. The
CADE agreement was approved by Congress and became
effective in October. 17
The government also signed a contract with AMFORP to
settle the company's compensation claims and acquire its
remaining plants. This contract would not require
Congressional approval and the final valuation of the
properties would be determined by a board formed by the
President of the Argentine Supreme Court, a person named
by him and three more persons named by President Frondizi,
the IBRD and AMFORP respectively. AMFORP would
subsequently invest a part of the payment received to
build a 300,000 kilowatt steam power plant in Buenos
Aires. 18
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Frondizi also sent a new foreign investment bill to
Congress to replace Law 14.222 enacted in 1953. The new
law, approved in December as Law 14.780, eliminated all
restrictions on profit remittances and guaranteed the
repatriation of capital. This law was supplemented by
Industrial Promotion Law 14.781 which provided favorable
tax treatment, liberal credit terms, and other advantages
aimed at attracting foreign investors into areas favored
by the government. 19
The Argentine government had simultaneously been
exploring the possibility of obtaining loans to buttress
the economy, until its development program began to show
results. An IMF mission had visited the country in June,
but no agreement had been reached because IMF economists
had made the implementation of severe economic
stabilization measures a preliminary condition to any
balance-of-payments assistance. The IMF stance had left
Frondizi in a difficult position since, on the one hand,
he was reluctant to adopt IMF recommendations that would
have conflicted with both his industrial development
program and his plan to win over labor but, on the other
hand, he knew that monetary stability and IMF-sanctioned
creditworthyness were essential conditions to win the
confidence of the foreign investors that he so badly
wanted to attract. 20
An EXIM-Bank mission headed by Vance Brand also
visited Argentina to discuss the government's economic
program. Frondizi expected to obtain additional EXIM
loans for SOMISA and to develop the country's coal and
iron ores. The President assigned great importance to the
development of the steel industry, since he considered it
essential to the establishment of other industries, the
mechanization of agriculture, and the rehabilitation of
the transportation system. He planned to complete and
expand the San Nicolas plant and to support a project
sponsored by a group of private companies for the
construction of a million-ton-capacity steel plant.
Increased domestic production of steel would contribute to
alleviate the balance of payment problem, since Argentina
spent $150 million annually on imports of steel
products. Brand however was not very enthusiastic about
these projects, and he told Frondizi that "building steel
mills was a very complicated business." He suggested
instead that private capital be given more active
participation in the SOMISA project. 22
But altering the composition of SOMISA was a delicate
matter. Although SOMISA had been created in 1947 as a
mixed company, with 51 percent of the capital to be
supplied by the government and the remainder by private
investors, Fabricaciones Militares, an organization of
military factories created in 1941 to produce war supplies
and develop related industries, had retained complete
control over planning and management in the steel plant.
In fact, the original plan as devised by General Manuel
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Savio had contemplated a much larger participation of
private capital, as well as the gradual transformation of
the mixed enterprise into a completely privately owned
company. However, when this plan was sent to Congress for
approval, a group of Congressmen led by Frondizi had
introduced modifications to ensure that the State would
retain majority control over the new company. As a result
of this provision, private investors had lost interest in
the enterprise, and their participation had never exceeded
the initial 12 million peso contribution which, at 1958




Frondizi, whose views on the issue had changed
considerably since his days in Congress, was now
personally in favor of expanded private-investor
participation in the control of the state steel plant, but
Fabricaciones Militares, although quite willing to channel
any available private capital through SOMISA, wanted to
retain complete control over the management of the firm.
The weakness of Frondizi 's own position vis-a-vis the
armed forces made it very difficult for him to take any
measures that might alienate military groups even further.
He thus expected to find an alternative solution by
encouraging foreign investment in private steel
development projects.
The EXIM mission left Argentina without having
reached any new agreement. In fact, Brand suggested that
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new loan applications be postponed, pointing out that
"there was a great deal that Argentina had to do first."
He specifically mentioned the solution of AMFORP's and the
meatpackers' problems and the stabilization of the economy
along the lines suggested by the IMF. 24
However, once Frondizi had announced the petroleum
contracts and the settlements with AMFORP and CADE, EXIM-
Bank officials began to consider the possibility of
offering a "substantial package" to Argentina both as
proof of the Bank's support for the steps taken and as an
inducement for further progress in this direction. Brand
suggested a $250 million offer, broken into $100 million
from the EXIM, $50 million from the DLF, $50 million from
private U.S banks and $50 million as a standby from the
Treasury Department. The Treasury, however, made its
participation in any stabilization assistance dependent on
Argentina's adoption of adequate stabilization measures. 25
On October 9, Secretary of the Treasury Robert
Anderson met with the Argentine Minister of Finance Donato
del Carril during the Annual Meeting of the Boards of
Governors of the IMF , the IBRD, and the International
Finance Corporation at New Dehli. Del Carril told
Anderson that Argentina would need emergency balance-of-
payments aid to help her get through the next two or three
years, until the petroleum program started to give
results. Anderson expressed his government's strong
appreciation of the steps taken by Frondizi on the issues
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of petroleum and electricity, but he indicated that it
would be necessary for Argentina to take some steps along
the lines proposed by the IMF if she wanted to obtain
balance-of-payments loans. Del Carril informed Anderson
that his government had invited the IMF mission to return
for further negotiations and he requested Washington's
good offices in this respect. At the end of the
Conference, Donate del Carril flew to Washington to start
negotiations with the U.S. banks. 26
As these negotiations proceeded, Frondizi was
confronted with a serious domestic crisis. Tensions had
been escalating since July as a result of two successive
confrontations between the government and the Armed Forces
and a series of demonstrations and strikes touched off by
rising living costs and public discontent with the
government's policies in the fields of petroleum,
electricity and education. 27 These tensions reached a
climax in the first days of November when the Peronist-
dominated branch of the National Union of Petroleum
Workers in the province of Mendoza went out on strike for
the avowed purpose of forcing the government to amend the
contracts that it had negotiated with the foreign
petroleum companies. After several failures at compromise
between the government and the workers, the national block
of Peronist Unions joined the dispute, declaring a 48-hour
general strike to begin on November 20 in support of the
Mendoza strikers. 28
On the next day, after having unsuccessfully appealed
to the striking oil workers to return to work, Frondizi
issued a decree declaring a nation-wide state of siege for
a 30-day period. Subsequently, hundreds of workers and
political leaders were arrested in different parts of the
country. The measure taken by Frondizi was pretty
extreme, since the circumstances surrounding the conflict
did not really justify the adoption of a state of siege as
defined by the Constitution. His action seemed to signal
the end of the administration's efforts to obtain the
support of Peronist labor leaders through concessions and
compromise. 29
The crisis with the oil workers was complicated by
another incident that led to the resignation of the Vice-
President, Alejandro Gomez, and to the removal of Frigerio
from his position of Secretary for Social and Economic
Affairs. Gomez had become an outspoken critic of
Frondizi's policies, particularly in the fields of
petroleum and electricity. The Vice-President had also
repeatedly denounced what he considered Frigerio 's
excessive influence on the President, a concern that was
shared by most of the members of the Armed Forces who
strongly disliked Frigerio for his alleged communist
inclinations in the past and for his role of intermediary
between Frondizi and the Peronists. As rumors of plots to
overthrow the government intensified, Frondizi reached a
compromise accepting the dismissal of Frigerio in return
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for military support. This action did not, however, put
an end to Frigerio's influence, because the President kept
him at the Presidential residence as his personal
counselor. 30
The real motives behind the President's state-of-
siege declaration would become evident a few days later,
when he announced that the measure would be prolonged. In
fact when Frondizi issued the original decree, he had
already decided to adopt the harsh austerity program
recommended by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury, and he
wanted to have at his disposal an instrument that would
enable him to repress any popular resistance to the
economic measures he was going to implement. On December
4, the Argentine government presented a proposal to the
IMF mission that had come to Argentina in November and, on
that same day, Frondizi announced the extension of the
state of siege for an indefinite period of time which, in
fact, lasted until the end of Frondizi 's presidency
.
31
The stabilization plan, approved by the IMF a week
later, envisaged a sharp devaluation, adoption of a single
exchange rate system, abolition of all import
restrictions, freezing of wages, elimination of all
consumer subsidies and price controls, a tightening of the
monetary supply, and the promise to achieve a balanced
budget mostly through public service rate increases and
layoffs of public employees. 32 In return, Argentina
obtained $329 millions in loans, broken into $125 million
from the EXIM-Bank for private projects in the areas of
electric power, meat, rubber, paper, cement and
petrochemicals; $25 million from the Development Loan Fund
to purchase capital goods for waterworks, transportation
and electric power; and $54 million from 11 private U.S.
banks, $50 million from the U.S. Treasury and $75 million
from the IMF for repayment of existing debts and peso
stabilization. An agreement was also signed for a $17.7
million P.L. 480 loan for funds accumulated under an 1955
edible-oils sale. All these loans were announced by the
U.S. government on December 2 9 and, on that same day,
Frondizi addressed his countrymen to announce the
austerity program. 33
Subsequently, Frondizi began to prepare for a visit
to the United States in January. This visit, the first
one by an Argentine president to the northern nation, was
very important for Frondizi, who expected to make the most
of this opportunity to explain his government's plans and
expectations directly to U.S. audiences and to strengthen
the relationships between the two countries. But on the
eve of his departure, a new confrontation with labor
threatened to upset his plans. A group of workers
occupied a state meatpacking plant which the government
was planning to sell and, subsequently, the national block
of the Peronist unions declared a national strike for an
indefinite period of time in support of the meatpacking
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workers. other non-peronist unions joined the strike and
the country became almost completely paralyzed. 34
In spite of the crisis, Frondizi decided to proceed
with his planned trip to the United States and, after he
left, the Acting President Jose Maria Guido, ordered the
military to repress the strike. Workers were mobilized
under the army while soldiers and tanks occupied the city
of Buenos Aires. Hundreds were arrested, Peronist and
Communist party buildings were ransacked and destroyed and
the unions were once again put under the control of
military interventors
. This strong reaction on the part
of the government brought the country back to normal
activities in a few days, but it also contributed to the
further alienation of the workers. 35
Frondizi's visit to the United States was highly
successful. Everywhere he went, the President was warmly
welcomed and received profuse expressions of support for
his economic policies. Frondizi addressed a joint meeting
of Congress, and he had private meetings with President
Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, CIA Director Allen
Dulles, EXIM-Bank and IBRD directors and private business
groups. In the course of these meetings, Frondizi
explained his government's plans and reguested further
help for the development of his country's iron and steel
industry and for the construction of the El Chocon
hydroelectric plant. Although these projects would be
carried out by private groups, they would reguire access
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to long-term financing. The President also told U.S.
officials that the Argentine armed forces needed to
modernize their equipment, and he asked for United States
collaboration in this area. President Eisenhower informed
Frondizi that the United States government admired his
courage and leadership and was watching very
sympathetically the progress being made in Argentina. He
then indicated that his administration was anxious to do
everything it could to help him carry his program
through. 36
But Frondizi 's success in the United States did
nothing to alleviate his domestic problems. 1959 was a
difficult year, marked by growing social tensions and
constant threats of military coups. The stabilization
program brought about unprecedented recession and record
inflation. In 1959, the cost of living rose by 133
percent. Industrial output fell by 8 percent and the GDP
declined by 5 percent. Domestic meat prices tripled and
meat consumption was reduced by 50 percent. The prices of
gasoline also tripled, forcing many people to stop using
their cars or even public transportation. Devaluation and
the liberation of the domestic markets effected a drastic
transfer of income in favor of the farming sectors. Real
working class income dropped sharply, and the wage share
in national income fell from 43.3 percent in 1958 to 37.8
percent in 1959. The real income of industrial workers
declined by 25.8 percent. This situation was naturally
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resented by labor, which felt that it alone was
underwriting the cost of economic reform, and 1959 saw a
record number of strikes. The government, however, clung
fast to the austerity plan and suppressed dissent with a
strong hand. Large sectors of the working force remained
mobilized under the Army and the government authorized the
armed forces to implement the CONINTES Plan which gave
them special powers to arrest and interrogate those
suspected of subversive activities. 37
Frondizi, however, feared that, unless the new
policies began to show some positive results soon, social
and political tensions would be so exacerbated that the
stability of the government might become endangered.
Thus, while moving ahead with the stabilization program,
the President also tried to retain as many projects as
possible from his original development plan. 38 He had
special faith in the petroleum project, success in which
would not only provide immediate relief to the balance of
payments but also enable the government to show some
concrete, measurable evidence of the wisdom of its
economic policies. Frondizi wanted to push this plan
forward through intensified drilling and construction of
new oil and gas pipelines. In February, the government
signed drilling contracts for 1,800 additional wells with
two U.S companies, Kerr-McGee and the Southeastern
Drilling Corporation, and with an Italian company, the
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi. But once again, financial
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constraints would become the main obstacle in the way of
expanded petroleum activities. By 1959, YPF was already
having problems in meeting the dollar costs of the
contracts it had signed with the foreign companies, and
Frondizi decided to approach U.S. banks to request
emergency loans to help the agency get through, until it
could begin to pay for its operations with dollars saved
through reduced imports. Frondizi also expected the EXIM-
Bank to provide financing for private companies interested
in building and operating new oil and gas pipelines in
Argentina. 39
The government's desire to accelerate the progress of
the petroleum program was also related to its plans to
divert funds provided by a tax on gasoline, which were
then being used by YPF, to the financing of an extensive
highway building program. This program envisaged the
construction of 15,000 kilometers of new highways as well
as airports and motels, and it had been devised with the
double purpose of improving the nation's transportation
facilities and providing jobs for the workers that were
going to be laid off by state enterprises. IMF officials
had estimated that at least 250,000 public employees would
have to be dismissed to achieve the aim of a balanced
budget, but Frondizi was concerned about the social and
political effects that such a massive layoff might have
and, before moving on to this stage of the stabilization
plan, he wanted to have in place a program that could
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absorb the displaced workers at least until the
reactivation of the economy provided new job opportunities
in the private sector. Kaiser Engineering and other U.S.
companies had expressed interest in taking the contracts
for the building of the highways, but they needed access
to financing for the initial stages of the program, at
least until the proceedings of the tax on gasoline became
available. 40
In April, Frondizi sent Frigerio to the United states
on an unofficial mission to discuss all the above
mentioned projects with U.S. government officials and
private enterprises. The Argentine envoy had interviews
with Vice-President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury
Anderson, State Department, EXIM-Bank and IBRD officials
as well as with private investors. 41 His efforts in
Washington were reinforced by Frondizi's own direct appeal
to State Department officials Roy Rubottom and Thomas Mann
on the occasion of the latter's visit to Buenos Aires for
the second meeting of the OAS Committee of 21. in his
conversations with these officials, Frondizi reiterated
his unfaltering determination to carry the stabilization
program to its last consequences, but he also indicated
that, given the strong popular reaction to the immediate
effects of the austerity measures adopted by the





Argentine government officials were, however, divided
in their opinions. while Frigerio and his followers
regarded the continuation of development plans,
particularly in the field of petroleum, as essential to
the final success of the government's program, other
officials, led by the Minister of Economy Donate del
Carril and his Under Secretary Roberto Alemann, opposed
Frigerio's plans and urged Frondizi to postpone further
development programs until the success of the austerity
plan had been assured. These officials were particularly
concerned about YPF's plans to undertake new construction
and drilling programs, and they argued that any new funds
obtained should be used to help meet existing commitments
rather than to finance new activities. 43
Opinions in Washington were also divided. Those who
were in favor of giving a positive response to Frondizi 's
request for U.S financing of petroleum operations in
Argentina argued that such a course of action would not
only benefit U.S. firms by enabling them to take advantage
of a good business opportunity but would also contribute
to bolstering a government that had shown courage and
determination in adopting policies which had long been
recommended by Washington. If Frondizi failed in his
efforts to carry out his program, the policies that he had
adopted would be discredited not only in Argentina, but
also in other countries like Brazil which were attentively
following developments in the neighbor nation. Moreover,
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some U.S. officials feared that Frondizi's failure to
obtain help fro, the United States might force him to turn
to the Soviets. In 1958, the trade between Argentina and
the Soviet bloc had once again increased substantially
after a steep decline in 1957, and the Soviet Union had
become the largest importer of Argentine hides and wool.
In October, the Argentine government had accepted the
Soviet offer of a $100 million dollar credit for oil
equipment, and the Liceaga mission had signed contracts
for purchases valued at $32 million. These contracts,
however, had never been ratified by YPF technicians, who
preferred to buy U.S. equipment for technical reasons, but
some people in Washington feared that failure to obtain
the material needed in the United States might eventually
lead YPF to carry the agreements through. 44
The IMF, however, strongly opposed any further
expansion of Argentina's petroleum program, arguing that
it would have inflationary effects which would endanger
the stabilization program. in mid-May, U.S. officials
discussed these issues in a series of meetings with IMF
representatives. Thomas Mann confidentially informed the
IMF of Frondizi's interest in arranging financing from the
EXIM-Bank for U.S companies interested in building and
operating gas and oil pipelines in Argentina, and he
requested an IMF opinion as to whether this project would
still be inflationary if the companies assumed all costs,
including peso obligations. IMF officials admitted that
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it would not, but they still opposed the idea, arguing
that the government had already devoted an undue portion
of its resources to petroleum and pointing out that it
would be wiser to direct any further resources that might
be available to other sectors of the economy, such as
electric power and roads. U.S. Embassy officials also
believed that the U.S. should abstain from helping finance
projects already contracted for by YPF and they hoped that
lack of funds would force YPF to convert service contracts
into privately financed operations of a more conventional
type. 45
Meanwhile, Frigerio had continued his negotiations
with private U.S. interests and, before returning to
Argentina, he announced that he had secured approximately
$350 million in loans, contracts, and letters of intent
from U.S. and Canadian firms interested in investing in
Argentina. Part of these funds would be provided by three
U.S. oil companies, Esso, Standard Oil of Indiana, and
Conorada, which had agreed to advance $100 million to
4 6YPF. Frigerio later described his visit to the United
States in enthusiastic terms in the course of a meeting
with Ambassador Willard Beaulac, and he told the
Ambassador that Secretary of the Treasury Anderson and the
Director of the State Department Office for Inter-American
Affairs Harry Turkel had shown special interest in his
projects, particularly as concerned the construction of
refineries and pipelines by U.S. companies. 47
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Frigerio's days in the administration were, however,
numbered. m his absence, the tensions between the
government and anti-peronist military and civilian groups
had heightened, and the rumors of an impending military
uprising had intensified. The rebel groups, associated
primarily with former Vice-President Rojas and some
sectors of the UCRP, the Socialist and the Conservative
parties, had consistently objected to the presence in the
government of certain persons whom they accused of having
pro-Peronist and Communist inclinations. They focused
their opposition on Frigerio, whom they had never forgiven
for his deals with the Peronists during the presidential
electoral campaign. In an effort to relieve tensions,
Frondizi issued a decree banning the Communist party, and
he ordered the departure of several Communist bloc
diplomats. He subsequently replaced some of the most
controversial members of his administration and accepted
Frigerio's resignation. 48
The President then intensified his efforts to obtain
aid from the United States. At his request, Ambassador
Cesar Barros Hurtado, called on the State Department,
where he had an interview with Rubottom and Mann. The
Ambassador explained that Frondizi was in a difficult
political position because of the adverse popular reaction
to the effects of the austerity program. This situation
was aggravated by the fact that the Brazilian government,
which had refused to implement the stabilization measures
prescribed for their country by the IMF
, had now launched
a campaign to rally other countries to follow a similar
course of action. Developments in Brazil provided useful
propaganda for Frondizi's political opponents. Frondizi
needed further U.S assistance to see his program through,
and he had instructed Barros to seek an interview with
President Eisenhower to explain the critical situation
that his government was facing. Barros mentioned several
fields in which U.S. public and private aid might be of
help, including the construction of pipelines, refineries,
highways and airports, and the development of iron
deposits and steel industry capacity. 49 shortly after
this interview, the President of YPF visited the United
States to discuss the possibility of loans to finance the
drilling contracts that YPF had signed with Kerr-McGee and
the Southeastern Drilling Corporation as well as the
pipeline project contracted for with TIPSA in 1957. 50
Meanwhile, in Argentina, the tensions between the
government and military and civilian opposition groups had
continued to escalate. In June, the president was
confronted with the most serious military crisis since the
beginning of his government. The military were
particularly concerned about the possibility of a
resurgence of Peronism, which they regarded as a
preliminary step to the triumph of Communism. Unrest in
the armed forces was significantly aggravated by Peron's
publication of a document which had allegedly been signed
by himself and Frondizi in 1958 to ratify their electoral
pact. Although Frondizi strongly denied the authenticity
of the document, this event contributed to strengthen
those elements in the armed forces that favored a coup.
After a tense week in which the fate of the government
seemed to hang from a thread, the crisis was surmounted by
agreement. 51
As the price for their loyalty, the military demanded
a complete shakeup of the Cabinet and the end of Army
mobilization of workers. Alvaro Alsogaray, a politician
from an opposition party, closely connected to the armed
forces and well-known for his strong advocacy of stringent
austerity measures and orthodox laissez-faire economic
policies, was chosen to occupy the position of Minister of
Economy. His appointment signaled the final triumph of
those groups who supported economic stabilization and
anti-Peronism over developmental ism and integrationist
political strategies. Although Frondizi survived the June
crisis, his administration emerged in a much weaker
position. From then onward, the President would become a
virtual hostage of the armed forces, who assumed the self-
appointed role of "guiding" him under the implied threat
that they would remove him, if he refused to comply with
their demands. 52
The Argentine military had become obsessed with the
idea of a leftist conspiracy, and they wanted to
restructure and modernize their forces to prepare them for
anti-subversive operations." Budgetary constraints,
however, posed serious limitations to their plans.
During his visit to Washington in January of 1959,
Frondizi had discussed the issue of arms purchases with
both President Eisenhower and Secretary of state Dulles.
Subsequently, Assistant Secretary Rubottom had had a
private talk with two members of Frondizi's delegation,
the Vice-Chief of the Argentine Army General Staff,
Colonel Rosas, and the head of the North and Central
American Section of the Argentine Foreign Office, Gallac,
who had shown him secret documents from the files of the
Argentine Department of Defense to emphasize the Army's
need for anti-subversive equipment. 54 Following this
conversation Rubottom had contacted the appropriate
agencies in the U.S. government to work out the details of
a military assistance package for Argentina.
Negotiations had then begun and, after 9 months of
discussions, constantly complicated and delayed by the
internal rivalries and competing demands of the Argentine
Navy, Army and Air Force, the U.S government had
authorized an $11.1 million credit to finance the sale of
approximately $13 million worth of military equipment to
Argentina under the terms of the Mutual Security Act. The
loan was to be repaid in dollars over a 3-year period with
a 3.5 annual interest, and it would be broken into $1.2
million for the rehabilitation of two submarines available
to Argentina under the Ship Loan Bill of 1958, $5.9
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million for the purchase of F-86 jet planes and spare
parts for the Air Force, and S5.9 nillion for tanks and
trucks for the Arrcy." In thg ^^
authorized the Navy to fulfill ^ fc „t ,y
°
r ±£li lts old-time aspiration of
purchasing an aircraft carrier from Britain. 5 * These
acquisitions, however, had only partially fulfilled the
aspirations of the Argentine military and, for the
remainder of his Administration, Frondizi would haye to
struggle with the problem of how to satisfy the materiel
requirements of the armed forces within the country's
limited financial resources.
Before the year was over, Frondizi also had to deal
with a new drawback in Argentina's trade relationships
with the United States. On May 11, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture announced a total ban on imports of salt-cured
meats from foot-and-mouth disease infected countries to
become effective on May 15. The ban was based on studies
made at the U.S. Department of Agriculture Laboratory at
Plum Island, which proved that the salt-curing process did
not destroy aftosa virus present in lymph nodes.
Washington's announcement had strong repercussions in
Argentina. Argentine exports of salt-cured meat to the
United States had been steadily growing, reaching $30
million in 1958 and giving rise to a profitable business,
predominantly carried on by small Argentine firms. As a
consequence of the ban, meat supplies which had previously
been absorbed by these firms were shifted to canning, an
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area that was dominated by the big foreign-owned
meatpacking companies. Consequently, there were rumours
that the ban had been promoted by these companies, as a
way of eliminating cured meat competition and ensuring
more adequate supplies for their activities. 57
The Argentine government made strong protests against
this new restriction on Argentine exports. Argentine
officials argued that the embargo was an excessively
drastic measure, because it was based on laboratory
experiments rather than on any actual finding of aftosa
virus in a particular shipment coming from Argentina, and
meat cured in the manner now objected to by the U.S.
government had been shipped to the United States for years
without introducing foot-and-mouth disease. They
therefore requested that the measure be reconsidered until
new experiments could be conducted. 58
State Department officials were concerned about the
effects that the embargo would have on U
. S . -Argentine
relations, and they feared that it would provide useful
political ammunition to the opponents of Frondizi's policy
of collaboration with the United States. They therefore
asked the Department of Agriculture to extend the deadline
or to make some gesture toward affirmative cooperation
with the affected countries in developing an alternative
acceptable curing process. It was finally decided that
the State Department would invite some Argentine
technicians to visit Plum Island, so that they could study
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the findings made there and discuss other possible methods
for processing meat. 59
The Argentine government accepted the invitation and
four meat-packing technicians were sent to the United
States where they spent a month visiting the Plum Island
Laboratory as well as private establishments that
processed Argentine meat. After a careful analysis of the
experiments conducted in Plum Island, the Argentine envoys
concluded that these experiments did not provide enough
scientific evidence to justify the ban of Argentine cured
meat because they had only proved that the foot-and-mouth
disease virus remained alive in the ganglions and
Argentine commercial regulations required that all the
ganglions be removed from meat used for exports. On the
basis of these conclusions, the Argentine government
requested that the prohibition against the importation of
Argentine cured meats be lifted. The Department of
Agriculture, however, responded that the differences
reported by the Argentine commission did not alter the
basic facts of the Plum Island study, since there were no
practical procedures whereby it could be acurately
determined that infected tissues had been entirely
excluded from cured meat and, consequently, the import
restrictions remained in place. No solution was reached
and the issue of U.S. restrictions on Argentine meat has
remained a sore point in the relations between the two
countries to this day. 60
By the end of 1959, the Argentine economy was
beginning to show some signs of recovery. The record
levels of inflation began to decline, and the balance of
payments showed a small surplus of $i 6 million. As YPF's
expansion program proceeded, petroleum production
increased by 26.5 percent. The gas and oil pipeline built
by TIPSA was completed and the government held a new
tender for the awarding of exploration and development
contracts in 16 provinces. Frondizi's efforts to attract
foreign investors had also begun to show results and, in
1959, the government approved investment proposals for an
estimated $244 for industrial and petroleum development
projects. 61
In spite of these achievements, Frondizi continued to
have serious problems. Popular turmoil and
dissatisfaction over the government's policies remained
strong. Prices of basic commodities and public services
continued to rise while wages remained depressed and, as
workers' living standards deteriorated, working-class
protests multiplied. Meanwhile, military groups continued
to plot and meddle with government affairs, triggering a
series of highly publicized crises. 62
In July, EXIM-Bank and IMF missions visited Argentina
to discuss the progress of the economic program and, in
October, the Argentine Minister of Economy Alvaro
Alsogaray travelled to the United States and to Europe to
negotiate new loans and refinance old ones. 63 On his
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return, he announced that he had obtained comments for
loans from private banks and international lending
agencies for $300 million, broken into $100 million from
the IMF, $75 million from U.S. private banks, $50 million
from the U.S. Treasury and $75 million from private
European banks. " on the same day on which this
announcement was made, Argentina signed an Investment
Guarantee Agreement with the United States. This
agreement provided that U.S. investors could apply to the
U.S. government for insurance against non-convertibility
of peso earnings into dollars and that, in the case of
such an eventuality, the Argentine government would
transfer to the account of the U.S. government the non-
convertible pesos for U.S. government uses. 65
Meanwhile, a series of landmarking developments had
begun to unfold in the sphere of inter-American affairs.
In February of 1959, a revolutionary movement led by Fidel
Castro had overthrown the Batista dictatorship in Cuba and
taken control of the island. The new government had set
out to implement a number of reforms that would
drastically alter the economic and social structure of
Cuba. Castro's revolution, with its message of social
justice, income redistribution, land reform, economic
diversification and national sovereignty had a strong
appeal among lower and middle class groups in Latin
America. Moreover, the Cuban model seemed to offer an
attractive alternative to the free enterprise and economic
stabilization policies recommended by the United states,
in the future, it would become increasingly difficult for
Latin American leaders like Frondizi to find support for
the sorts of programs advocated by the IMF unless they
could provide concrete evidence of the short-term
advantages that the adoption of such programs would
yield. 66
Castro's reforms, combined with his strident anti-
U.S. rhetoric, soon brought the revolution into conflict
with powerful U.S interests, which had traditionally had a
conspicuous presence on the island. As tensions between
Washington and Havana escalated, Castro began to move
closer to the Soviet Union. This trend worried U.S
officials who feared that Cuba could become a beachhead
for the expansion of Communism throughout Latin America.
The Eisenhower Administration was also concerned about the
effects that Castroism and the revived threat of
expropriation might have on U.S. investors' interest in
Latin America. In 1959, the net flow of U.S. private and
public capital to Latin America declined from $684 million
to $448 million. 67
As the conflict between the U.S. and Cuba
intensified, the Eisenhower Administration increased its
efforts to undermine the Castro regime and to counteract
the Cuban appeal to the Latin American countries. In
November of 1959, President Eisenhower created a National
Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs to analyze
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U.S.
-Latin American relations and provide recommendations
for solving the problems in the area. This committee,
formed by representatives from business, labor and
education and chaired by Secretary of state Herter,
Assistant Secretary Rubottom and Milton Eisenhower, was
also expected to serve as a symbol of the importance that
Washington assigned to the relations with its Southern
neighbors. 68
In January of i960, the White House announced that
President Eisenhower would make a good-will trip to
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay at the end of
February. Eisenhower wanted to use this opportunity to
familiarize himself with conditions in Latin America and
to reiterate his Administration's support for
representative government, free enterprise and social,
political and economic reform. But one of the main
reasons for the trip was Eisenhower's desire to win the
endorsement of the Latin American nations for some kind of
collective action against Cuba. 69
Eisenhower's trip was highly successful. Cheering
crowds welcomed the President everywhere he went. In his
public and private meetings, Eisenhower emphasized his
country's desire to cooperate with Latin America, citing
the large amounts of U.S. public and private capital that
had been transferred to the region as evidence of this.
But he also warned that continued capital transfers would
depend on social and political stability and a favorable
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investment climate. Moreover, struck by the vast
differences in wealth that separated social classes in
Latin America, the President also insisted on the need to
make sure that the benefits of economic progress reached
the masses. 70
During his visit to Argentina, Eisenhower and the
members of his delegation discussed issues concerning
U.S.
-Argentine relations, as well as broader aspects of
inter-American relations and the world situation with
high-level Argentine government officials. 71 President
Eisenhower congratulated Frondizi for the success of the
courageous stabilization program he had undertaken and for
the progress made in the field of petroleum development.
The Argentine President told Eisenhower that the next
problem Argentina had to solve was the expansion of its
steel production, since it was now spending $150 million a
year on imports of steel products. He intended to tackle
this problem by simultaneously speeding up the development
of SOMISA and supporting private projects for the
construction of additional steel producing facilities. 72
Works in San Nicolas were close to completion and
SOMISA expected to start blast furnace operations in the
plant in the near future. The San Nicolas mill would have
an annual pig iron production capacity of approximately
600,000 tons but, since it had processing facilities for 2
million tons of finished steel products, SOMISA needed to
build additional blast furnaces to make the most of its
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installed capacity. Frondizi hoped to obtain EXIM
financing for the purchase of the furnaces. He also
expected U.S. private investors to participate in the
construction and operation of an additional integrated
steel plant, and he requested Eisenhower's good offices in
this field. 73
Eisenhower suggested that he discuss these issues
with Walter Donnelly, a member of his delegation who was
an expert in the steel business. Frondizi then referred
to Argentina's need for financing for its highway program,
which he also considered an urgent priority. The two
presidents also discussed the U.S. ban on Argentine cured
meats, and the Argentine Army's desire to acquire
equipment in the United States to modernize its forces.
President Eisenhower listened attentively to Frondizi 's
comments and promised the Argentine President that he
would personally look into all these matters. 74
On his return to Washington, Eisenhower conveyed
Frondizi 's requests to the appropriate government
agencies, but no further action followed in any of the
fields discussed by the two presidents. 75 Walter Donelly
informed U.S. Steel and the American Iron and Steel
Institute of Frondizi ' s interest in U.S. private
investment for the steel industry, and they agreed to send
representatives to Argentina for further discussions on
the subject. However, when Ambassador Beaulac was
informed of this plan, he suggested that the visit be
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postponed, indicating that it would be preferable to wait
until existing private and public steel projects could be
combined by channeling available private funds through
SOMISA. The EXIM-Bank informed the Argentine government
that it would be willing to finance additional blast
furnaces for the San Nicolas plant, but only "under
appropriate conditions which would include efficient
private management." 76
Eisenhower was impressed by his trip to Latin America
and he returned to the United States with a much more
realistic understanding of the problems and expectations
of the peoples in the region. He was deeply touched by
the poverty that he saw in some of the places that he
visited, and he became convinced that something would have
to be done to improve this situation. He also had first-
hand exposure to the impact of the Castro mystigue among
the Latin American population when, in Brazil, he was




But Eisenhower was unable to obtain ungualified
support for his anti-Castro policy from the governments of
the countries that he visited. For one thing, domestic
political considerations made it difficult for many Latin
American leaders to take a strong public stand against
Castro. Moreover, their analysis of the Cuban problem
differed from Washington's in that, whereas Washington
viewed the Cuban situation as an example of Communist
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penetration in the hemisphere which had to be dealt with
by the inter-American system, the Latin Americans tended
to regard the issue as a dispute between the U.S. and the
Cuban governments, which had to be treated bilaterally
.
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The Latin American leaders were skeptical about U.S.
denunciations of Communist control over the Cuban regime,
a charge that not even Washington's own National
Intelligence Estimates had been able to prove. 79
Eisenhower, mostly concerned about the impact that the
actions of the Cuban government could have on U.S.
investors' interest in Latin America, repeatedly urged the
Latin American presidents not to condone a situation which
might result in frightening U.S. business away from the
region. 80
On his return to Washington, Eisenhower instructed
the State Department to consider "all possible ways of
influencing [the] Latin American countries to favor our
policies in Cuba." 81 The President discussed the issue
again in the course of an NSC meeting held on March 17.
After expressing his concern about the Cuban situation,
Eisenhower stressed the importance of maintaining a
favorable climate for U.S. business and investment in
Latin America and noted that "businessmen were constantly
coming to him and saying that something must be done to
counteract the Cuban situation or else the flow of
business investment to Latin America would dry up." He
then indicated that continued access to the resources of
the South American continent was vital for U.S. security
and economic welfare, since the U.S. was increasingly
becoming a "have-not nation" in raw materials, and he
cited the dependence of the U.S. steel industry on imports
of iron ore from Canada and Venezuela as an example of
this trend. Eisenhower pointed out that the U.S. had to
be prepared to make every possible effort to keep the
Latin American countries aligned on its side, and he
warned that matters connected with Latin America could not
be looked at "solely from the viewpoint of saving
money." 82 0n that same day, the President authorized the
CIA to start working on a program to overthrow Castro. 83
Eisenhower, however, still preferred the option of
multilateral intervention through the OAS, and he expected
that a way would be found to persuade the Latin American
countries of the need to take collective action against
Castro under the Rio Treaty or the Caracas Resolution.
As these options were being discussed, Milton
Eisenhower and the other members of the National Advisory
Committee on Inter-American Affairs continued to look for
ways to solidify the goodwill that the President's trip to
Latin America had generated. Tensions between Cuba and
the United States reached a new peak in the summer of
1960. In June, Castro asked Esso, Texaco, and Shell to
process Soviet oil in their refineries. Following
Washington's recommendations, the companies refused to
comply with this request and the Cuban government
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President Eisenhower authorized a 700,000-ton cut in the
'
Cuban sugar quota. 8 * shortly^^
Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev declared that his
government was prepared to give full support to the Cuban
regime in its dispute with the United States and informed
the Cuban authorities that the Soviet Union would buy the
sugar that the United States had rejected. 86
Khrushchev's declarations were, in fact, privately
welcomed by Washington, since they provided a useful
element to back up its charges of Soviet intervention in
hemispheric affairs that might serve to prompt the OAS
into action. 87 On July 11, Cuba appealed to the U.N.
Security Council for a special meeting to consider what it
regarded as aggressive actions by the United States. 88 On
that same day, President Eisenhower announced at a press
conference his administration's intention to implement a




Two days later, the Peruvian government requested
that a special OAS meeting of Foreign Ministers be
convoked to discuss the Cuban situation, a request that
was approved by the OAS council on July 18. The meeting
would be held in Costa Rica, in mid-August, coinciding
with another special meeting which had been previously
summoned to discuss various Venezuelan government charges
against the Trujillo administration. 90 On July 19, the
U.N. Security Council approved a resolution submitted by
Argentina and Ecuador requesting the U.N. to take no
action on the Cuban charges, until the OAS had had an
opportunity to deal with the problem." on August 8,
President Eisenhower asked Congress to authorize the
appropriation of $600 million for economic assistance to
Latin America. 92
Meanwhile, the internal situation in Argentina had
continued to deteriorate. Frondizi's stabilization
program had reached a point at which further progress in
the efforts to balance the budget would depend on the
government's ability to rationalize state enterprises. The
President, however, was reluctant to take any measures
that would further alienate the working class, unless he
could concurrently offer some evidence of progress in the
field of economic development. His concerns were
heightened by the results of the March Congressional
elections, at which 78 percent of the voters massively
expressed their dissatisfaction with the government's
labor and austerity policies by either casting blank
ballots or voting for opposition candidates. 93 Frondizi
was thus anxious to speed up the implementation of his
road building and steel development programs and, on
several occasions, he raised this subject with Ambassador
Beaulac, expressing his disappointment at the lack of




Frondizi's position was further complicated by
divisions in his own government over the adequate bal
between development and stabilization. whereas Frigerio
and his followers considered these two issues as
intrinsically related, Alsogaray viewed stabilization as
an end in itself and thus was reluctant to push forward
Frondizi's plans to develop the country's iron and steel
industry, hydroelectric resources, highways and airports
on the grounds that such projects would add an unnecessary
burden to the budget. 95
As preparations for the inter-American meetings moved
forward, Frondizi decided to make a new appeal for help to
President Eisenhower through a letter which was delivered
on August 16. After describing the great sacrifices that
the stabilization program had imposed on the Argentine
population and stressing the political cost that his
government had had to pay for it, Frondizi expressed his
concern that, without prompt financial assistance, the
program would flounder and all these sacrifices would have
been made in vain. He then forcibly stated his
disappointment at the lack of U.S. response to his
repeated appeals for assistance in the fields of highway
construction, hydroelectric power and steel industry
development. He urged Washington to give prompt attention
to Argentina's requests for urgently needed aid. 96
Frondizi's appeal for help was backed by similar
approaches made by Argentine government officials to high-
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level U.S. functionaries during the OAS meeting at Costa
Rica. u.S officials listened sympathetically to these
requests, but they made it nloa-i- +-v^+-y du x c ear that economic matters
should not become involved with the problems under
discussion at the OAS conference. 97
Eisenhower sent an immediate response, reassuring
Frondizi of Washington's continuing support for his
Administration and indicating that he would discuss the
President's letter in detail with his advisers.
Eisenhower's answer was delivered by U.S. Charge d'Affairs
Maurice Bernbaum, who took advantage of this opportunity
to have a long and frank conversation with Frondizi. The
Argentine President said that he had made his plea to
Eisenhower "in desperation and with some frustration." He
indicated that he had been under the impression that the
U.S government was as interested as his own in the success
of Argentina's stabilization and development program, and
he was thus unable to understand why it had delayed so
long in responding to his repeated requests for
assistance. 98
Frondizi then commented that Argentina and the U.S.
were "in the same boat", since the failure of Argentina's
program would be interpreted by other Latin American
countries as a failure of the kind of approach advocated
by Washington and would consequently contribute to
strengthen those who advocated the Cuban way. The
President reaffirmed his determination to carry the
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stabilization program forward, but he added that, although
he had not hesitated to take any necessary measures to
quell terrorism and subversively-motivated strikes, he was
not prepared to suppress with bullets the demonstrations
of unemployed masses motivated by hunger. He thus needed
U.S. help to launch his highway construction program,
which was expected to serve the dual purpose of furthering
the nation's economic development and absorbing unemployed
workers. Frondizi then referred to the problems created
by U.S. trade policy, specifically mentioning the surplus
disposal program, and the restrictions on Argentine
exports to the United States such as meat, tung oil, and
quebracho extract. He finished his comments expressing
his hope that satisfactory solutions would be found for
the problems that he had mentioned."
Bernbaum expressed surprise over Frondizi 's apparent
belief that the United States was not doing enough for
Argentina. He reassured Frondizi that his appeals had
received the most sympathetic attention in Washington, and
he indicated that there had obviously been some kind of
misunderstanding concerning the procedure to follow, since
U.S. government officials had long been awaiting the
presentation of specific proposals from Argentina. 100
Frondizi ironically remarked that there had indeed
been a lack of communication, since he had thought that,
after all the studies made by the IMF, the IBRD, the EXIM-
Bank and various others, the extent of Argentina's
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requirements should be pretty well known to the United
States. it had not occurred to him that it would be
necessary for Argentina to spell out her needs or to
present carefully worked out and time-consuming projects,
since it was pretty obvious that she could use any amount
of help available, and it was up to the United states to
decide how much it could give. He was, however, ready to
discuss his program and the possibilities of financing at
any time and with any one designated by the U.S.
government. 101
Bernbaum explained that the United States government
had become a very large organization, which inevitably
involved the need for certain bureaucratic procedures to
prevent chaos, though he also added that he did not
discount the possibility of certain "inspirational
decisions" being taken at the top level from time to time.
Frondizi remarked that one of these "inspired decisions"
had apparently just been made with Eisenhower's
announcement of a $600 million program for Latin America,
and he indicated that it seemed to have been inspired by
Castro's intransigence. 102 in subsequent conversations,
it was arranged that Argentina would forward complete
documentation on its highway, airport, and housing
construction projects through its Embassy in Washington
for preliminary discussions with U.S. officials. 103
Meanwhile, in Costa Rica, the Sixth OAS Meeting of
Consultation had concluded. The delegates found the
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Trujillo regime guilty of the charges brought by the
Venezuelan government and had thus adopted a resolution
recommending that OAS member states break diplomatic
relations and partially interrupt economic relations with
the Dominican Republic. The U.S. delegation had voted
affirmatively, thus joining the majority. 104
Subsequently, the delegates began the Seventh Meeting
which had been convoked to consider the Cuban situation.
Washington hoped to obtain a resolution condemning Cuba
and, if possible, recommending sanctions similar to the
ones that had just been applied to the Dominican Republic.
The majority of the Latin American delegates, however,
were not enthusiastic about this idea and, according to
Herter's report, the initial atmosphere of the Conference
was "rather tense, with the U.s almost isolated and viewed
with skepticism." 105
Eventually, the U.S. delegation had to modify its
expectations and agree on a weaker declaration to get at
least the necessary fourteen votes. The resolution, as
finally adopted, condemned intervention in the Western
Hemisphere by any extra-continental power, but it did not
make any specific mention of Cuba. Upon returning to
Washington, Herter gave President Eisenhower a general
report on the conference. The Secretary indicated that he
would have liked to see a much stronger declaration passed
but that, given the circumstances, the one obtained was
the best possible. The Secretary singled out the
Venezuelan, Peruvian and Mexican Foreign Ministers as the
most uncooperative, and he referred to the Argentine and
Colombian delegations as the ones who had given the
strongest support to the U.S. position. 106
In the first week of September, the OAS Committee of
21 met again to discuss proposals for economic development
projects. The Eisenhower Administration planned to use
this meeting to announce the creation of a $500 million
Social Progress Trust Fund for Latin America. This Fund,
administered by the IADB, would make loans repayable in
local currencies for projects aimed at strengthening the
social infrastructure of Latin America by improving rural
life, the use of farm land, housing, health care, and
education. Three days after the conference started, the
U.S. Congress authorized the $500 million appropriation
that the President had requested. 107
The U.S. announcement was welcomed by the Latin
Americans as a step in the right direction, but they were
disappointed at the modest volume of the funds involved.
Clearly, there was an enormous distance between the U.S.
offer and the much more ambitious projects envisioned by
Operation Pan America. Moreover, leaders like Frondizi
and Kubitschek questioned the usefulness and purpose of
Eisenhower's fund, pointing out that social assistance was
only a palliative and that the way to true social
improvement lay in the creation of an economic
infrastructure that could generate self-sustaining growth,
create jobs, and help project the Latin American countrie
into the developed world. 108
Under Secretary of state Douglas Dillon tried to
assuage any Latin American misgivings by indicating that
the $500 million authorization was only the first
installment of "large additional resources for the
inauguration and carrying forward of a broad new social
development program for Latin America, dedicated to
supporting the self-help efforts of the governments and
peoples of Latin America.- 109 Finally, on September 13,
the Committee approved the Act of Bogota with only Cuba
abstaining. 110 Small as it might seem to the Latin
Americans, this gesture by the Eisenhower Administration
represented a turning point in its Latin American policy
as well as a tacit recognition that trade, foreign
investment, and self-help would not, in and of themselves
suffice to bring about the desired level of economic
development and social change in Latin America.
On September 7, President Eisenhower had sent a
letter to Frondizi in which he restated Washington's
determination to continue supporting Argentina's economic
program to the fullest extent feasible. Eisenhower also
invited the Argentine President to submit his government'
highway proposal to the appropriate U.S. authorities. He
suggested that Argentine officials could hold preliminary
discussions with Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon
at Bogota and, that subsequently, the Argentine Minister
of Economy could come to Washington to discuss specific
proposals. 111
At the end of September, Alsogaray travelled to the
United States to explore the possibility of loans with
EXIM-Bank, IBRD, and U.S. government officials. in his
conversations with these functionaries, Alsogaray stressed
his government's intention to promote private activity in
the fields of oil, steel, petrochemicals, pulp and paper
and transportation and to concentrate its activities on
sectors for which private capital was not available, such
as road-building and housing. He informed them that
Argentina did not contemplate direct government building,
but was rather looking for financial assistance to private
domestic and foreign builders. Alsogaray then described
steps recently taken by the government to increase private
capital participation in the Buenos Aires Dock Sud power
project and in SOMISA. On September 6, Frondizi had sent
a project to Congress to modify law 12.987, in order to
eliminate the provisions that gave Fabricaciones Militares
majority control over the steel complex. Alsogaray also
discussed Argentina's plans to reorganize and modernize
its armed forces, and he reguested U.S. financial
assistance in this area. 112
In October, Frondizi was confronted with a new
military crisis. Originally triggered by the opposition
of some military groups to YPF's announcement that it
would offer contracts to foreign companies for the
development of petroleum fields in the southern part of
the country, the crisis soon widened and became the
occasion for the military to express all of their
grievances against the government, particularly as regards
charges of graft, corruption, and Communist and Peronist
infiltration in governmental agencies and educational
institutions. The Army issued an ultimatum to Frondizi
and tensions escalated reaching a dangerous peak. At that
point, however, Frondizi once again managed to out-
maneuver his opponents and, with Aramburu's mediation, he
worked out a compromise with the armed forces. 113
By the end of 1960, Frondizi 's economic plan was
beginning to show some results. The recession and record
inflation of 1959 began to decline and the economy grew by
8 percent in 1960 and 7.1 percent in 1961. The rate of
inflation declined to 27.1 percent in 1960 and 13.7
percent in 1961 and real wages gradually started to
recover. Oil production shot up, increasing by 43.2
percent in 1960, 32.3 percent in 1961 and 16.3 percent in
1962. By 1963, Argentina's production met 90 percent of
the country's needs. 114
At the end of 1960, the IMF and U.S. Treasury credits
were extended again, and the remaining loans from U.S.
banks were refinanced. Argentina was granted a $94
million loan for highway construction, with the EXIM-Bank
contributing $40 million, the IBRD $48.5 million, and the
DLF $6 million. Subsequently, the EXIM-Bank also
authorized a $12 million loan for SOMISA and a $13 million
loan for SEGBA. By March of 1961, Argentina's gold and
foreign exchange reserves had increased to almost $600
million. 115
Frondizi's determined bid for foreign capital had
also begun to show results and, between 1959 and 1961, an
estimated $369 million was invested in Argentina,
predominantly by U.S. firms. Most of this investment was
used to build new industries, with automobiles, metals and
petrochemicals leading the way. After a 10.3 percent
decline in 1959, industrial production increased by 10.1
percent in both 1960 and 1961. The number of motor
vehicles manufactured domestically rose from 6,000 in 1956
to 125,000 in 1963. Production of tractors went up from
8,500 in 1958 to 13,600 in 1965. In January of 1961,
Frondizi inaugurated the San Nicolas steel plant. The
country's crude steel production rose from 280,000 tons in
1960 to 900,000 tons in 1963 and 1,37 million tons in
1965, and pig iron production increased from 40,000 tons
in 1955 to 180,000 in 1960 and 425,000 in 1963. 116
But all these encouraging signs were only a part of
the picture. Many problems still remained to be solved.
For one thing, Frondizi failed to overcome Argentina's by
then chronic foreign-exchange problem. After a small
surplus in 1959 attained mostly as a result of shrinking
imports, the trade deficit shot up again reaching $170
million in 1960 and it continued to increase in the
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following years as a result of a sharp rise in the imports
of machinery, motors and vehicles which resulted from the
expansion of industrial activities. As usual, the
negative balance was predominantly concentrated in the
dollar area. Dollar imports were $203 million in 1958,
$191 million in 1959, and $327 million in 1960, while
exports to the United States declined from $128 million to
$107 million and $90 million respectively. 117
The foreign exchange problem was aggravated by the
country's growing foreign debt, which tripled under
Frondizi, as well as by increased profit remittances, and
royalty and patent payments from the new foreign
investments. By 1961, Argentina's balance-of-payments
deficit had climbed to $572 million. Meanwhile,
agricultural output and exports had continued to decline.
Between 1958 and 1962, agriculture grew by a mere 1.5
percent annually. Meat exports fell from 655,000 tons in
1958 to 524,000 tons in 1959 and 438,000 tons in 1960.
Exports of wheat went down from 2,679 million tons in 1957
to 2,486 million tons in 1960, a dismal performance if
compared to the 3,313 million ton volume of the pre-war
period. 118
Compounding the disappointing performance in the
external sector was the government's failure to reduce the
public-sector deficit, which averaged 23.1 percent between
1958 and 1962. Frondizi ' s plans to cut down the
substantial losses of the state railroads and other
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enterprises through the elimination of redundant personnel
were constantly thwarted by strong labor union resistance
and the government's own reluctance to bear the heavy
political cost that such a step might have. Moreover, the
expansion of industry had not led to any significant
increase in employment in the private sector because the
new industries were mostly capital rather than labor
intensive. in fact, the government's achievements in the
economic field did little to stem popular discontent or to
help Frondizi win the confidence of the military and
successive crises would continue to complicate the
administration's task for the remainder of Frondizi 's stay
in office. 119
Meanwhile, relationships between the United States
and Cuba had continued to deteriorate. Washington had
stepped up pressure on Cuba by imposing a total embargo on
U.S. exports to the island and recalling its Ambassador
from Habana. Castro had concurrently expropriated all
remaining U.S. property in Cuba, and he had begun to
receive arms from the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower
Administration had continued with its covert plans to
overthrow Castro while, at the same time, intensifying
efforts to obtain OAS support for collective action
against Cuba. 120
In December, Ambassador William Pawley called on the
Presidents of Peru and Argentina to explore the
possibility of calling another OAS meeting to discuss
sanctions against Cuba. On his return, Pawley informed
Eisenhower that, although both Presidents had taken strong
anti-Castro stands, they had indicated that it would be
very difficult for most Latin American governments to
publicly support action against Cuba, since such a stance
would bring strong popular reactions in their countries.
When discussing the results of the Pawley mission with
State Department officer Livingston Merchant and White
House Staff Secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster,
Eisenhower admitted that, given the circumstances, a
formal OAS Meeting would not be advisable, but he pointed
out that, if leaders like Frondizi and Prado were
concerned about the effects of Castroism, they should make
an effort to convince other countries to ask the U.S. to
take the initiative in removing Castro from power. 121
By the time he stepped down from power, Eisenhower
had not yet been able to resolve the Cuban issue. His
Administration had, however, initiated important changes
in the U.S. policy towards Latin America, and it had laid
the institutional foundations on which the new
Administration, led by John Fitzgerald Kennedy, would
build its much more ambitious program embodied in the
Alliance for Progress.
The advent of the Kennedy Administration seemed to
offer new hopes and possibilities for countries like
Argentina. Shortly after his inauguration, President
Kennedy announced his intention to launch a $20 billion
aid program, the Alliance for Progress, aimed at fostering
rapid economic growth, social change and political reform
in Latin America. This announcement was welcomed by
Frondizi, who expected to obtain increased funds for his
development projects under the new aid program. The
Argentine President was, however, concerned with the
Alliance's excessive emphasis on social projects to the
detriment of other issues, such as expanded export trade,
commodity price stabilization, and industrial investment,
the solution of which he regarded as essential to the
achievement of the aims set up by the Alliance.
On different occasions, Kennedy and Frondizi
discussed these and other issues related to Latin American
affairs and they developed a friendly relationship which
was strengthened by Frondizi 's two visits to the United
States in 1961. The Argentine President also attempted to
mediate in the conflict between the United States and
Cuba, as well as in the negotiations carried out among OAS
members regarding the course to follow with respect to the
Cuban issue. Argentina's role in these complex and
sensitive bargaining processes still remains to be
clarified because the pertinent documents have not yet
become available.
On the domestic front, Frondizi' s position continued
to deteriorate and, for the rest of his Administration,
the President walked on an increasingly precarious
tightrope between the armed forces and organized labor.
In 1961, the Peronist unions mounted a campaign to resist
further layoffs in state enterprises and to demand wage
readjustments. July, October, and November were marked by
a wave of strikes which culminated with a six-week
railroad stoppage. Frondizi, with an eye on the coming
congressional and gubernatorial elections, was reluctant
to follow the hard line he had adopted on previous
occasions, and he eventually negotiated a settlement by
granting some of the workers' demands.
Meanwhile, his relationships with the military had
also worsened, predominantly as a result of a series of
crises related to the President's conduct of foreign
policy. The Argentine armed forces, obsessed with the
idea of a Communist conspiracy and particularly concerned
about the impact of the Cuban example, wanted to align
Argentina clearly and unequivocally on the side of
Washington in its dealings with Cuba and the OAS.
Consequently, they strongly opposed Frondizi 's attempts to
play arbiter between Washington and Havana, and they were
determined to prevent the return of anything that
resembled Peron's Third Position.
The conflict over foreign policy reached a climax
over the conduct of the Argentine delegation at the OAS
Conference held at Punta del Este in January of 1961 to
discuss sanctions against Cuba under the Rio Treaty. The
Argentine delegation supported eight of the nine
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resolutions adopted by the Conference but, together with
Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador, it abstained
on the resolution that proposed the expulsion of Cuba from
the OAS on the grounds that, in order to make this
expulsion legal, the OAS Charter would have to be
modified. The Argentine military were infuriated, and
they presented Frondizi with an ultimatum as a result of
which the President was forced to break diplomatic
relations with Cuba. Although Frondizi had, once again,
given way to the pressures of the military and accepted
their demands in order to remain in power, this incident
contributed to cristalyze their distrust of the President
and to reinforce their conviction that, sooner or later,
Frondizi would have to go.
A month later, the outcome of the Congressional and
gubernatorial elections triggered another crisis which
eventually led to Frondizi 's removal from power. The
government had decided to allow neo-Peronist parties to
participate in the election in the hope that the UCRI
candidates would defeat them and thus put an end to
Peron's continuing influence on the Argentine political
process. This gamble, however, proved fatal. The
Peronists carried ten out of the fourteen provinces in
dispute, including Buenos Aires. Their victory left
Frondizi in a difficult position, since the armed forces
would never have accepted a Peronist return to power.
Under pressure from the military, Frondizi annulled the
elections, but this act was not enough to calm the
military who demanded that the President offer his
resignation. When he refused, he was deposed, arrested,
and imprisoned, and a military-controlled regime headed by
the President of the Senate Jose Maria Guido assumed
power. With Frondizi's departure, one more attempt to
break the cycle of political instability and economic
stagnation in which the country had become trapped, had
come to an end.
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This dissertation covers a period that now, with the
benefit of hindsight, we know to have been crucial for the
history of Argentina; the developments that took place
during that period have had consequences that are visible
to the present day. At the end of World War II, Argentina
seemed to be in a favorable position to make the
transition from an economy highly dependent on foreign
markets to a more autonomous and modern industrial one.
The process of transition, however, proved to be more
difficult than what contemporary observers had anticipated
and, by the i960 's, the country had become caught up in a
persistent stop-go cycle characterized by recurrent
balance-of-trade difficulties, chronic inflation and
disruptive political instability.
The problems faced by Argentina were, in many ways,
similar to those experienced by other semi-industrialized,
middle-income developing countries. For one thing, the
postwar international trading structure had become
increasingly less flexible and open than the one in which
Argentina had prospered in the previous period. Although
trade between the industrialized countries has grown
significantly, the developing countries share of total
global trade has fallen in every year since 1950 as a
result of the inelasticities in the demand for primary
commodities and the protectionist measures instituted by
the developed countries. Like most other Third World
producers of agricultural commodities and raw materials,
Argentina was unable to maintain the level of exports
necessary to finance essential imports. This problem was
aggravated by the secular tendency of the prices for
primary products to decline relative to manufactured
goods. Thus, in the period under study, Argentina's
deteriorating trade position combined with the increasing
demand for imports fueled by industrialization resulted in
recurrent balance-of-payment problems which have had very
negative effects on the country's economic development.
The problems in the external sector were aggravated
by domestic factors. The policies adopted by the three
different governments studied in this dissertation failed
to bring about sustained growth and to restore political
stability. By resorting to indiscriminate import-
substitution industrialization policies without first
trying to develop the country's basic industries and
resources or expanding the country's exports, Peron helped
worsen the problem of Argentina's external dependence and
foreign exchange constraints. His policies also
accelerated the declining trend in agriculture, unleashed
inflationary pressures, and expanded inefficient and
deficit-ridden state enterprises. His failure to
reinstate economic growth combined with his increasingly
authoritarian and repressive tactics intensified social
and political tensions.
420
The military government that followed Peron intended
to restore prosperity by opening up the economy, removing
state controls, rebuilding agricultural production for
exports, reconstructing the country's infrastructure and
balancing the budget. The policies they adopted, however,
failed to produce the expected results and only aggravated
the social, political and economic problems of the
country. The devaluation failed to bring about the
expected fast recovery of agricultural production and,
with the terms of trade at their lowest level since the
1930's, returns from exports continued to diminish while
the decontrol of imports resulted in a flood of foreign
products. The government's persecution and repression of
Peronist sympathizers and union leaders, combined with the
drastic transfer of income in favor of the upper classes
which resulted from the devaluation, had very damaging
effects since it alienated the working class and only
served to strengthen Peron 's influence over the country's
political processes. As the economy continued to
stagnate, the struggle over distributive income shares
became highly politicized and took on a zero-sum
characteristic that has persisted to this day making
attempts to reconcile conflicting demands over the remains
of a shrinking pie next to impossible.
This problem became particularly acute during the
Frondizi period and his efforts to restore stability with
growth foundered in the midst of raging social and
political tensions seriously aggravated by the harsh
effects of the austerity plan and by the military's
intransigence toward any concessions to the Peronists.
Frondizi's efforts to transform Argentina's economic
structure by accelerating the development of selected
basic-industry sectors through foreign investments and
loans also failed to bring about the desired transition.
The inflow of foreign capital was not sufficient and did
not last long enough to create a sustained impulse in the
growth of the economy and, when the rate of foreign
investment began to decline, the outlays required by
profit remittances and loan repayments added a further
burden to the foreign exchange bottleneck. This situation
was aggravated by the continuing declining trend in
exports. Thus, a recurrent cycle of periods of fast
growth followed by sharp recessions became the dominant
characteristic of the Argentine economy. This pattern was
aggravated by a persistent stalemate between opposing
political forces that made consistent, long-term economic
planning next to impossible. Torn apart by political
chaos, Argentina was unable to mobilize her human and
natural resources to master her chronic social and
economic problems.
Throughout this period Argentina's relationships to
the United States became increasingly important as the
Southern nation grew more and more dependent on U.S.
capital goods, technology and financial capital for the
422
implementation of her development programs. The
relationships between the two countries had reached their
lowest level during World War II and the early postwar
period but, during the Eisenhower years they began to
evolve in a more positive direction. The process of
rapprochement, however, was slow, difficult and uneven and
a combination of cultural misunderstandings, mutual
mistrusts rooted in past experiences, persisting
stereotypes, and structural constraints complicated the
efforts made by both sides to find satisfactory solutions
to the problems afflicting the relationship.
One of the main characteristics of the relationship
between the two countries has been its asymmetry. Whereas
decisions made in Washington have a strong impact on
political and economic developments in Argentina, the
reverse is not the case, since for the United States
Argentina is a country of peripheral importance which only
acquires significance in the context of the influence that
the policies followed by her leaders might have on inter-
American relations. The consequences of this situation
become evident when one analyzes the way in which policies
were made by the governments of each country during this
period. The fact that Argentina (and, in fact, Latin
America in general) held a very low priority for the
United States meant that issues concerning the Southern
country seldom came to the attention of the President or
even of the Secretary of State and were, in turn, decided
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by minor functionaries in different government agencies.
As a consequence, the policy followed became very
compartmentalized and was often dominated by
technicalities rather than by an overall guiding purpose.
State Department officials in charge of dealing with
Argentina often pointed out that the Administration seemed
to be undoing with one hand what it was trying to do with
the other. The way in which decisions on trade issues
concerning Argentina were made provides a very good
example of this. it was only in moments of crisis that
the decision-making process became centralized and
policies could be coordinated. This becomes very clear as
we have shown when examining the developments that served
as the background to each successive loan granted to
Argentina
.
For Argentina, on the other hand, relationships with
the United States were of primary importance and,
consequently, the U.S. lack of attention or failure to
follow up on issues that seemed vital to her became a very
sensitive matter and a source of constant frustration for
Argentine functionaries and people in general. As a
consequence, issues involving the United States often
became highly politicized making it very difficult for
Argentine officials to move forward in the implementation
of what they viewed as pragmatic policy decisions. The
difficulties faced by successive Argentine presidents in
their attempts to resolve the problems of petroleum
development and electricity are clear examples of this
problem.
Cultural misunderstandings and ideological
divergencies resulting from very different historical
experiences contributed to complicate the process of
communication, often leading to actions that seemed
intended to defeat their own purposes. in fact, in the
course of this period, we see the participants apparently
moving in circles, endlessly negotiating and arguing over
the same issues without ever seeming to come to any action
and making constant commitments to modify behavioral
patterns that none of them seems to want and yet keeps
repeating. For one thing, the ideology of individualism
and the belief that anyone can succeed in life if only he
or she works hard enough is a strong component in U.S.
culture which influences the way in which U.S.
functionaries view other countries. This ideology often
leads U.S. officials to ignore or dismiss the structural
constraints faced by the Latin American countries and to
argue that most of the difficulties they face are the
result of their own mistakes and can be solved simply by
working harder. The Latin Americans, on the other hand,
often tend to go to the other extreme and wait for magical
solutions to come from outside. Moreover, the
contradictions between ideologies promoted and practices
followed contribute to deepen misunderstandings and
exacerbate ill-feelings. Thus, U.S. officials keep
constantly upholding the virtues of free trade and arguing
that the solution of all problems will come through trade
liberalization while, at the same time, they keep raising
the barriers to Argentine exports. Or we see Peron
repeatedly assuring the United States of his desire to
improve his relationships with Washington and then turning
his back and making anti-U.S. speeches. Or the Aramburu
Administration praising the advantages of privatization
and foreign investment and then cancelling the petroleum
contracts and nationalizing the electricity companies.
Although all these actions may have had perfectly
understandable domestic political motivations, they
contributed little to mutual understanding and led to
feelings of frustration and disillusionment. The cost for
these mistakes was obviously higher for Argentina since
she needed the United States more than the United States
needed her. Lack of understanding of the operational
processes of the other country and internal divisions
among government officials also contributed to
communication failures. A good example of this was the
inability of successive Argentine governments to speak to
U.S representatives with one voice or to submit concrete
and well developed projects.
The three Argentine governments studied in this
dissertation, each with very different political agendas
and economic programs, tried to enlist the collaboration
of both the U.S. government and private investors for
Argentina's economic development programs. m the three
cases, the U.S. response was basically the same and
apparent variations responded more to developments
external to Argentina than to the changes in Argentina
itself. As a price for its help, the Eisenhower
Administration demanded two things: unequivocal adherence
to anti-communism and promotion of free trade, private
enterprise and foreign investment. Argentine leaders,
aware of the realities of power politics in international
relations, were willing to go along with the U.S.
requests. However, although they made considerable
progress in meeting the first demand and collaboration
between the two countries on issues related to fighting
Communism in the hemisphere improved significantly, they
faced serious problems in meeting the second, as
ideological and political constraints on the domestic
front limited their range of action. As a consequence,
although the relationships improved significantly, there
was very little change in the economic field.
It is nevertheless true that the Eisenhower
Administration did liberalize its policies toward
Argentina as part of a changing view towards the needs of
the entire hemisphere. Aware of the bottlenecks to
expanding trade, the U.S. government made increased loan
funds available through domestic and international
institutions. Unfortunately, this was only a second best
solution for ultimately only by expanding their exports
could the recipient countries pay off the loans. Trade
problems remained a sore point in the relationships
between Argentina and the United States throughout the
period and economic assistance and investment, though
progressively increasing, never reached a high enough
level to meet the expectations of Argentine policy-makers
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